Sayles v. Commonwealth

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Sayles v. Commonwealth

367 N.E.2d 833, 373 Mass. 856, 1977 Mass. LEXIS 1146

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedSeptember 28, 1977

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 367 N.E.2d 833 (Sayles v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sayles v. Commonwealth, 367 N.E.2d 833, 373 Mass. 856, 1977 Mass. LEXIS 1146 (Mass. 1977).

Pincite

Opinion

A single justice of this court correctly allowed the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of error and entered a judgment accordingly. The plaintiff was convicted of the offense of unlawfully carrying a firearm in 1972 and pleaded guilty to the further allegation in the indictment that the offense was a second or subsequent offense. See G. L. c. 278, § 11A. Although the allegations of the petition, prepared pro se, are obscure, it seems to be agreed that the plaintiff had been convicted in 1961 of unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10. During the time between the plaintiff’s two offenses, G. L. c. 269, § 10, was amended to require a greater sentence for a second offense than § 10 required in 1961. See G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended through St. 1971, c. 456, §§ 5 and 6, and St. 1972, c. 312, § 5, for the statutory provisions in effect during 1972 and, for earlier provisions, G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended through St. 1957, c. 688, § 23.

1. The plaintiff claims that the imposition of a sentence for a second offense based on § 10 as amended subsequent to his conviction of the first offense is unconstitutional as an ex post facto law. The claim is meritless. Commonwealth v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 164-165 (1892). Ross’s Case, 2 Pick. 165, 169-170 (1824). Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-560 (1967). Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623-624 (1912). McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312-313 (1901). Price v. Allgood, 369 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1966). The statutory change required the imposition of a greater penalty for any relevant future crime. In its application here, § 10 does not involve a greater or second penalty for the earlier offense.

2. The plaintiff further claims he was advised neither of his right to a jury trial nor that a consequence of his guilty plea was a mandatory five year sentence “without parole.” This question need not be considered on a writ of error and may be presented in the Superior Court by a motion for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Penrose, 363 Mass. 677, 680-681 (1973). Earl v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 181, 183 (1969).

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on briefs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

A single justice of this court correctly allowed the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of error and entered a judgment accordingly. The plaintiff was convicted of the offense of unlawfully carrying a firearm in 1972 and pleaded guilty to the further allegation in the indictment that the offense was a second or subsequent offense. See G. L. c. 278, § 11A. Although the allegations of the petition, prepared pro se, are obscure, it seems to be agreed that the plaintiff had been convicted in 1961 of unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10. During the time between the plaintiff’s two offenses, G. L. c. 269, § 10, was amended to require a greater sentence for a second offense than § 10 required in 1961. See G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended through St. 1971, c. 456, §§ 5 and 6, and St. 1972, c. 312, § 5, for the statutory provisions in effect during 1972 and, for earlier provisions, G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended through St. 1957, c. 688, § 23.

1. The plaintiff claims that the imposition of a sentence for a second offense based on § 10 as amended subsequent to his conviction of the first offense is unconstitutional as an ex post facto law. The claim is meritless. Commonwealth v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 164-165 (1892). Ross’s Case, 2 Pick. 165, 169-170 (1824). Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-560 (1967). Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623-624 (1912). McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312-313 (1901). Price v. Allgood, 369 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1966). The statutory change required the imposition of a greater penalty for any relevant future crime. In its application here, § 10 does not involve a greater or second penalty for the earlier offense.

2. The plaintiff further claims he was advised neither of his right to a jury trial nor that a consequence of his guilty plea was a mandatory five year sentence “without parole.” This question need not be considered on a writ of error and may be presented in the Superior Court by a motion for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Penrose, 363 Mass. 677, 680-681 (1973). Earl v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 181, 183 (1969).

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on briefs.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

367 N.E.2d 833, 373 Mass. 856, 1977 Mass. LEXIS 1146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sayles-v-commonwealth-mass-1977.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack