Savannah Valley Carpets v. Ellison (In Re Ellison)

34 B.R. 120, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 6779
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedFebruary 18, 1983
Docket16-71344
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 34 B.R. 120 (Savannah Valley Carpets v. Ellison (In Re Ellison)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Savannah Valley Carpets v. Ellison (In Re Ellison), 34 B.R. 120, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 6779 (Ga. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON OBJECTIONS TO DISCHARGE

ROBERT F. HERSHNER, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 23, 1981, Defendants Mike Ellison, d/b/a Ellison Builders, a/k/a Mike Ellison Construction, and Judy Ann Ellison filed with this Court their joint petition under Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code. On February 9, 1982, Plaintiffs Gaines Ace Hardware, Savannah Valley Carpets, and Harbin Lumber Co. of Royston (hereinafter Plaintiffs) each filed an adversary proceeding objecting to Defendants’ discharge in bankruptcy.

All three adversary proceedings assert the same grounds for denying Defendants a discharge in bankruptcy, and on March 22, 1982, the Court, with the consent of all parties, entered an order consolidating the three adversary proceedings. A trial in the consolidated adversary proceedings was held on May 11, 1982, at which time the complaints were dismissed as to Defendant Judy Ann Ellison.

After reviewing the evidence and considering the briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs’ objections must be sustained and Defendant denied a discharge in bankruptcy. In support of its opinion, the Court publishes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Defendant was a contractor engaged in the business of constructing private residences. Defendant testified that in the eleven months prior to filing his bankruptcy case, he received approximately $315,000 in gross income from his business.

Defendant’s business should have functioned in the following manner. Typically, the person for whom Defendant contracted to build a residence would obtain a loan from a lending institution, and as the construction progressed, Defendant would be given “advances” from the loan proceeds. From the advances, Defendant was to pay his suppliers from whom he purchased the materials necessary for the construction of the residence.

When construction of the residence was completed, Defendant was required to sign an “affidavit of completion,” certifying that all materialmen and laborers had been paid for the materials and services furnished for the construction of the residence. 1 If the lender was the Farmers Home Administration (FHA), Defendant was also required to complete a form designated as a “Release by Claimants.” In order to complete the form, Defendant was required to obtain the signature of each claimant who had supplied labor or materials for the residence. The signature of the laborer or material-man served as an added check to insure that all claims for labor and material had in fact been paid. After Defendant submitted all necessary documents in completed fashion, the final distribution of the loan proceeds would be made to him.

The procedure described above is the way Defendant’s business transactions should have worked. However, as Defendant’s financial condition deteriorated, he ceased making the payments to Plaintiffs and other suppliers. In order to obtain final payment from the FHA, Defendant caused fictitious names to be entered on the FHA’s “Release by Claimants” forms. He then caused the FHA’s funds to be deposited into his checking account.

Defendant did not keep any records of his business dealings other than his cancelled checks and bank statements. He did not keep books indicating to whom he owed *123 money or for what residence a claimant had supplied materials or labor. At trial, he could not testify as to how much he had paid his laborers because he kept no records of his cash payments to them. From Defendant’s records, it is impossible to ascertain the disposition of a large portion of the loan proceeds which he received in his construction business. In particular, large cash withdrawals from his checking account, sometimes as much as $12,000 in one month, are undocumented. In addition, it is difficult to ascertain what portion of Defendant’s resources were used to fund an unsuccessful attempt to operate a barbeque businéss.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In their complaints, Plaintiffs have asserted that Defendant must be denied a discharge on four grounds:

1. That Defendant destroyed, mutilated, falsified, concealed or failed to keep or preserve books of account or records from which his financial condition and business transactions might be ascertained;
2. That Defendant has failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or deficiency of asserts to meet his liabilities;
3. That Defendant has failed to list the names, addresses, and amounts due and owing all of his creditors; and
4. That during September, October, and November, 1981, Defendant transferred, removed, destroyed or concealed, or permitted to be removed, destroyed, sold or concealed, his property with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors.

The Court will first address Plaintiffs’ fourth ground, that Defendant has transferred property with the intent of hindering, delaying, or defrauding his creditors. This argument is based on section 727(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(2)(A) (West 1979). When such an allegation is made, the burden is on the party objecting to discharge to prove the facts essential to his objection. R.Bankr.P. 407, Home Indemnity Co. v. Oesterle (In re Oesterle), 651 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2268, 73 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1982).

The Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden on their contention that Defendant has transferred property with the intent to hinder, defraud or delay a creditor. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the facts essential for the Court to find that Defendant has made any transfer of property of the estate with the requisite intent to hinder, defraud or delay a creditor of the estate. Thus, the Court may not sustain Plaintiffs’ objection on the basis of section 727(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Plaintiffs, in their first ground, argue that Defendant has not kept books or records from which Defendant’s financial status may be ascertained. This ground for objection to discharge is found in section 727(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that:

(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—
(3)the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor’s financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of the case ....

11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(3) (West 1979).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
34 B.R. 120, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 6779, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/savannah-valley-carpets-v-ellison-in-re-ellison-gamb-1983.