Saunders v. Saunders
This text of Saunders v. Saunders (Saunders v. Saunders) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEBORAH A. SAUNDERS,
Plaintiff, v. No. 23-cv-2154 (DLF) MALACHIAH SAUNDERS, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Deborah A. Saunders, proceeding pro se, seeks relief from the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (“PBGC”) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),
29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Before the Court is PBGC’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 49. For the reasons
that follow, the Court will grant the motion.
Saunders is the ex-wife of Malachiah Saunders, a former employee of General Motors.
Pl.’s Pet. for Declaratory J. & Injunctive Relief at 2, Dkt. 5. Her complaint is not a model of
clarity, but it seems to allege that her ex-husband “never reported or disclosed” their marriage “to
the GM . . . [b]enefits office.” Id. “Nevertheless,” Saunders says she is entitled to pension benefits
either under her ex-husband’s pension plan or pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order
(“QDRO”) within the meaning of ERISA. Id.
Saunders sued her ex-husband and PBGC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. Id. at 1. The Georgia court dismissed Saunders’ ex-husband from the case
for want of personal jurisdiction, Dkt. 40, and then transferred her remaining claims against PBGC
to this district, Dkt. 50. PBGC moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 49. To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint
must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim is facially plausible when the complaint contains ‘factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.’” Sanchez v. Office of State Superintendent of Educ., 45 F.4th 388, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2022)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints
“liberally,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), but even a pro se complaint must “plead
factual matter that permits [a] court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” Jones
v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
Under ERISA, “any . . . beneficiary” of a PBGC-administered pension plan may “bring an
action against [PBGC] for appropriate equitable relief.” 29 U.S.C. § 1303(f)(1). Section
1303(f)(1) creates “the exclusive means for bringing actions” against PBGC in its capacity as plan
administrator. Id. § 1303(f)(4). PBGC concedes that it administers Malachiah Saunders’ pension
plan, PBGC’s Mem. of Points & Authorities in Support of Def.’s Renewed Mot. to Dismiss at 2,
Dkt. 49-1, meaning the Court must only decide whether Saunders’ complaint plausibly states a
claim “for appropriate equitable relief” under 29 U.S.C. § 1303(f)(1).
It does not. Insofar as Saunders contends that PBGC must award her benefits under the
terms of her ex-husband’s pension plan, her complaint does not “plead[] factual content” that
makes the contention “plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, her filings do not quote, cite,
or summarize the terms of the General Motors plan. They allege that Saunders has “rights” as an
“alternate payee” and is “qualified” as a “former-spouse” under that plan, Pl.’s Pet. at 2–3, Dkt. 5,
but those assertions amount to legal conclusions that the Court may properly disregard, see
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
2 Nor does Saunders plausibly allege that PBGC must award her benefits pursuant to a
QDRO. Although ERISA says that “benefits provided under [a] plan may not be assigned or
alienated,” 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), it creates an exception for assignments made pursuant to “a
qualified domestic relations order,” id. § 1056(d)(3)(A). A QDRO is a judicial “judgment, decree,
or order” that (1) “concerns ‘the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property
rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a [plan] participant’”; (2) “is ‘made
pursuant to a State domestic relations law’”; and (3) “creates or recognizes an alternate payee’s
right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, a portion” of a plan participant’s retirement
benefits. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 846 (1997) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)–(ii)).
Nothing in Saunders’ complaint, however, even hints that a court has entered a judgment, decree,
or order in her favor. If anything, an attachment to the complaint—an unsigned order purporting
to be a QDRO—affirmatively suggests that no court has entered such an order. See Pl.’s Pet. at
10–12, Dkt. 5; cf. Dkt. 53-3 at 1 (describing Saunders’ order as a “draft” QDRO rather than “an
original signed domestic relations order”). All told, Saunders’ complaint does not “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,” to make it plausible that a QDRO entitles her to
anything. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Saunders replies that “[a] federal court . . . should have signed [her]” blank QDRO. Pl.’s
Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 9, Dkt. 53. Not so. To acquire a right to her ex-husband’s
pension benefits through a QDRO, Saunders must sue her ex-husband and obtain relief against
him “pursuant to [an applicable] State or Tribal domestic relations law.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II). She cannot obtain a QDRO by suing PBGC in federal court. Indeed, it is
not obvious that federal courts have jurisdiction to issue QDROs. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504
U.S. 689, 701–04 (1992); cf. VanderKam v. VanderKam, 776 F.3d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
3 (describing QDROs as “state-court orders”). Nor does it help Saunders that federal law governs
whether a state-court judgment qualifies as a QDRO. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)–(C). Although
federal law settles which domestic relations orders are “qualifying” under ERISA, it does not
require federal courts to enter domestic relations orders on their own. And at any rate, Saunders’
complaint does not allege that any court, federal or state, has entered any judgment in her favor,
QDRO or otherwise.
Finally, the Court notes that Saunders has filed two pleadings that the Court might construe
as her operative complaint: a Complaint for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Injunctive Relief,
Dkt.
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