Sauzo v. Weiss

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sauzo v. Weiss

11 A.D.3d 220, 784 N.Y.S.2d 477, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11535

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 5, 2004

StatusPublished

This text of 11 A.D.3d 220 (Sauzo v. Weiss) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sauzo v. Weiss, 11 A.D.3d 220, 784 N.Y.S.2d 477, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11535 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004).

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Opinion

[221]*221Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Gerald V Esposito, J.), entered July 8, 2003, which denied the motion of G & F Management Co. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant management company failed to establish that it ceased managing the building before the infant plaintiff’s alleged exposure to lead paint, which began in April 1990. Accordingly, it failed to satisfy its burden as summary judgment movant to demonstrate a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). We note as well that the evidence submitted by plaintiff in opposition to the summary judgment motion was, in any event, sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether the infant plaintiffs high lead levels were attributable to exposure at the subject building predating the cessation of defendant’s management responsibilities there (see Munoz v Puretz, 301 AD2d 382 [2003]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Williams, Friedman, Marlow and Sweeny, JJ.

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[221]*221Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Gerald V Esposito, J.), entered July 8, 2003, which denied the motion of G & F Management Co. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant management company failed to establish that it ceased managing the building before the infant plaintiff’s alleged exposure to lead paint, which began in April 1990. Accordingly, it failed to satisfy its burden as summary judgment movant to demonstrate a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). We note as well that the evidence submitted by plaintiff in opposition to the summary judgment motion was, in any event, sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether the infant plaintiffs high lead levels were attributable to exposure at the subject building predating the cessation of defendant’s management responsibilities there (see Munoz v Puretz, 301 AD2d 382 [2003]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Williams, Friedman, Marlow and Sweeny, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

11 A.D.3d 220, 784 N.Y.S.2d 477, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11535, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sauzo-v-weiss-nyappdiv-2004.

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