Sayad v. New York City Transit Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sayad v. New York City Transit Authority

246 A.D.2d 639, 666 N.Y.S.2d 955, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 584

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided January 26, 1998·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), dated September 3, 1996, which, inter alia, granted the plaintiff leave to serve a late notice of claim.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts of the plaintiff’s claim either within 90 days after it arose or within a reasonable time thereafter. In light of this, among other things, and the lack of prejudice to the defendant in maintaining its defense on the merits, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the plaintiff leave to serve a late notice of claim (see, Matter of Alvarenga v Finlay, 225 AD2d 617; Pecchio v National Safety Envtl., 211 AD2d 773; Matter of O’Mara v Town of Cortlandt, 210 AD2d 337).

Further, because the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant within the relevant Statute of Limitations, the court was not without authority to grant such relief (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Carr v City of New York, 176 AD2d 779; Ceely v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 162 AD2d 492; CPLR 304).

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Ritter, Altman and Florio, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), dated September 3, 1996, which, inter alia, granted the plaintiff leave to serve a late notice of claim.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts of the plaintiff’s claim either within 90 days after it arose or within a reasonable time thereafter. In light of this, among other things, and the lack of prejudice to the defendant in maintaining its defense on the merits, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the plaintiff leave to serve a late notice of claim (see, Matter of Alvarenga v Finlay, 225 AD2d 617; Pecchio v National Safety Envtl., 211 AD2d 773; Matter of O’Mara v Town of Cortlandt, 210 AD2d 337).

Further, because the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant within the relevant Statute of Limitations, the court was not without authority to grant such relief (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Carr v City of New York, 176 AD2d 779; Ceely v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 162 AD2d 492; CPLR 304).

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Ritter, Altman and Florio, JJ., concur.

Sayad v. New York City Transit Authority, 246 A.D.2d 639, 666 N.Y.S.2d 955, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 584 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

Pincite

246 A.D.2d 639 (Sayad v. New York City Transit Authority) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

Related