1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 SAVE THE PARK AND BUILD THE Case No.: 20-CV-1080 TWR (AHG) SCHOOL, 12 ORDER (1) DECLINING Plaintiff, 13 SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION, v. (2) DISMISSING WITHOUT 14 PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S FIFTH NATIONAL PARK SERVICE; DAVID 15 AND SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTION, L. BERNHARDT, in his official capacity (3) DISSOLVING PRELIMINARY 16 as Secretary of the United States INJUNCTION, AND (4) DENYING Department of the Interior; DAVID 17 PERMANENT INJUNCTION VELA, in his official capacity as Director
18 of the National Park Service; ARMANDO (ECF Nos. 1, 21, 45, 60) QUINTERO, in his official capacity as 19 Director of the California Department of 20 Parks and Recreation; and CARDIFF SCHOOL DISTRICT, 21 Defendants. 22
23 24 On July 24, 2020, the Honorable Larry Alan Burns entered a preliminary injunction 25 enjoining Defendant Cardiff School District (the “District”) “from engaging in any 26 construction or demolition within the original 6(f)(3) boundary of George Berkich Park, 27 with the exception that construction of the biofiltration basins and turf may proceed 28 consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement between [Plaintiff] Save the Park 1 [and Build the School] and the District.” (ECF No. 21 at 2.) After Defendant National 2 Park Service (“NPS”) rescinded its approval of the District’s project—the original basis 3 for this Administrative Procedure Act lawsuit—Judge Burns dismissed as moot Plaintiffs’ 4 claims under federal law against Defendants NPS; David L. Bernhardt, in his official 5 capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior; David Vela, in his 6 official capacity as Director of the NPS; and Lisa Mangat, in her official capacity as 7 Director of the California Department of Parks and Recreation (“DPR”). (See ECF No. 60 8 (“OSC”) at 2–3.) As Judge Burns framed it, this left Plaintiff with two claims: “a claim 9 that the District and the State Parks violated the public trust doctrine and a claim that the 10 District can’t proceed with a conversion without proper NPS approval.” (Id. at 4.) 11 Judge Burns therefore ordered the District to show cause “why the Court should not 12 convert its existing preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction enjoining the District 13 from converting land within the 6(f)(3) boundary without NPS approval,” (id. (citing 54 14 U.S.C. § 200305(f)(3))), and ordered Plaintiff to show cause “why, if the Court issues a 15 permanent injunction, it shouldn’t decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state 16 claim.” (Id.) The undersigned is in receipt of the following responses to Judge Burns’ 17 Order to Show Cause: Plaintiff’s responses regarding the Court’s exercise of supplemental 18 jurisdiction (“Pl. Juris. Resp.,” ECF No. 63) and the issuance of a permanent injunction 19 (“Pl. Inj. Resp.,” ECF No. 66), the District’s responses regarding supplemental jurisdiction 20 (“Dist. Juris. Rep.,” ECF No. 64) and a permanent injunction (“Dist. Inj. Resp.,” ECF No. 21 62), and Armando Quintero’s response regarding supplemental jurisdiction (“DPR Juris. 22 Resp.,” ECF No. 65).1 Having carefully reviewed the Parties’ arguments, the record, and 23 the applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction and 24 DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. 25 / / / 26
27 1 This case was transferred from Judge Burns to the undersigned on October 8, 2020. (See ECF No. 61.) 28 Further, Plaintiff originally named Ms. Mangat as a Defendant, but Mr. Quintero replaced her as Director 1 Regarding the issuance of a permanent injunction, 2 a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four- factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must 3 demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 4 remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 5 balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 6 remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 7
8 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010) (quoting eBay Inc. v. 9 MercExchange, L.L. C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). The District raises several arguments 10 against the issuance of a permanent injunction here: (1) injunctive relief is a remedy, not a 11 standalone claim, meaning that the sixth cause of action for injunctive relief should be 12 dismissed, (Dist. Inj. Resp. at 6); (2) Plaintiff cannot obtain an injunction based on its 13 already dismissed federal claims, (id. at 6–7); (3) a permanent injunction is improper 14 because there was no adjudication on the merits of Plaintiff’s underlying claims, which 15 were denied as moot, (id. at 7); (4) to the extent Plaintiff contends that its sixth cause of 16 action can be construed as a distinct claim for violation of the Land and Water Conservation 17 Fund Act (“LWCFA”), there is no private right of action to enforce that statute, (Dist. Inj. 18 Resp. at 7–10); and (5) Plaintiff released all claims against the District for violation of the 19 LWCFA under the settlement of the prior state court action. (Dist. Ins. Resp. at 10–11.) 20 The Court need not address all of the District’s arguments because the Court agrees 21 that permanent injunctive relief is unavailable under the terms of the Settlement Agreement 22 and Mutual Release executed by the District and Save the Parks in February 2020 (the 23 “Settlement Agreement”). (See Dist. Inj. Resp. at 10–11.) The mutual release specifically 24 released “any and all claims, demands, liabilities, causes of action, suits, accounts and 25 obligations of whatsoever character, nature and kind, in law or in equity, arising from, 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 connected with or related to the [state court] Lawsuit.” (ECF No. 66-1 at 19–20. ) In the 2 state court lawsuit, Plaintiff alleged that the District had violated the LWCFA, (ECF No. 3 52-1 at 8–9 ¶¶ 17–21, 9–10 ¶¶ 27–28), and sought “[a]n injunction prohibiting [the District] 4 from constructing any improvements west of the 6(f)(3) boundary line.” (Id. at 28 ¶ 4.) 5 Because Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction “arises from,” is “connected with,” 6 and is directly “related to the Lawsuit,” the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for a 7 permanent injunction is foreclosed by paragraph 10 of the Settlement Agreement. 8 To be sure, the broad waiver language in paragraph 10 of the Settlement Agreement 9 is subject to the carve-out provision of paragraph 10a. Paragraph 10a, however, merely 10 allows the parties to bring a future challenge to “any action taken, or to be taken, by 11 OGALS and/or NPS in connection with the District’s current or any future application for 12 a conversion of any land within the 6(f)(3) Boundary.” (ECF No. 66-1 at 20.) The Court 13 agrees with Plaintiff that the carve-out provision governed the initial litigation in this 14 matter, when Plaintiff was challenging the NPS’s “erroneous approval of the District’s 15 conversion application.” (Pl. Inj. Resp. at 8.) Because NPS has since rescinded the 16 challenged approval, however, Plaintiff’s surviving request for a permanent injunction is 17 in no way tethered to “an action taken” by NPS. As such, Plaintiff’s request for a 18 permanent injunction is not exempted by the carve-out to the mutual release, and the Court 19 DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action and DENIES the 20 request for a permanent injunction.3 21 22
23 2 Pin citations to ECF Nos.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 SAVE THE PARK AND BUILD THE Case No.: 20-CV-1080 TWR (AHG) SCHOOL, 12 ORDER (1) DECLINING Plaintiff, 13 SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION, v. (2) DISMISSING WITHOUT 14 PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S FIFTH NATIONAL PARK SERVICE; DAVID 15 AND SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTION, L. BERNHARDT, in his official capacity (3) DISSOLVING PRELIMINARY 16 as Secretary of the United States INJUNCTION, AND (4) DENYING Department of the Interior; DAVID 17 PERMANENT INJUNCTION VELA, in his official capacity as Director
18 of the National Park Service; ARMANDO (ECF Nos. 1, 21, 45, 60) QUINTERO, in his official capacity as 19 Director of the California Department of 20 Parks and Recreation; and CARDIFF SCHOOL DISTRICT, 21 Defendants. 22
23 24 On July 24, 2020, the Honorable Larry Alan Burns entered a preliminary injunction 25 enjoining Defendant Cardiff School District (the “District”) “from engaging in any 26 construction or demolition within the original 6(f)(3) boundary of George Berkich Park, 27 with the exception that construction of the biofiltration basins and turf may proceed 28 consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement between [Plaintiff] Save the Park 1 [and Build the School] and the District.” (ECF No. 21 at 2.) After Defendant National 2 Park Service (“NPS”) rescinded its approval of the District’s project—the original basis 3 for this Administrative Procedure Act lawsuit—Judge Burns dismissed as moot Plaintiffs’ 4 claims under federal law against Defendants NPS; David L. Bernhardt, in his official 5 capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior; David Vela, in his 6 official capacity as Director of the NPS; and Lisa Mangat, in her official capacity as 7 Director of the California Department of Parks and Recreation (“DPR”). (See ECF No. 60 8 (“OSC”) at 2–3.) As Judge Burns framed it, this left Plaintiff with two claims: “a claim 9 that the District and the State Parks violated the public trust doctrine and a claim that the 10 District can’t proceed with a conversion without proper NPS approval.” (Id. at 4.) 11 Judge Burns therefore ordered the District to show cause “why the Court should not 12 convert its existing preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction enjoining the District 13 from converting land within the 6(f)(3) boundary without NPS approval,” (id. (citing 54 14 U.S.C. § 200305(f)(3))), and ordered Plaintiff to show cause “why, if the Court issues a 15 permanent injunction, it shouldn’t decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state 16 claim.” (Id.) The undersigned is in receipt of the following responses to Judge Burns’ 17 Order to Show Cause: Plaintiff’s responses regarding the Court’s exercise of supplemental 18 jurisdiction (“Pl. Juris. Resp.,” ECF No. 63) and the issuance of a permanent injunction 19 (“Pl. Inj. Resp.,” ECF No. 66), the District’s responses regarding supplemental jurisdiction 20 (“Dist. Juris. Rep.,” ECF No. 64) and a permanent injunction (“Dist. Inj. Resp.,” ECF No. 21 62), and Armando Quintero’s response regarding supplemental jurisdiction (“DPR Juris. 22 Resp.,” ECF No. 65).1 Having carefully reviewed the Parties’ arguments, the record, and 23 the applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction and 24 DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. 25 / / / 26
27 1 This case was transferred from Judge Burns to the undersigned on October 8, 2020. (See ECF No. 61.) 28 Further, Plaintiff originally named Ms. Mangat as a Defendant, but Mr. Quintero replaced her as Director 1 Regarding the issuance of a permanent injunction, 2 a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four- factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must 3 demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 4 remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 5 balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 6 remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 7
8 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010) (quoting eBay Inc. v. 9 MercExchange, L.L. C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). The District raises several arguments 10 against the issuance of a permanent injunction here: (1) injunctive relief is a remedy, not a 11 standalone claim, meaning that the sixth cause of action for injunctive relief should be 12 dismissed, (Dist. Inj. Resp. at 6); (2) Plaintiff cannot obtain an injunction based on its 13 already dismissed federal claims, (id. at 6–7); (3) a permanent injunction is improper 14 because there was no adjudication on the merits of Plaintiff’s underlying claims, which 15 were denied as moot, (id. at 7); (4) to the extent Plaintiff contends that its sixth cause of 16 action can be construed as a distinct claim for violation of the Land and Water Conservation 17 Fund Act (“LWCFA”), there is no private right of action to enforce that statute, (Dist. Inj. 18 Resp. at 7–10); and (5) Plaintiff released all claims against the District for violation of the 19 LWCFA under the settlement of the prior state court action. (Dist. Ins. Resp. at 10–11.) 20 The Court need not address all of the District’s arguments because the Court agrees 21 that permanent injunctive relief is unavailable under the terms of the Settlement Agreement 22 and Mutual Release executed by the District and Save the Parks in February 2020 (the 23 “Settlement Agreement”). (See Dist. Inj. Resp. at 10–11.) The mutual release specifically 24 released “any and all claims, demands, liabilities, causes of action, suits, accounts and 25 obligations of whatsoever character, nature and kind, in law or in equity, arising from, 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 connected with or related to the [state court] Lawsuit.” (ECF No. 66-1 at 19–20. ) In the 2 state court lawsuit, Plaintiff alleged that the District had violated the LWCFA, (ECF No. 3 52-1 at 8–9 ¶¶ 17–21, 9–10 ¶¶ 27–28), and sought “[a]n injunction prohibiting [the District] 4 from constructing any improvements west of the 6(f)(3) boundary line.” (Id. at 28 ¶ 4.) 5 Because Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction “arises from,” is “connected with,” 6 and is directly “related to the Lawsuit,” the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for a 7 permanent injunction is foreclosed by paragraph 10 of the Settlement Agreement. 8 To be sure, the broad waiver language in paragraph 10 of the Settlement Agreement 9 is subject to the carve-out provision of paragraph 10a. Paragraph 10a, however, merely 10 allows the parties to bring a future challenge to “any action taken, or to be taken, by 11 OGALS and/or NPS in connection with the District’s current or any future application for 12 a conversion of any land within the 6(f)(3) Boundary.” (ECF No. 66-1 at 20.) The Court 13 agrees with Plaintiff that the carve-out provision governed the initial litigation in this 14 matter, when Plaintiff was challenging the NPS’s “erroneous approval of the District’s 15 conversion application.” (Pl. Inj. Resp. at 8.) Because NPS has since rescinded the 16 challenged approval, however, Plaintiff’s surviving request for a permanent injunction is 17 in no way tethered to “an action taken” by NPS. As such, Plaintiff’s request for a 18 permanent injunction is not exempted by the carve-out to the mutual release, and the Court 19 DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action and DENIES the 20 request for a permanent injunction.3 21 22
23 2 Pin citations to ECF Nos. 52-1 and 66-1 refer to the CM/ECF page numbers electronically stamped at 24 the top of each page.
25 3 In a footnote, Plaintiff adds that, “[s]hould the Court find that Plaintiff’s Complaint as drafted does not sufficiently plead a claim sufficient to support the relief requested, Plaintiff requests leave to file an 26 amended Complaint to include a third party beneficiary claim under the Project Agreement.” (Pl. Inj. Resp. at 9–10 n.2 (emphasis omitted).) That request is not properly before the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27 7(b) (“A request for a court order must be made by motion.”). In any event, Plaintiff provides no indication 28 as to how the Court could exercise jurisdiction over a dispute concerning a contract between DPR, the 1 Of course, the District remains obligated under the law, see 54 U.S.C. 2 § 200305(f)(3), and the Settlement Agreement, (see ECF No. 66-1 at 18–19), to refrain 3 from the vast majority of its planned construction within the 6(f)(3) Boundary without NPS 4 approval. Should the District fail to abide by those obligations, (see Pl. Inj. Resp. at 6 n.1), 5 Plaintiff has a remedy before the Superior Court under the Settlement Agreement. (See id. 6 at 20; see also, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 382 (1994).) 7 As for supplemental jurisdiction, Judge Burns previously indicated that he “d[id] not 8 intend to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims once all federal 9 claims have been resolved.” (OSC at 4 (citing Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Ins., 556 10 U.S. 635, 639 (2009)).) The Parties appear to agree. (See Pl. Juris. Resp. at 24; Dist. Juris. 11 Resp. at 2–3; DPR Juris. Resp. 2–3.) The Court therefore DECLINES to exercise 12 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law cause of action and 13 DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action. 15 In light of the foregoing, the Court DECLINES supplemental jurisdiction; 16 DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth causes of action (ECF 17 / / / 18 / / / 19 / / / 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24
25 4 The Court notes that Plaintiff indicated that it did not object to the dismissal of its remaining state law 26 claim if the Court issues a permanent injunction. (See Pl. Juris. Resp. at 2.) Assuming Plaintiff objects to the dismissal of its state law claim in the absence of a permanent injunction, Plaintiff has provided no 27 legal basis for the Court to retain jurisdiction over that claim, (see generally id.), and the Court determines 28 that judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity weigh in favor of declining jurisdiction here. 1 || No. 1); DISSOLVES the preliminary injunction entered by Judge Burns on July 24, 2020 2 || (ECF Nos. 21, 45); and DENIES the permanent injunction requested by the Plaintiff. The 3 || Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file. 5 Dated: November 5, 2020 | Odd (2 re Honorable Todd W. Robinson 8 United States District Court 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28