S.B., the Mother v. Department of Children and Families

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: March 5, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-1573
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed March 5, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________

Nos. 3D24-1564 & 3D24-1573 Lower Tribunal No. 24-15011 D003 ________________

S.B., the Mother, Appellant,

vs.

Department of Children and Families, et al., Appellees.

Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Angelica D. Zayas, Judge.

Joyce Law, P.A., and Richard F. Joyce, for appellant.

Karla Perkins, for appellee Department of Children and Families; Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Caitlin E. Burke, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division (Tallahassee), for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.

LOGUE, C.J. In these consolidated appeals, S.B., the mother, seeks review of an

order and amended order adjudicating her two children, L.R. and K.R.,

dependent. We affirm.

The Mother first argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter

the amended order under review. After a two-day hearing ending on June 4,

2024, the trial court adjudicated the children dependent. This first order of

adjudication was entered on July 23, 2024, nunc pro tunc to June 4, 2024.

The Father, whose parental rights were adjudicated in the same

proceeding, moved for rehearing on July 30, 2024 on the ground that the

order failed to contain sufficient findings of imminent harm, as required by

section 39.01(15)(f), Florida Statutes. The trial court held a hearing on the

Father’s motion for rehearing on August 1, 2024. At the hearing, the Mother

joined the motion and the Department of Children and Families agreed to the

motion. As clearly reflected in the transcript, the trial court expressly granted

the motion and directed the parties to submit new proposed orders.

On August 22, 2024, the Mother filed an appeal of the first order of

adjudication believing it was necessary for her to protect her right to appeal.

The trial court ultimately signed the amended order of adjudication on August

28, 2024, nunc pro tunc to June 4, 2024.

In arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the amended order,

2 the Mother relies on Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.265(b)(3), which

provides: “The court must rule on the motion for rehearing within 10 days of

filing or it is deemed denied.” She contends the motion was deemed denied

as a matter of law, and the trial court lost jurisdiction when the court’s verbal

ruling was not reduced to writing within ten days. We decline to read this

Rule of Juvenile Procedure so narrowly. Having verbally ruled within ten

days, including directing the parties to submit proposed orders, the trial court

retained jurisdiction to reduce its ruling to writing.

The Mother next argues that the record lacks sufficient evidence of

“substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect” required by

section 39.01(15)(f). “A court’s final ruling of dependency is a mixed question

of law and fact and will be sustained on review if the court applied the correct

law and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence in the

record.” L.C. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 315 So. 3d 66, 68–69 (Fla. 3d DCA

2020) (quoting M.F. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 770 So. 2d 1189, 1192 (Fla.

2000)).

The two children at issue, L.R. and K.R., were three and four years old

and non-verbal at the time of the hearing. The evidence at the dependency

hearing indicated the Department petitioned to have the two children

declared dependent after an infant sibling died from an unsafe sleeping

3 arrangement. The investigation revealed alcohol use was involved in the

circumstances leading up to the death. After hearing the testimony of the

Mother, Father, Medical Examiner, and Child Protective Investigator, the trial

court expressly found that the infant died due to the neglect of the parents.

It is well established that “evidence of prior neglect of another child is

admissible to effectuate the liberal construction given to Chapter 39 in

guaranteeing a child a safe and nurturing environment free from the prospect

of abuse or neglect.” Brown v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 582 So. 2d

113, 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Such evidence includes the death of a sibling.

R.B. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 283 So. 3d 410, 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

The trial court also expressly found that the testimony of both parents

at trial was not credible on critical points. The trial court determined the

parents exhibited a lack of understanding concerning how their behavior put

the children at risk. At the time of the hearing, the family was homeless and

declined shelter. The two children declared dependent are particularly

vulnerable because they are non-verbal. If one removed the factor of the

death of the sibling, these circumstances may not suffice to declare the

children dependent. But the death of the sibling was entitled to great weight

in the trial court’s consideration when deciding whether harm to these

children was imminent.

4 We emphasize that the primary purpose of a petition for dependency

is to protect the children, not to punish the parents. See § 39.001, Fla. Stat.

We recognize that the Father and Mother suffered a debilitating loss in the

death of their infant. Indeed, the favored result of a dependency action is the

reunification of the parents with their children pursuant to a case plan which

provides needed support and services – if this can be done safely. As has

been pointed out by this Court before, the adjudication of dependency need

not signal the end of the parents’ relationship with the children, but perhaps

a new beginning. R.B., 283 So. 3d at 415.

Affirmed.