Sawyer v. United States

161 F. Supp. 610, 142 Ct. Cl. 169, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 132
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 7, 1958
DocketNo. 71-53
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 161 F. Supp. 610 (Sawyer v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sawyer v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 610, 142 Ct. Cl. 169, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 132 (cc 1958).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff sues for unpaid tuition in the amount of $18,-969.11, claimed to be due him under a contract dated October 19,1951, for the training of veterans in radio broadcasting and as radio technicians, under the provisions of P. L. 16 and P. L. 346,78th Congress,1 commonly referred to as the G. I. Bill. This contract terminated in October 1952, but the school continued to give the students instruction until they completed their courses in March 1953. Defendant does not deny that the amount claimed was due under the contract as written, nor does it contest the amount claimed from October 1952 to March 1953, but says that the cost data furnished by plaintiff, on which the rate of tuition was based, was erroneous. It seeks a reduction in the tuition rate on this contract and counterclaims for amounts it alleges were overpaid on prior contracts.

Its defense to the suit on this contract and also the counterclaims are based upon the allegations: First, that the plaintiff 2 submitted erroneous cost data in negotiating the tuition rates provided in prior contracts, which were carried forward in the one sued on, in that he did not allocate certain school operating costs to his advertising business, partially conducted by him from the school premises; Second, that in negotiating the tuition rate for the radio technical course plaintiff claimed an allowance for salary for instruction by plaintiff personally, although he did not in fact teach the course; and Third, that students enrolled in separate courses were improperly mingled or mixed together in the same classroom under a common instructor, and that a lesser quantum of instruction was thereby given than what was billed and paid for. The alleged overcharges resulting from the first and second counterclaims total $50,868.74, and from the third counterclaim, $45,876.95. Defendant would offset [171]*171these amounts against what it says is the proper amount due on the present contract.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover on the contract, unless he fraudulently misrepresented the facts on which the contract was based.

Plaintiff has been engaged in the training of veteran students in radio broadcasting since September 1946 in Portland, Oregon. Under a series of contracts with the Veterans Administration, veterans have been trained at hourly rates and payment has been received therefor upon submission of vouchers as provided in the contracts. Before actual cost experience had been established, the contract rate of tuition was based, in part, upon costs as estimated by plaintiff. Thereafter, rates were negotiated, based in large part upon actual cost experience as certified by plaintiff. Officers of the Veterans Administration reviewed the cost data, made adjustments where necessary to conform to regulations or as a result of audits or conferences with plaintiff, and then arrived at what was considered a “fair and reasonable” rate of compensation, as required by law. In 1949 the rates of tuition for courses which had been under contract for at least two previous years became fixed as the “customary cost of tuition” pursuant to P. L. 266, 63 Stat. 631, 652-653. It was thereafter unnecessary for plaintiff to submit cost data, except in connection with certain technical courses, which were first instituted in 1949.

Some time after May 1952 defendant refused to honor any vouchers submitted by plaintiff on the ground that over-payments had been made. It is for payments accruing under the contract for the period after payments were stopped until courses were completed that plaintiff brings this action.

Defendant says that the cost data furnished by plaintiff for fixing tuition rates on prior contracts, which prior contracts determined the tuition rate in the contract sued on, was false in the respects set out above, to wit: first, that there was included therein costs properly allocable to plaintiff’s advertising business; second, that plaintiff claimed the sal-, ary of an instructor for himself in the technical course, although he did not teach any subject in this course; and, third, that less instruction was given in the mixed classes [172]*172than that for which plaintiff billed the Veterans Administration.

We consider defendant’s first contention that a part of plaintiff’s claimed costs was attributable to his advertising business carried on from the school premises. During the time for which cost figures were furnished to the defendant, plaintiff conducted a daily radio program over a local commercial radio station. This was a separate and distinct activity from the school. Related thereto, plaintiff engaged in advertising promotions, which he conducted both from the school and from his home. Defendant seeks to allocate plaintiff’s total costs to the advertising business and to the school in direct proportion to the amounts received by plaintiff from each.

Defendant shows no justification for this. The costs allocated in part to the school, and in part to the advertising business consisted of “supplies, depreciation, rent, heat, light, advertising and administration.” On the first contract it allocates 54.33 percent of the costs to the school and 45.67 percent to advertising; on the next contract, 46.38 percent to the school, and 54.62 percent to advertising; on the next, 68.88 percent to the school, and 31.12 percent to advertising; and on the last 68.97 percent to the school, and 31.03 percent to advertising. On the technical training course it allocates 68.97 percent to it, and 31.03 percent to advertising.

Plaintiff’s advertising business was carried on partly from the school office, and partly from plaintiff’s home. Other than the office, plaintiff used no part of the school premises for his advertising business. In addition to the office, there were in the school premises six classrooms covering 3,250 square feet, and there was a laboratory or workroom with 20 work stations. To charge from 31 to 54 percent of the rent, heat, and light, and depreciation to advertising is manifestly absurd. What amount of the supplies was used in the advertising business is not shown, nor what part of the administration expenses and advertising.

So far as the proof shows, all the expense data furnished by plaintiff were properly attributable to the operation of the school.

[173]*173Defendant’s second contention is tbe inclusion within the cost of operating the school of an allowance for an instructor’s salary for Sawyer personally, when he did not teach the stated course, and was not qualified to do so.

It is true that plaintiff did not teach this course. He did, however, teach some of the broadcasting courses and he supervised all instruction. The trial commissioner finds that “it was common practice to allocate costs between courses where unbalanced costs might otherwise result. The allocation of allowable costs and the salary allowance for Sawyer were determined and agreed upon between plaintiff’s accountant Oswald and the Veterans Administration contracting officer Prink, for the determination of a fair and reasonable rate of tuition for the technical training course.”3

If the Veterans Administration’s contracting officer was aware of the allocation of a part of the time Sawyer put in as an instructor in the broadcasting courses — if he was aware that a part of it was being allocated to the technical course, there has been no misrepresentation.

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161 F. Supp. 610, 142 Ct. Cl. 169, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 132, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sawyer-v-united-states-cc-1958.