SB1 Federal Credit Union v. Finsecure LLC

14 F. Supp. 3d 651, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49596, 2014 WL 1395036
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 9, 2014
DocketCivil Action No. 13-6399
StatusPublished

This text of 14 F. Supp. 3d 651 (SB1 Federal Credit Union v. Finsecure LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SB1 Federal Credit Union v. Finsecure LLC, 14 F. Supp. 3d 651, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49596, 2014 WL 1395036 (E.D. Pa. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

PADOVA, District Judge.

Plaintiff Sbl Federal Credit Union (“Sbl”) commenced this action against Defendants FinSecure LLC and Berkley Regional Insurance Company after Defendants denied coverage for damages that Plaintiff sustained as a result of fraudulent wire transfers. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we grant the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The Complaint alleges that Sbl is a registered credit union serving members in the United States and abroad. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.) Defendant Berkley Regional Insurance Company issued a Credit Union Bond (the “Policy”) to Sbl. (Id. ¶ 51.) The Policy was effective from February 11, 2013 to February 11, 2016 (the “Policy Period”), and provided $1,000,000 in coverage for “Forgery or Alteration of an Instrument”; $5,000,000 in “Funds Transfer” coverage; $5,000,000 in “Faithful Performance” coverage; and $6,000,000 in “Employee or Director Dishonesty” coverage. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.) Defendant FinSecure is the underwriter for the Policy, and the Policy requires FinSecure to pay for covered losses incurred by Sbl during the Policy Period. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 53.)

A. The Underlying Fraud

In December 1988, an individual (“Member”) applied for membership with Sbl. (Id. ¶ 11.) In doing so, Member provided Sbl with his address, telephone number, social security number, date of birth, and other identifying information. (Id.) Member also opened a checking account with Sbl and provided a specimen of his signature. (Id. ¶ 13.) Member authorized Sbl to recognize any of the signatures sub[653]*653scribed to the account in payment of funds or in the transaction of business for the account. (Id. ¶ 14.) Member also regularly managed his accounts with Sbl electronically. (Id. ¶ 15.)

On July 2, 2013, an Sbl employee received an email from Member’s email address, from an individual purporting to be Member. (Id. ¶21.) The individual requested that Sbl wire $70,000 from Member’s checking account to another account in Thailand pursuant to instructions attached to the email. (Id. ¶ 22.) The Sbl employee filled out a wire request form and emailed the form to the individual, instructing him to sign the form and send it back with a copy of his driver’s license or passport. (Id. ¶ 23.) Shortly before the close of business that day, the individual purporting to be Member faxed the completed form back to Sbl, but also sent an e-mail stating that he did not have the ability to make and provide a copy of his driver’s license or passport because he was travelling. (Id. ¶24.) The Sbl employee was aware of Sbl’s wire transfer policy (the “Wire Transfer Policy”), which requires telephone verification on a recorded line, in a call initiated by the credit union, for all wire transactions of credit union funds to a non-credit union account.1 (Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 25.) However, the Sbl employee did not perform the required callback procedure. (Id. ¶ 25.) Instead, based on her past experience with Member and relying on Sbl’s signature verification procedure, the employee responded that the transfer request could be processed, noting that Sbl had Member’s signature on file and Member had authorized Sbl in his membership agreement to recognize his signature in the transaction of any business for his account. (Id. ¶ 26.) The transfer request was processed that same day. (Id. ¶ 27.)

On July 9, 2013, the Sbl employee again received an email from Member’s email, from an individual purporting to be Member. (Id. ¶ 28.) The individual stated that he expected a large deposit into his checking account that week and asked to be advised of the balances in his account. (Id. ¶ 29.) In an email response, the Sbl employee advised the individual of the current balances in Member’s accounts. (Id. ¶ 30.) About an hour later, the employee received another email from Member’s email account. (Id. ¶ 31.) In that email, the individual purporting to be Member stated that he had an ongoing business deal in Thailand that he needed to complete that week, and he asked that Sbl wire him $128,000 from his savings account to a different bank in Thailand. (Id. ¶ 32.) The employee again filled out a wire request form and sent it via email to the individual purporting to be Member for his signature. (Id. ¶ 33.) The individual returned the signed form and the employee processed the wire request, again without following Sbl’s Wire Transfer Policy. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.)

On July 15, 2013, the Sbl employee received a third email from Member’s email, again from the individual purporting to be Member. (Id. ¶ 36.) The individual stated that he believed the large deposit had not [654]*654yet been deposited, but that he had been notified of the delay. (Id. ¶ 37.) He then asked that Sbl wire $65,000 to an account in Singapore to help pay expenses related to a house he owned in France. (Id. ¶ 38.) The Sbl employee followed the same procedure that she had followed on July 2 and July 9, and processed the wire transfer request that day. (Id. ¶ 39.)

On July 16, 2013, Member called to speak with the Sbl employee about the activity on his account. (Id. ¶ 40.) Member stated that the wire transfers were fraudulent and put his statement in writing. (Id. ¶ 41.) Sbl filed a police report with the local police department, and that report was forwarded to the Commercial Affairs Department in Singapore. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.) Despite its best efforts, Sbl has been unable to recover the money. (Id. ¶ 44.)

B. The Policy Provisions

The Policy, which is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, contains several, separately defined “Insuring Agreements.” A “Funds Transfer” Insuring Agreement provides coverage for

(0)(1) Loss resulting directly from fraudulent instruction through E-mail, Telefacsimile or Telephonic means received by the Insured from a person who purports to be the Accountholder, the Accountholder’s authorized representative or an Employee but is not the Accountholder, provided:
(a) the Insured performed a Callback Verification with respect to such instruction, or
(b) the Insured followed a commercially reasonable security procedure set forth in a written funds transfer agreement, signed by the Account-holder or the Accountholder’s authorized representative, that governs the transaction and instruction.

(Id. ¶ 64.)

A “Forgery or Alteration” Insuring Agreement provides coverage for “loss resulting from Forgery or alteration of an Instrument.” (Id. ¶ 60.) The Policy defines “forgery” as “affixing the handwritten signature, or a reproduction of the handwritten signature, of another natural person without authorization or ratification, and with the intent to deceive.” (Id. ¶ 61.)

An “Employee or Director Dishonesty” Insuring Agreement provides coverage for:

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Bluebook (online)
14 F. Supp. 3d 651, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49596, 2014 WL 1395036, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sb1-federal-credit-union-v-finsecure-llc-paed-2014.