Savage, J. v. Trump, D.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 13, 2025
• Docket: 1000 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A06005-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

JAMES SAVAGE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DONALD J. TRUMP, AND DONALD J. : TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., : JENNA ELLIS, RUDOLPH W. : No. 1000 EDA 2024 GIULIANI, GREGORY STENSTROM, : LEAH HOOPES, PHILLIP KLINE, : THOMAS MOORE SOCIETY, : RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, PLLC : : : APPEAL OF: J. CONOR CORCORAN :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 12, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 211002495

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 13, 2025

J. Conor Corcoran, Esquire (Appellant) appeals from the order of the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered on March 12, 2024,

finding that Appellant violated the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.

After review, we vacate the order.

The trial court accurately summarized the factual and procedural history

of the case. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/24, at 1-3. Briefly, we state the

facts relevant to our disposition. Appellant represented James Savage in the

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A06005-25

underlying action claiming that Appellees1 defamed Savage with regards to

his actions as a voting machine supervisor during the 2020 presidential

election.

On February 14, 2024, Appellees filed a motion seeking monetary

sanctions and a finding that Appellant violated the Rules of Professional

Conduct regarding Appellant’s filing of a prior motion that the trial court

denied. On February 28, 2024, Appellant filed a praecipe for discontinuance.

A few hours later, without having held a hearing, the trial court issued an

order denying Appellees’ motion for monetary sanctions but finding that

Appellant violated the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. 2

On March 1, 2024, the trial court vacated the February 28, 2024 order

and issued a substantively identical corrected order. On March 12, 2024, the

court vacated its March 1, 2024 order on Appellant’s motion because that

order had also been entered without a hearing. After a hearing, on that same

day, the trial court again issued an order denying Appellees’ motion for

monetary sanctions but finding that Appellant violated the Pennsylvania Rules

of Professional Conduct. Appellant appealed. ____________________________________________

1 Savage filed suit against multiple individuals and organizations. Only two individuals, Gregory Stenstrom and Leah Hoopes, participated in the proceedings relevant to this appeal. To be concise we refer to them as Appellees. Although on January 31, 2024, we granted Appellees leave to file an Appellee Brief Nunc Pro Tunc within 10 days, they failed to file a brief as of the day this case was listed for argument, i.e., March 4, 2025.

2 We commend the trial court for candidly explaining that it had entered its

order of March 12, 2024, after Appellant’s praecipe for discontinuance had been filed. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/24, at 2 n.3.

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Appellant raises several arguments about why the trial court erred in

finding he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, we do not

reach those issues because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the

March 12, 2024 order after the discontinuance had been entered.

“A discontinuance shall be the exclusive method of voluntary

termination of an action, in whole or in part, by the plaintiff before

commencement of the trial.” Pa.R.C.P. 229(a). “The court, upon petition and

after notice, may strike off a discontinuance in order to protect the rights of

any party from unreasonable inconvenience, vexation, harassment, expense,

or prejudice.” Pa.R.C.P. 229(c).

“[W]hen an action is discontinued, there no longer is an action pending

before the trial court.” Motley Crew, LLC v. Bonner Chevrolet Co., 93 A.3d

474, 476 (Pa Super. 2014). “It is self-evident that if there is no action pending

before a court, there is no matter over which a court can or may exert

jurisdiction.” Id. An order entered by a court without jurisdiction is without

force and effect. See Jones v. McGreevy, 270 A.3d 1, 24 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Here, the action was terminated when Appellant filed the praecipe for

discontinuance. Neither Appellees nor any other party petitioned the trial court

to strike the discontinuance. After the case had been discontinued there was

no action pending before the trial court over which it could exert jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the orders issued after the case had been discontinued, which

orders are the subject of this appeal, were a legal nullity. Those orders were

dated February 28, 2024, March 1, 2024, March 5, 2024, and March 12, 2024.

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We acknowledge that the trial court had vacated all of these orders except the

March 12th order, however, out of concern for Appellant, we state that all of

these orders were a legal nullity. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s order

of March 12, 2024.

Orders vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 3/13/2025

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