Sayidin v. Warner

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided October 18, 2024·No. 2:24-cv-00098·Unknown

Opinion

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON MAHAMAD HUSSEIN SAYIDIN, Case No. 2:24-cv-00098-JNW-TLF Petitioner, v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND, MOTION TO SEAL, AND JACK WARNER, MOTION TO STAY, STRIKING OTHER PENDING MOTIONS AS Respondent. MOOT

The District Court has referred this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 action to United States Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke. Petitioner has been appointed counsel. Dkt. 19. Currently before the Court is petitioner’s motion to amend (Dkt. 24), motion to seal exhibits (Dkts. 25), and motion to stay (Dkt. 27). After review of the motions and the relevant record, the motions are GRANTED. BACKGROUND In January 2024, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with this Court challenging his custody under a King County Superior Court judgment and sentence. Dkts. 1, 3. Petitioner also filed two motions for appointment of counsel. Dkts. 4, 7. The petition was served and respondent filed a response arguing that the petition was a “mixed petition” – presenting both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Dkt. 8. Respondent asserted that petitioner failed to show “good cause” for failing to exhaust his unexhausted claims as required to support a stay of proceedings under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005); respondent also argued the Court should give petitioner the option of dismissing his unexhausted claims and proceeding on his sole exhausted claim or dismissing his entire petition without prejudice. Id. Petitioner subsequently filed a “motion to dismiss unexhausted

claims” (Dkt. 12) and a “motion to amend” (Dkt. 13) in which he appeared to indicate that he wished to proceed solely on his exhausted claim -- that his right to be present at trial was violated. By order dated June 7, 2024, the Court directed petitioner to submit a financial affidavit by June 19, 2024, to allow the Court to properly consider his motions for appointment of counsel. Dkt. 16. Petitioner failed to submit the financial affidavit by the deadline and by order dated July 3, 2024, the Court denied the motions to appoint counsel. Dkt. 17. Petitioner subsequently submitted the financial affidavit. Dkt. 18. On July 11, 2024, the Court issued an order reconsidering and granting petitioner’s motions to appoint counsel and appointing the Federal Public Defender to

represent petitioner in these proceedings. Dkt. 19. The Court further directed petitioner’s counsel to file a response to the respondent’s response to the habeas petition (Dkt. 8) specifically addressing the issue of the “mixed petition” and indicating to the Court whether petitioner intended to proceed with the pending “motion to dismiss unexhausted claims” (Dkt. 12) and “motion to amend complaint” (Dkt. 13). Id. Petitioner, through counsel, now moves for leave to file an amended petition (Dkt. 24), to seal the exhibits to the amended petition (Dkt. 25), and to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings (Dkt. 27) to allow petitioner to exhaust his unexhausted claims in state court.

Respondent indicates he does not oppose the motions to amend or to stay proceedings. Dkt. 28. Respondent also indicates he does not oppose the motion to seal “other than to note that evidence not presented in state court cannot be considered to adjudicate [petitioner’s] grounds for relief.” Dkt. 28 at 3.

A. Motion to Amend Pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1) Amending as a Matter of Course A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. (2) Other Amendments In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.

Although it appears petitioner may no longer be able to amend as a matter of course at this time, respondent does not oppose the motion. Dkt. 28. Further, the Court finds justice requires allowing petitioner to amend. Therefore, petitioner’s motion to amend (Dkt. 24) is GRANTED. Petitioner’s proposed amended petition (Dkt. 24-1) is hereby deemed filed as petitioner’s amended petition. The Clerk is directed to docket the proposed amended petition (Dkt. 24-1), including the sealed exhibits (Dkt. 26) as the amended petition. B. Motion to Seal Petitioner also moves to file exhibits 1-3 to petitioner’s proposed amended petition under seal. Dkts. 25, 26. Petitioner argues that these documents should be filed under seal because they consist of medical records containing confidential information which, if made public, could result in harm to petitioner. Id. Respondent also indicates he does not oppose the motion to seal “other than to note that evidence not presented in state court cannot be considered to adjudicate [petitioner’s] grounds for relief.” Dkt.

28 at 3. Local Civil Rule 5(g) allows the court to seal documents and other evidence upon a showing that a party cannot avoid filing a document under seal and a statute, rule, or prior court order expressly authorizes the party to file the document under seal or a party files a motion or stipulated motion to seal before or at the same time the party files the sealed document. LCR 5(g)(1)–(2). The Ninth Circuit has applied a strong presumption of public access to judicial records. See Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). A party seeking to file a document under seal must overcome that strong presumption. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana,

447 F.3d at 1178). Parties who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents related or attached to dispositive pleadings “must meet the high threshold of showing that ‘compelling reasons’ support secrecy.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136); see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Instituut Voor Landbouw- En Visserijonderzoek, 2018 WL 4090585, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018) (applying the “compelling reasons” standard to a dispositive motion). Those compelling reasons must outweigh the competing interests of the public in having access to the judicial records and understanding the judicial process. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79.

Several district courts in the Ninth Circuit “have recognized that the need to protect medical privacy qualifies as a ‘compelling reason’ for sealing records, since medical records contain sensitive and private information about a person's health.” Williams v. Ely State Prison, No. 3:24-CV-00022, 2024 WL 3329757, at *1 (D. Nev. July

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Related

Rhines v. Weber
544 U.S. 269 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Pintos v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS'N
605 F.3d 665 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Knight v. Spencer
447 F.3d 6 (First Circuit, 2006)