KAUGER, J.
¶ 1 The issue presented is whether respite/certified foster parents should have been allowed to participate in a proceeding to remove a child from their home. We hold that 10 O.S. Supp.2002 § 7208
does not divest
the trial court of its duty to determine the child’s best interests in a removal proceeding. Under the facts presented, a proper determination of the child’s best interest requires that all the foster parents be allowed to fully participate in the removal proceeding. Therefore, we assume original jurisdiction and grant the writ of prohibition and writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to hold another hearing regarding the child’s removal.
FACTS
¶2 This controversy centers around two foster families, Doctors Greg and Deborah Saul (the Sauls) and their neighbors, the Hagermans, who live across the street from the Sauls. On November 6, 2006, Angela Elizabeth Miller gave birth to a baby girl, B.D.M. Upon her birth, the Department of Human Services (DHS) removed B.D.M. from her mother and took her into emergency custody. On December 11, 2006, B.D.M. was adjudicated deprived and the mother relinquished her parental rights to two of her other children. B.D.M. was initially placed with the Hagermans who were already ear-ing for B.D.M.’s older half-sister, R.M.
¶3 According to the Sauls, as early as December of 2006, when the child was approximately 4 weeks old, they began providing respite care for B.D.M. on a intermittent basis. DHS insists that B.D.M. remained in the Hagermans’ care for about four months after her birth, or until sometime near the end of February, 2007. Nevertheless, by March 9, 2007, the Sauls became certified foster parents with B.D.M. in their care.
¶ 4 On June 7, 2007, the trial court held a review hearing and DHS recommended that B.D.M. remain with the Sauls. The trial court approved the recommendation and it decided that the Sauls could take the child overseas for a family vacation. On June 11, 2007, the trial court approved an order authorizing the Sauls to obtain a passport for the child. Abruptly, the next day, June 12, 2007, DHS sent a written notice to the Sauls notifying them that B.D.M. would be removed from their home on June 19, 2007, and placed with the Hagermans.
¶ 5 On June 15, 2007, upon request of the child’s attorney and in agreement with the assistant district attorney, the trial court stayed the removal of B.D.M. until a hearing on the matter could be held. The parties participated in foster parent mediation, but nothing was resolved. On July 30, 2007, the trial court held another hearing. The hearing revealed that:
1) B.D.M. had spent approximately four months of her life with the Sauls and four months with the Hagerman; 2) moving the child was allegedly part of the Department’s long-term and permanency placement plan to reunite the half-siblings, even though two other siblings were not with the Hagermans; 4) both families wish to adopt B.D.M.; 5) the Sauls had provided intermittent respite care for the Hager-mans because of some family tragedies; 6) the Sauls were willing to sign a contract agreeing to keep the half-siblings in close contact with each other; 7) caseworkers at DHS changed and the removal coincided with the change in caseworkers; 8) the Sauls initially provided respite care, but were under the belief that they had become the assigned foster parents.
The trial court did not hear testimony or take evidence from either set of foster parents, and no evidence was heard regarding the effects the move might have on the child. Neither the original caseworker nor the new
caseworker attended the hearing to explain the removal.
¶ 6 The trial court lifted the temporary stay on B.D.M.’s removal and approved the DHS request to place B.D.M. with the Hag-ermans. It found that: 1) DHS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its decision to remove B.D.M.; 2) the Sauls lacked standing to object to the removal because they had not had custody of the child for at least six months as required by 10 O.S. Supp.2002 § 7208;
and 3) it was in B.D.M.’s best interest to be placed with the Hagermans.
¶ 7 On August 16, 2007, the Sauls filed an application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for emergency relief, and writs of mandamus and prohibition. They sought an emergency stay of the trial court’s order allowing the child’s removal from their home. They also requested writs requiring the trial court to: 1) conduct a hearing wherein they would be provided an opportunity to participate and present testimony regarding the child’s removal; and 2) return B.D.M. to their home pending a proper hearing.
¶8 On August 17, 2007, after oral arguments before a Court referee, the Vice Chief Justice denied the emergency application for a stay. On August 20, 2007, the biological mother relinquished her parental rights to B.D.M., thereby making the child eligible for adoption. The Sauls filed a petition for adoption in Cleveland County on August 22, 2007. On September 6, 2007, the Sauls filed a supplemental appendix to their application to assume original jurisdiction advising the Court that the trial court has refused to allow them access to the juvenile court records in order to proceed with their petition for adoption.
We assume original jurisdiction.
¶ 9 TITLE 10 O.S. SUPP.2002 § 7208 DOES NOT DIVEST THE TRIAL COURT OF ITS DUTY TO DETERMINE THE BEST INTERESTS OF A CHILD IN A PROCEEDING TO MOVE THE CHILD FROM ONE FOSTER HOME TO ANOTHER. UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, A PROPER DETERMINATION OF THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS REQUIRES THAT FOSTER PARENTS BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDING TO REMOVE THE CHILD FROM THEIR HOME.
¶ 10 The Sauls argue that they have a substantive due process right
and a statutory procedural due process right
to at least present testimony at a hearing involving the removal of the child from their care. They insist that at the time of the July 30, 2007, hearing B.D.M. was eight months old and that they had cared for her most of her life and developed a strong familial bond with the child. The Sauls argue that because they had cared for B.D.M. for more than three months, 10 O.S. Supp.2002 § 7208(B)(2) allows them to present testimony regarding the “strengths, needs, behavior, important experiences and relationships of the child.”
¶ 11 DHS argues that the Sauls’ reliance on § 7208 is misplaced because the hearing was merely a hearing concerning lifting the stay of removal and not a removal hearing. DHS insists that the Sauls were given more due process than they might have been enti-
tied to because the trial court allowed their attorney to present evidence and argument concerning whether they had standing to show that DHS acted arbitrarily in its decision to remove the child. Finally, DHS contends that it has discretion as to where to place the child and the trial court is limited in its review of that discretion.
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KAUGER, J.
¶ 1 The issue presented is whether respite/certified foster parents should have been allowed to participate in a proceeding to remove a child from their home. We hold that 10 O.S. Supp.2002 § 7208
does not divest
the trial court of its duty to determine the child’s best interests in a removal proceeding. Under the facts presented, a proper determination of the child’s best interest requires that all the foster parents be allowed to fully participate in the removal proceeding. Therefore, we assume original jurisdiction and grant the writ of prohibition and writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to hold another hearing regarding the child’s removal.
FACTS
¶2 This controversy centers around two foster families, Doctors Greg and Deborah Saul (the Sauls) and their neighbors, the Hagermans, who live across the street from the Sauls. On November 6, 2006, Angela Elizabeth Miller gave birth to a baby girl, B.D.M. Upon her birth, the Department of Human Services (DHS) removed B.D.M. from her mother and took her into emergency custody. On December 11, 2006, B.D.M. was adjudicated deprived and the mother relinquished her parental rights to two of her other children. B.D.M. was initially placed with the Hagermans who were already ear-ing for B.D.M.’s older half-sister, R.M.
¶3 According to the Sauls, as early as December of 2006, when the child was approximately 4 weeks old, they began providing respite care for B.D.M. on a intermittent basis. DHS insists that B.D.M. remained in the Hagermans’ care for about four months after her birth, or until sometime near the end of February, 2007. Nevertheless, by March 9, 2007, the Sauls became certified foster parents with B.D.M. in their care.
¶ 4 On June 7, 2007, the trial court held a review hearing and DHS recommended that B.D.M. remain with the Sauls. The trial court approved the recommendation and it decided that the Sauls could take the child overseas for a family vacation. On June 11, 2007, the trial court approved an order authorizing the Sauls to obtain a passport for the child. Abruptly, the next day, June 12, 2007, DHS sent a written notice to the Sauls notifying them that B.D.M. would be removed from their home on June 19, 2007, and placed with the Hagermans.
¶ 5 On June 15, 2007, upon request of the child’s attorney and in agreement with the assistant district attorney, the trial court stayed the removal of B.D.M. until a hearing on the matter could be held. The parties participated in foster parent mediation, but nothing was resolved. On July 30, 2007, the trial court held another hearing. The hearing revealed that:
1) B.D.M. had spent approximately four months of her life with the Sauls and four months with the Hagerman; 2) moving the child was allegedly part of the Department’s long-term and permanency placement plan to reunite the half-siblings, even though two other siblings were not with the Hagermans; 4) both families wish to adopt B.D.M.; 5) the Sauls had provided intermittent respite care for the Hager-mans because of some family tragedies; 6) the Sauls were willing to sign a contract agreeing to keep the half-siblings in close contact with each other; 7) caseworkers at DHS changed and the removal coincided with the change in caseworkers; 8) the Sauls initially provided respite care, but were under the belief that they had become the assigned foster parents.
The trial court did not hear testimony or take evidence from either set of foster parents, and no evidence was heard regarding the effects the move might have on the child. Neither the original caseworker nor the new
caseworker attended the hearing to explain the removal.
¶ 6 The trial court lifted the temporary stay on B.D.M.’s removal and approved the DHS request to place B.D.M. with the Hag-ermans. It found that: 1) DHS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its decision to remove B.D.M.; 2) the Sauls lacked standing to object to the removal because they had not had custody of the child for at least six months as required by 10 O.S. Supp.2002 § 7208;
and 3) it was in B.D.M.’s best interest to be placed with the Hagermans.
¶ 7 On August 16, 2007, the Sauls filed an application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for emergency relief, and writs of mandamus and prohibition. They sought an emergency stay of the trial court’s order allowing the child’s removal from their home. They also requested writs requiring the trial court to: 1) conduct a hearing wherein they would be provided an opportunity to participate and present testimony regarding the child’s removal; and 2) return B.D.M. to their home pending a proper hearing.
¶8 On August 17, 2007, after oral arguments before a Court referee, the Vice Chief Justice denied the emergency application for a stay. On August 20, 2007, the biological mother relinquished her parental rights to B.D.M., thereby making the child eligible for adoption. The Sauls filed a petition for adoption in Cleveland County on August 22, 2007. On September 6, 2007, the Sauls filed a supplemental appendix to their application to assume original jurisdiction advising the Court that the trial court has refused to allow them access to the juvenile court records in order to proceed with their petition for adoption.
We assume original jurisdiction.
¶ 9 TITLE 10 O.S. SUPP.2002 § 7208 DOES NOT DIVEST THE TRIAL COURT OF ITS DUTY TO DETERMINE THE BEST INTERESTS OF A CHILD IN A PROCEEDING TO MOVE THE CHILD FROM ONE FOSTER HOME TO ANOTHER. UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, A PROPER DETERMINATION OF THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS REQUIRES THAT FOSTER PARENTS BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDING TO REMOVE THE CHILD FROM THEIR HOME.
¶ 10 The Sauls argue that they have a substantive due process right
and a statutory procedural due process right
to at least present testimony at a hearing involving the removal of the child from their care. They insist that at the time of the July 30, 2007, hearing B.D.M. was eight months old and that they had cared for her most of her life and developed a strong familial bond with the child. The Sauls argue that because they had cared for B.D.M. for more than three months, 10 O.S. Supp.2002 § 7208(B)(2) allows them to present testimony regarding the “strengths, needs, behavior, important experiences and relationships of the child.”
¶ 11 DHS argues that the Sauls’ reliance on § 7208 is misplaced because the hearing was merely a hearing concerning lifting the stay of removal and not a removal hearing. DHS insists that the Sauls were given more due process than they might have been enti-
tied to because the trial court allowed their attorney to present evidence and argument concerning whether they had standing to show that DHS acted arbitrarily in its decision to remove the child. Finally, DHS contends that it has discretion as to where to place the child and the trial court is limited in its review of that discretion.
¶ 12 Courts have a duty to guard with jealous care the interests of minors and to protect infants’ rights.
The state also has an interest in a child’s welfare and a responsibility to protect a child’s interest.
Under the Oklahoma Children’s Code, the paramount consideration in all proceedings concerning a child alleged or found to be deprived is the health, safety and best interests of the chid.
The purposes of laws relating to deprived children are to secure the permanency, care, health, safety and welfare of the child and to preserve family ties whenever possible.
The function of a foster home environment is to assure stability and to provide a family setting for the child.
¶ 13 The goal of providing a secure permanent environment for a deprived child is evident throughout our statutes governing children. DHS is responsible for the care of deprived children
and is required to complete comprehensive assessments of a child and a permanency goal.
Constant movement of children is restricted and discouraged. Pursuant to 10 O.S.2001 § 7003-5.4a, movement of a child in custody from one location to another is monitored by the court and notification to the foster parents is required.
¶ 14 Built into the statutory scheme for the protection of children are provisions for constant court supervision as well as participation and input from foster parents. For example, disposition hearings are held every six months to update the court on the status of a deprived child — and foster parents are required to be heard.
Title 10 O.S.2001 § 7003-5.6 provides in pertinent part:
... D. In addition to the parties, adequate prior written notice of review hearings shall be provided by the Department pursuant to rules promulgated by the Commission for Human Services to the current foster parents, pre-adoptive parent, or relative providing care for the child. A right to be heard at such hearings shall be provided by the court to the current foster parent of a child, the child’s guardian ad litem, and to any pre-adoptive parent or relative providing care for the child. Such
notice and right to be heard shall not be construed as requiring any foster parent, pre-adoptive parent or relative to be made a party to such deprived proceedings if not currently a party to the action.
E. The court shall receive all evidence helpful in deciding the issues before the court including, but not limited to, oral and written reports, which may be admitted and relied upon to the extent of then-probative value, even though not competent for purposes of an adjudicatory hearing. ...
DHS has an affirmative statutory duty to cooperate with and provide guidance and support to foster parents and foster families to promote stability and permanency.
Foster parents are guaranteed the right to provide input in the planning of services for a child and actively and fully participate in the decision-making process regarding the child pursuant to 10 O.S.2001 § 7206(9).
¶ 15 The statute in controversy, 10 O.S. Supp.2002 § 7208, is another example of a statute with a stated purpose “to promote stability for foster children and limit repeated movement of such children from one foster placement to another.”
Section 7208 provides, unless an emergency situation is involved, foster parents who have had a child for three (3) or more months are entitled to submit to the court written reports or present testimony concerning the strengths, needs, behavior, important experiences, and relationships of the child, in addition to such other information the court may request.
¶ 16 Section 7208 also provides for foster parents with whom the child has resided for more than six (6) months an entitlement to object to the removal.
At this juncture, the court is required to conduct an informal hearing within fifteen (15) working days and may order that the child may remain in or be returned to the objecting foster parent’s home if the court finds that the Department of Human Services or child-placing agency’s decision to remove the child was arbitrary or was inconsistent with the child’s treatment and service plan.
17. Be considered as a preferred placement option when a foster child who was formerly placed with the foster parent is to reenter foster care at the same level and type of care, if that placement is consistent with the best interest of the child and other children in the foster parent's home;
¶ 17 DHS’s argument that this statute was inapplicable to the proceedings because the hearing was merely to determine whether to stay the removal rather than a removal hearing is unconvincing. To label the nature of the hearing as such puts form over function. The function of the hearing was to determine whether the removal should occur because it was in the child’s best interests. Under the unique circumstances of this case, no emergency is involved and the child had not resided with either set of foster parents for a full six months — both had kept the child at least three months. The trial court heard from neither set of foster parents nor did it hear evidence regarding the effects of the move on the child. Under 10 O.S. Supp.2002 § 7208,
the trial court was required to determine whether the DHS decision was arbitrary, but neither caseworker involved in the decision to place this child was present to testify and explain the abrupt removal. DHS explained the removal as being consistent with the
long-term treatment plan of reuniting the half-siblings.
¶ 18 Pursuant to 10 O.S.2001 § 7202,
when two or more foster children are siblings, reasonable attempts should be made to place them in the same temporary or permanent home or at least be allowed contact or visitation with one other. However, the standard in determining whether they should be placed in the same foster placement or allowed contact with other siblings is the best interests of each sibling.
The trial court could not have made such a determination without hearing from both sets of foster parents and from the DHS caseworkers involved. The effect of the trial court’s order as applied to the facts of this case was to make placing a child with a sibling in and of itself automatically in the child’s “best interests” in degradation of § 7202.
The trial court’s function is not to rubber stamp a DHS placement plan.
¶ 19 We have previously held that foster parents, who are also persons
in loco paren-tis,
have standing to intervene as a matter of right and assert their justiciable interest in an adoption proceeding.
Other jurisdictions have determined that foster parents have standing in some custody proceedings as well.
The Sauls have been given statutory standing and due process rights which allow full participation in custody proceedings.
When viewed collectively, it is clear that applying § 7208 to forego the Sauls an opportunity to fully participate in the proceedings would be in degradation of the trial court’s duty to determine the child’s best interests. There is no indication that § 7208 was intended by the Legislature to divest the trial court of this duty, especially when the overall statutory scheme of stability, permanency and foster parent input concerning custody decisions is considered.
Section
7208 states on its face that it was intended to discourage DHS from abruptly moving children from one foster home to another. Accordingly, another hearing is required in which the foster parents must be allowed to participate.
CONCLUSION
¶20 The goal of providing for the permanency, care, health, safety and welfare of children is found throughout our statutes relating to deprived children. The function of a foster home is to assist in carrying out these goals. Involved in this cause are two foster families who have assisted in providing for the care of B.D.M. Both families are interested in adopting the child, yet neither was included in the decision-making process to move the child from one home to another. Built into the statutory scheme for the protection of children are provisions for constant input, coordination, and participation from foster parents. These provisions provide foster parents with standing and due process rights. Title 10 O.S. Supp.2002 § 7208 was intended to prevent DHS from suddenly moving foster children from one home to another. It was not intented to divest the trial court from considering the child’s best interests when determining whether a child should be placed with a half-sibling. Because the Sauls were not allowed to participate in the removal proceedings, we assume original jurisdiction and grant the Sauls’ request for a writ requiring the trial court to conduct a hearing in which they have an opportunity to participate and present testimony regarding the child’s removal. However, we decline to require that the child be returned to the Sauls pending that prompt hearing.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED; WRITS GRANTED IN PART.
ALL JUSTICES CONCUR.