Sazar Dent v. Loretta E. Lynch

Ninth Circuit

Sazar Dent v. Loretta E. Lynch

606 F. App'x 405

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJune 30, 2015

Docket13-17213

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 606 F. App'x 405 (Sazar Dent v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Sazar Dent v. Loretta E. Lynch, 606 F. App'x 405 (9th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner, a native of Honduras, appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona granting the Government’s motion for summary judgment as to Petitioner’s nationality, due process, and equal protection claims. Petitioner also challenges the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding him eligible for removal on the grounds that he committed an aggravated felony. 1 We have jurisdiction over this case under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5). We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir.2011). 2

Petitioner asserts that INS’s delay in handling the naturalization application filed by his mother on his behalf in 1983 and the naturalization application he filed on his own behalf in 1986 amounts to a due process violation. The district court did not address the merits of this argument, finding the cause of delay irrelevant under the then-current legal precedent. However, subsequent to the district court’s ruling, this circuit issued Brown v. Holder, 763 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir.2014), holding that a petitioner may be able to establish a claim to citizenship if he can demonstrate that the “INS acted arbitrarily and intentionally obstructed his Childhood and/or Adult Applications” or was “deliberately indifferent to whether his application^] [were] processed.” See id. at 1150. Accordingly, we vacate and remand this matter for further consideration of Petitioner’s due process claims in light of Brown.

This panel retains jurisdiction over any future appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

*406 Each party to bear its own costs on appeal. The motion to take judicial notice is denied as moot.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. This court vacated the BIA’s decision on November 9, 2010, and no removal order is currently in effect.

2

. The parties are familiar with all relevant facts. Therefore, we need not set out the facts here.

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MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner, a native of Honduras, appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona granting the Government’s motion for summary judgment as to Petitioner’s nationality, due process, and equal protection claims. Petitioner also challenges the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding him eligible for removal on the grounds that he committed an aggravated felony. 1 We have jurisdiction over this case under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5). We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir.2011). 2

Petitioner asserts that INS’s delay in handling the naturalization application filed by his mother on his behalf in 1983 and the naturalization application he filed on his own behalf in 1986 amounts to a due process violation. The district court did not address the merits of this argument, finding the cause of delay irrelevant under the then-current legal precedent. However, subsequent to the district court’s ruling, this circuit issued Brown v. Holder, 763 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir.2014), holding that a petitioner may be able to establish a claim to citizenship if he can demonstrate that the “INS acted arbitrarily and intentionally obstructed his Childhood and/or Adult Applications” or was “deliberately indifferent to whether his application^] [were] processed.” See id. at 1150. Accordingly, we vacate and remand this matter for further consideration of Petitioner’s due process claims in light of Brown.

This panel retains jurisdiction over any future appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

*406 Each party to bear its own costs on appeal. The motion to take judicial notice is denied as moot.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. This court vacated the BIA’s decision on November 9, 2010, and no removal order is currently in effect.

2

. The parties are familiar with all relevant facts. Therefore, we need not set out the facts here.

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606 F. App'x 405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sazar-dent-v-loretta-e-lynch-ca9-2015.

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