Saunders v. State
This text of 375 A.2d 453 (Saunders v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In this appeal from defendant's Superior Court jury convictions of criminal solicitation in the second degree (to commit robbery) (11 Del.C. § 502)1 and conspiracy in the second degree (11 Del.C. § 512),2 several grounds for reversal are asserted which we need not reach because we find that the Trial Judge committed reversible error by failing to excuse two possibly prejudiced jurors and failing to declare a mistrial.
I
In the evening of the second day of trial, defendant voluntarily committed himself to the psychiatric ward of the Delaware Division of the Wilmington Medical Center. The next day the jury was temporarily excused and the case continued in order to ascertain the condition and nature of defendant’s commitment. The Clinical Director of the Delaware State Hospital, called into the case to examine the defendant, diagnosed defendant’s condition as “significantly depressed and a substantial suicide hazard.” The Trial Judge committed defendant to the Delaware State Hospital subject to further review in three days, temporarily excused the jury again, and reserved for decision a motion made by defendant for a mistrial. At the State’s request, the Trial Judge granted an in camera hearing, outside the presence of defendant or his counsel, apprising the Trial Judge of investigative information of other criminal activities and possible malingering of defendant, offered by the State to support its objections to defendant’s motion for a mistrial.3
Later that night, before he could be transported to the Delaware State Hospital, defendant left the psychiatric ward of the Delaware Division of the Wilmington Medical Center without authorization. He was apprehended a short time later in nearby Pennsylvania by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigations possessing a warrant for his arrest on another charge, returned to Delaware, and, the next day, committed [455]*455to Delaware State Hospital under $137,000. bail.
On the sixth day after the original continuance, defendant’s motion for a mistrial was denied, and trial before the jury was resumed, following testimony of the Clinical Director of the Delaware State Hospital, reversing himself, that defendant’s depression and suicidal tendencies had terminated.
Because of newspaper publicity surrounding these developments, defense counsel requested that an inquiry be directed to the jury to determine if any of the jurors were aware of the news articles and, if so, if there was possible prejudice. Two jurors responded affirmatively and were individually questioned by the Trial Judge to determine possible prejudice.
II
This case is a sequel to United States ex rel. Clark v. Anderson, D.Del., 356 F.Supp. 445 (1973), reversed on other grounds, 3rd Cir., 502 F.2d 1080 (1974); Payne et al. v. State, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 1010 (1976) and Smith v. State, Del.Supr., 317 A.2d 20 (1974). In Clark and Payne the Trial Court took adequate steps to screen possible contamination from the jury before trial; in Smith the Trial Judge, during trial, conducted an inquiry to determine whether a newspaper article had been read by the jurors or discussed by them and, upon learning that one juror had read the article but had not discussed it with any other juror,, excused and replaced the juror with an alternate. In the instant case, on the other hand, the two jurors not only were aware of the articles but, at the outset of the Trial Judge’s questioning, expressed possible prejudice arising therefrom. Faced with a mistrial because of lack of alternate jurors, the Trial Judge finally satisfied himself, after extensive rehabilitative and leading questioning, that the two jurors could properly perform their duties and decide the case fairly, without bias or prejudice, on the evidence presented.
The conduct of an inquiry into the possibility of prejudice, and the giving of curative instructions, is entirely within the discretion of the Trial Judge and will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse. Smith v. State, supra.
Having neither observed nor heard the jurors’ responses to the Court’s inquiry, we are reluctant to reverse the Trial Judge, obviously satisfied that his questioning and instructions had purged the jurors of any possible initial prejudice. After reviewing the record,4 however, we have concluded [456]*456that sufficient bias and prejudice on the part of the two jurors is manifested to require a new trial as a matter of due process.
Reversed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
375 A.2d 453, 1977 Del. LEXIS 716, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/saunders-v-state-del-1977.