IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED JUNE 1997 SESSION July 25, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk
ROGER LEE SAWYERS, ) ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9607-CC-00255 Appellant, ) ) HAMBLEN COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. WILLIAM H. INMAN, STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (Post-conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
GREG EICHELMAN JOHN KNOX WALKUP Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
D. CLIFTON BARNES MICHAEL J. FAHEY, II Asst. Public Defender Asst. Attorney General 1609 College Park Dr., Box 11 450 James Robertson Pkwy. Morristown, TN 37813-1618 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
C. BERKELEY BELL District Attorney General
VICTOR J. VAUGHN Asst. District Attorney General 510 Allison St. Morristown, TN 37814
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge OPINION
The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief which was denied by the trial
court. This Court affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently reversed and
remanded for a hearing. Following the ordered hearing, the court below denied relief,
from which the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the
judgment below.
In 1976, when he was seventeen years and seven months old, the
petitioner murdered Elmer Trent in the course of robbing him with a firearm. He was not
indicted until 1978; he pled guilty to the murder “a few weeks shy of his 19th birthday.”1
At the time he pled guilty, the petitioner apparently thought that he had been over the age
of eighteen at the time he murdered Trent. He did not discover his real age until 1986.
He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief alleging that the criminal court in which he
pled guilty had not had subject-matter jurisdiction over him because he had been a
juvenile at the time he committed Trent’s murder.
When the petitioner’s claim for relief reached our Supreme Court, it ordered
the case “returned to the trial court for a de novo hearing to determine whether or not [the
petitioner] would have been transferred from juvenile to criminal court, based on the facts
existing at the time of his indictment and trial.” Sawyers v. State, 814 S.W.2d 725, 729
(Tenn. 1991). This hearing was held in 1996 and the court below found that the
petitioner would have been transferred and therefore denied post-conviction relief a
second time. It is from this ruling that the petitioner now appeals.
In ordering this matter remanded, our Supreme Court specifically referred
1 Sawyers v. State , 814 S.W .2d 725, 727 (T enn. 1991).
2 to T.C.A. § 37-1-134(a) and stated that an order of transfer from juvenile to criminal court
“must be predicated on a determination . . . that there are
that the child (a) committed the delinquent act alleged, (b) is not committable to an
institution for the mentally ill or retarded, and (c) needs to be placed under
or discipline’ for the good of the community.”2 Sawyers, 814 S.W.2d at 728. In making
this determination after the required hearing, the court below ruled:
It seems obvious beyond peradventure that the juvenile court, if proceedings in that court had been instituted, would have determined that there was [sic] reasonable grounds to believe that Sawyers committed the murder alleged, was not committable to an institution for the mentally ill or retarded, and needed to be placed under
In making its findings, the court below relied on a 1978 report from the Forensic Services
Division of Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute that the petitioner was competent
to stand trial and that a defense of insanity could not be supported, and that the petitioner
had committed a “comparable murder” in another county after he had reached the age
of majority but before he had been arrested for the instant murder. The court also had
before it a statement the petitioner had given to the police in which he admitted to having
shot and killed Trent in the course of robbing him.
The petitioner complains that the court below should not have considered
that he had committed another murder because he had not been convicted of that
offense at the time the transfer decision would have been made. We agree, but find that
the court below could properly have considered that the petitioner had been indicted for
2 In 1978, this statute was codified at T.C.A. § 37-234 (1976).
3 W e have om itted the citations and footnotes included in this portion of the lower cou rt’s order.
3 this second murder at the relevant time.4 We also note that the petitioner had been
convicted of two counts of larceny from the person in 1977, receiving a three year
sentence for each count. This information would also have been available to the court
in 1978 at the time of the transfer hearing.
Although not mentioned by our Supreme Court, we note that the relevant
statute in effect in 1978 provided that, in making the determination to transfer, the court
could5 consider the extent and nature of the child’s prior delinquency records; the nature
of past treatment efforts and the child’s response thereto; whether the offense had been
against property or person with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses
against the person; whether the offense had been committed in an aggressive and
premeditated manner; and the possible rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures,
services and facilities currently available. T.C.A. § 37-234(b) (1976). In the instant case,
the petitioner’s prior delinquency record consisted of a 1973 order by the Hamblen
County juvenile court finding him to be a “dependent and neglected child” and ordering
him “committed to the Tennessee Preparatory School for an indefinite period of time.”
This past treatment effort was obviously unsuccessful, given the numerous crimes the
petitioner had committed or been charged with by the time he was arrested for Trent’s
murder. The offense under consideration was a murder: the most serious of the
offenses against the person and therefore entitled to substantial weight in favor of
transfer.
Moreover, it had been committed in an aggressive and at least somewhat
premeditated manner. According to the petitioner’s statement to the police, he and two
4 See Sawyers, 814 S.W .2d at 727 (“[a}t the same time this case was being prosecuted, Sawyers was also u nde r indictm ent and s ubje ct to the dea th penalty for” this other m urde r.)
5 Th e cu rrent statute m akes c ons ideration of these fac tors m and atory. See T.C.A. §
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED JUNE 1997 SESSION July 25, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk
ROGER LEE SAWYERS, ) ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9607-CC-00255 Appellant, ) ) HAMBLEN COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. WILLIAM H. INMAN, STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (Post-conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
GREG EICHELMAN JOHN KNOX WALKUP Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
D. CLIFTON BARNES MICHAEL J. FAHEY, II Asst. Public Defender Asst. Attorney General 1609 College Park Dr., Box 11 450 James Robertson Pkwy. Morristown, TN 37813-1618 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
C. BERKELEY BELL District Attorney General
VICTOR J. VAUGHN Asst. District Attorney General 510 Allison St. Morristown, TN 37814
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge OPINION
The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief which was denied by the trial
court. This Court affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently reversed and
remanded for a hearing. Following the ordered hearing, the court below denied relief,
from which the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the
judgment below.
In 1976, when he was seventeen years and seven months old, the
petitioner murdered Elmer Trent in the course of robbing him with a firearm. He was not
indicted until 1978; he pled guilty to the murder “a few weeks shy of his 19th birthday.”1
At the time he pled guilty, the petitioner apparently thought that he had been over the age
of eighteen at the time he murdered Trent. He did not discover his real age until 1986.
He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief alleging that the criminal court in which he
pled guilty had not had subject-matter jurisdiction over him because he had been a
juvenile at the time he committed Trent’s murder.
When the petitioner’s claim for relief reached our Supreme Court, it ordered
the case “returned to the trial court for a de novo hearing to determine whether or not [the
petitioner] would have been transferred from juvenile to criminal court, based on the facts
existing at the time of his indictment and trial.” Sawyers v. State, 814 S.W.2d 725, 729
(Tenn. 1991). This hearing was held in 1996 and the court below found that the
petitioner would have been transferred and therefore denied post-conviction relief a
second time. It is from this ruling that the petitioner now appeals.
In ordering this matter remanded, our Supreme Court specifically referred
1 Sawyers v. State , 814 S.W .2d 725, 727 (T enn. 1991).
2 to T.C.A. § 37-1-134(a) and stated that an order of transfer from juvenile to criminal court
“must be predicated on a determination . . . that there are
that the child (a) committed the delinquent act alleged, (b) is not committable to an
institution for the mentally ill or retarded, and (c) needs to be placed under
or discipline’ for the good of the community.”2 Sawyers, 814 S.W.2d at 728. In making
this determination after the required hearing, the court below ruled:
It seems obvious beyond peradventure that the juvenile court, if proceedings in that court had been instituted, would have determined that there was [sic] reasonable grounds to believe that Sawyers committed the murder alleged, was not committable to an institution for the mentally ill or retarded, and needed to be placed under
In making its findings, the court below relied on a 1978 report from the Forensic Services
Division of Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute that the petitioner was competent
to stand trial and that a defense of insanity could not be supported, and that the petitioner
had committed a “comparable murder” in another county after he had reached the age
of majority but before he had been arrested for the instant murder. The court also had
before it a statement the petitioner had given to the police in which he admitted to having
shot and killed Trent in the course of robbing him.
The petitioner complains that the court below should not have considered
that he had committed another murder because he had not been convicted of that
offense at the time the transfer decision would have been made. We agree, but find that
the court below could properly have considered that the petitioner had been indicted for
2 In 1978, this statute was codified at T.C.A. § 37-234 (1976).
3 W e have om itted the citations and footnotes included in this portion of the lower cou rt’s order.
3 this second murder at the relevant time.4 We also note that the petitioner had been
convicted of two counts of larceny from the person in 1977, receiving a three year
sentence for each count. This information would also have been available to the court
in 1978 at the time of the transfer hearing.
Although not mentioned by our Supreme Court, we note that the relevant
statute in effect in 1978 provided that, in making the determination to transfer, the court
could5 consider the extent and nature of the child’s prior delinquency records; the nature
of past treatment efforts and the child’s response thereto; whether the offense had been
against property or person with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses
against the person; whether the offense had been committed in an aggressive and
premeditated manner; and the possible rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures,
services and facilities currently available. T.C.A. § 37-234(b) (1976). In the instant case,
the petitioner’s prior delinquency record consisted of a 1973 order by the Hamblen
County juvenile court finding him to be a “dependent and neglected child” and ordering
him “committed to the Tennessee Preparatory School for an indefinite period of time.”
This past treatment effort was obviously unsuccessful, given the numerous crimes the
petitioner had committed or been charged with by the time he was arrested for Trent’s
murder. The offense under consideration was a murder: the most serious of the
offenses against the person and therefore entitled to substantial weight in favor of
transfer.
Moreover, it had been committed in an aggressive and at least somewhat
premeditated manner. According to the petitioner’s statement to the police, he and two
4 See Sawyers, 814 S.W .2d at 727 (“[a}t the same time this case was being prosecuted, Sawyers was also u nde r indictm ent and s ubje ct to the dea th penalty for” this other m urde r.)
5 Th e cu rrent statute m akes c ons ideration of these fac tors m and atory. See T.C.A. § 37-1- 134(b). How ever, the sta tute in effe ct in 1978 utilize d the word “m ay” in conjun ctio n with th e court’s con sideration of the se fa ctors . See T.C.A. § 37-23 4(b) (1976).
4 cohorts had driven to a market with a shotgun which the petitioner loaded with four shells,
chambering one of them. When the victim drove up and walked toward the door of his
market, the petitioner called out to him “and told him to stick up his hands and drop those
money bags.” As the victim stopped and began to turn around, according to the
statement, the petitioner thought he was reaching for his front pocket. At that point, the
petitioner “pulled the trigger and blasted him four times.” Thus, at least three of the five
statutory considerations mitigated heavily in favor of transfer. There is no proof in the
record as to the possible rehabilitation of the petitioner by services and facilities which
would have been available in 1978. However, because the petitioner was no longer a
child in 1978, we find this factor to be inapposite.
The proof adduced at the hearing was more than sufficient for the court to
have “reasonable grounds to believe” that the petitioner had committed the murder, that
he was not committable, and that the community’s interests required him to be put under
legal restraint or discipline. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below.
_________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
______________________________ J. CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge