SC Johnson & Son, Inc. v. THE DIAL CORP.

571 F. Supp. 2d 984, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47383, 2008 WL 3582637
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJune 18, 2008
Docket07-cv-689-bbc
StatusPublished

This text of 571 F. Supp. 2d 984 (SC Johnson & Son, Inc. v. THE DIAL CORP.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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SC Johnson & Son, Inc. v. THE DIAL CORP., 571 F. Supp. 2d 984, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47383, 2008 WL 3582637 (W.D. Wis. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

BARBARA B. CRABB, District Judge.

Plaintiff S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. and defendant Dial Corporation compete in the home air freshener market. Plaintiff Con-sultoria Técnica e Representatoes, LDA owns United States Patent No. 6,487,367, which relates to technology for multi-scent, plug-in, scented oil, home air fresheners. It has granted an exclusive license to plaintiff S.C. Johnson. Plaintiffs accuse defendant’s Renuzit Tri Scents product of infringing claims 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 13, 14, 18, 21, 22 and 28 of the '367 patent. Claim 1 is an independent claim and the remaining asserted claims depend from it. On June 5, 2008 the parties presented their positions at a claims construction hearing at which the meanings of the following six claim terms were contested: (1) heating block; (2) wick opening; (3) wick recess; (4) extending through; (5) evaporation temperature; (6) thermal separator disposed between said wick openings for partial thermal disconnection of said heating units.

OPINION

The well established process for claim construction begins with examination of the claims language. The language is given its ordinary meaning as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the relevant art, given its context and the other patent claims. Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2001). This initial construction is then considered in light of the specification to determine whether the inventor expressed a different meaning for the language, whether the preferred embodiment is consistent with the initial interpretation or whether the inventor specifically disclaimed certain subject matter. Id. at 1342-43. Finally, the interpretation is examined for consistency with the patent’s prosecution history and any disclaimers made therein. Id.

A. Heating Block: a single piece of material that contains wick openings and conducts heat to them.

I conclude that the term “heating block” as used in claim 1 of the '367 patent means a single piece of material that contains wick openings and conducts heat to them. The parties agree that a heating block would be understood to be a single structure that conveys heat to the wick openings. However, plaintiffs advocate a slightly broader construction, contending that a heating block is not limited to a single piece of material, but also encompasses multi-part structures. Defendant argues for a narrower construction, contending that the term includes additional limitations that the block be a single mass of ceramic, that it heat all wick openings simultaneously and that it have one flat side. I reject both plaintiffs’ attempt to broaden and defendant’s attempt to narrow the construction as inconsistent with the claims, specification and prosecution history.

1. Heating block as permitting multiple components.

The word “block” generally implies a single piece of material. In their opening claims construction brief, plaintiffs themselves espouse a definition of the word block limited to a single piece of material: “Webster’s also notes that a block may be a piece of material altered for use as ‘the casting that surrounds material for an internal combustion engine’ ” Pits.’ Opening *987 Claim Constr. Br. at 16 (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 235, (2002 ed.)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, plaintiffs’ expert testified that in the context of a heating block, the word block is used in a manner similar to the terms engine or cylinder block, which typically refer to a single metal casting. I conclude that the patentee used the term block in this sense, as a single piece of material altered for a particular use.

Other references within the claims themselves are consistent with this definition. Claim 1 refers to openings or recesses “formed within” the block. Claim 9 describes an opening as a “bore extending through” the block. Claim 26 refers to a heating element “encapsulated” within the block. These references suggest that the block is a single piece of material altered to accommodate its purpose as a heating block. The specification and drawings disclose only a block made up of a single piece of material. In support of their preferred definition, plaintiffs note that the specification, col. 5, lines 44-50, discusses the installation of the heating element by insertion into a hole in the block. Plaintiffs argue that this proves that the heating block is a multi-component structure. Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, these references are entirely consistent with the block itself being a single piece of material adapted to a purpose. Just as pistons and other engine components are inserted into an engine block, the heating element and thermal separator may be inserted into the heating block without becoming a component of the block itself.

Plaintiffs’ concern with construing the heating block as a single piece of material apparently arises from conjecture that defendant’s heating block is constructed from separate pieces of molded plastic and that defendant will argue that its block is not a single piece of material. Whether defendant’s blocks contain such a structure and whether such a block would constitute a single piece of material (or equivalent), are questions beyond the scope of claims construction. However, the requirement that the heating block of the '367 patent is a single piece of material is inescapable in light of the language of the patent and specification and plaintiffs’ own evidence.

2. Heating block as ceramic only.

Defendant contends that the term “heating block” includes a limitation that the construction material must be ceramic because the only material disclosed in the specification is ceramic. Because that argument is contrary to the fundamental rules of patent construction, I will not accept it.

There is nothing in the claims specifying or limiting heating block materials. Although the specification provides for a ceramic block in the preferred embodiment, it also contemplates that other materials may be used. For example, the specification explains that the location of heating elements for proper heating of the block is important “especially where, in a preferred embodiment, a ceramic heating block is used.” Col. 4, fines 7-9. Requiring the block to be ceramic would be an inappropriate importation of a preferred embodiment feature into the claims. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2005). Even if, as defendant suggests, ceramic was known by those of skill in the art to be the best material for heating blocks, that is no reason to read a limitation into the claims that the patentee did not include. One of ordinary skill in the art would surely know that materials other than ceramic could also be used to conduct heat.

3. Heating block as requiring simultaneous emission.

The claims language and specification do not support a limitation that the *988

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571 F. Supp. 2d 984, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47383, 2008 WL 3582637, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sc-johnson-son-inc-v-the-dial-corp-wiwd-2008.