Opinion issued March 24, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00658-CR ——————————— SAUL RANCIER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 239th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 84493-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Saul Rancier appeals his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02. He pleaded guilty, and after a punishment
hearing, the trial court sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment. He moved for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing. After
a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
On appeal, Rancier argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
new trial because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses to
testify at the sentencing hearing. We affirm.
Background
Rancier pleaded guilty without an agreed punishment recommendation.
Evidence at the punishment hearing established that in 2017, Rancier and some
coworkers celebrated his promotion at his long-time employer by going to two
bars. They stayed at the second bar for several hours. When they left, a group of
four men followed them out of the bar and confronted Rancier and his friends, then
went back inside the bar. Rancier saw his friends off and went to his car.
A second group of men surrounded Rancier at his car. The trial court viewed
a video of the rest of the interaction. Rancier got a pistol from his car and put it in
his pocket. Another man approached the group and began arguing with Rancier
about a mutual acquaintance. The man testified at sentencing that he was agitated
and confrontational as he approached Rancier. The man and Rancier exchanged
some curse words, and then the man turned to walk away. When the man turned
around, Rancier heard him say something about a gun. Believing that the man was
reaching for his weapon, Rancier shot him six times. Bystanders tackled Rancier
2 and began hitting him in the face to disarm him, and Rancier was badly beaten.
The police arrived at the scene and arrested him.
The evidence at the sentencing hearing included a presentence investigation
report (“PSI”). Rancier had been released on bond without issue for seven years
after his arrest. The PSI included Rancier’s letter to the court explaining his regret
and requesting leniency along with favorable letters from three coworkers
recounting Rancier’s integrity and kindness, his willingness to help others, and his
pride in his family.
Additionally, the court admitted two other letters into evidence. Coworker
Jorge Roman’s letter describes Rancier as honest and hardworking. Roman says
that on the night in question, he and Rancier were provoked and harassed, and
Roman asks for leniency so that Rancier can raise his daughters. Rancier’s ex-wife
also wrote a letter stating that they had amicably separated after 20 years and that
they co-parent three daughters. His ex-wife described him as reliable and
dependable and a responsible partner and father.
Rancier testified at the sentencing hearing, and, by agreement with the State,
Rancier’s youngest daughter testified without cross-examination by reading her
letter of support to the court.
In closing argument, the State requested an 18-year sentence, and Rancier’s
counsel argued for 10 years’ community supervision. At the conclusion of the
3 hearing, the trial court sentenced Rancier to the maximum punishment of 20 years’
imprisonment.
Rancier moved for a new trial. In his motion, he argued that his trial counsel
failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. He
also argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to appropriately counsel him
on the effects of his guilty plea. He argued that he was unaware he had the right to
a jury trial or that a jury could have recommended he be placed on probation. After
a hearing, in which both Rancier and trial counsel testified, the trial court denied
the motion.
Rancier appealed.
Denial of Motion for New Trial
On appeal, Rancier argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for new trial. He argues that the motion should have been granted
because he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to
call witnesses to testify at the sentencing hearing and instead submitted letters from
them to the court. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
because Rancier did not meet his burden to show that his trial counsel performed
below objective standards of reasonableness and that, but for that performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. We agree with the State.
4 A. Standard of Review
Because Rancier raised his ineffective assistance claim in a denied motion
for new trial, we analyze the claim on appeal as a challenge to the trial court’s
ruling on that motion, and we review the ruling for an abuse of discretion.
Caballero v. State, 695 S.W.3d 467, 481 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023,
pet. ref’d). We will reverse the trial court’s ruling only if the decision to deny the
motion for new trial was arbitrary or unreasonable, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the ruling. Id.
We defer to the trial court’s decision to believe or disbelieve all or any part
of a witness’s testimony. Id. (explaining trial courts are better positioned than
appellate courts to evaluate witness credibility and to resolve conflicts in
evidence). “If there are two permissible views of the evidence, the trial court’s
choice between them cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.” Id. A trial court
abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no reasonable
view of the record could support the trial court’s ruling. Id. (citing Webb v. State,
232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
When, as here, the trial court makes no findings of fact on the denial of a
motion for new trial, we impute implicit factual findings that support the trial
judge’s ultimate ruling. Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 239 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005).
5 To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, an appellant must show that
(1) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). The Strickland standard applies to
ineffectiveness claims regarding trial counsel’s performance at both the guilt-
innocence and the punishment stages of trial. Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770,
772–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). An appellant must satisfy both prongs of the
Strickland test by a preponderance of the evidence; failure to demonstrate either
deficient performance or prejudice will defeat a claim of ineffectiveness. See Perez
v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
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Opinion issued March 24, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00658-CR ——————————— SAUL RANCIER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 239th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 84493-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Saul Rancier appeals his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02. He pleaded guilty, and after a punishment
hearing, the trial court sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment. He moved for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing. After
a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
On appeal, Rancier argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
new trial because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses to
testify at the sentencing hearing. We affirm.
Background
Rancier pleaded guilty without an agreed punishment recommendation.
Evidence at the punishment hearing established that in 2017, Rancier and some
coworkers celebrated his promotion at his long-time employer by going to two
bars. They stayed at the second bar for several hours. When they left, a group of
four men followed them out of the bar and confronted Rancier and his friends, then
went back inside the bar. Rancier saw his friends off and went to his car.
A second group of men surrounded Rancier at his car. The trial court viewed
a video of the rest of the interaction. Rancier got a pistol from his car and put it in
his pocket. Another man approached the group and began arguing with Rancier
about a mutual acquaintance. The man testified at sentencing that he was agitated
and confrontational as he approached Rancier. The man and Rancier exchanged
some curse words, and then the man turned to walk away. When the man turned
around, Rancier heard him say something about a gun. Believing that the man was
reaching for his weapon, Rancier shot him six times. Bystanders tackled Rancier
2 and began hitting him in the face to disarm him, and Rancier was badly beaten.
The police arrived at the scene and arrested him.
The evidence at the sentencing hearing included a presentence investigation
report (“PSI”). Rancier had been released on bond without issue for seven years
after his arrest. The PSI included Rancier’s letter to the court explaining his regret
and requesting leniency along with favorable letters from three coworkers
recounting Rancier’s integrity and kindness, his willingness to help others, and his
pride in his family.
Additionally, the court admitted two other letters into evidence. Coworker
Jorge Roman’s letter describes Rancier as honest and hardworking. Roman says
that on the night in question, he and Rancier were provoked and harassed, and
Roman asks for leniency so that Rancier can raise his daughters. Rancier’s ex-wife
also wrote a letter stating that they had amicably separated after 20 years and that
they co-parent three daughters. His ex-wife described him as reliable and
dependable and a responsible partner and father.
Rancier testified at the sentencing hearing, and, by agreement with the State,
Rancier’s youngest daughter testified without cross-examination by reading her
letter of support to the court.
In closing argument, the State requested an 18-year sentence, and Rancier’s
counsel argued for 10 years’ community supervision. At the conclusion of the
3 hearing, the trial court sentenced Rancier to the maximum punishment of 20 years’
imprisonment.
Rancier moved for a new trial. In his motion, he argued that his trial counsel
failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. He
also argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to appropriately counsel him
on the effects of his guilty plea. He argued that he was unaware he had the right to
a jury trial or that a jury could have recommended he be placed on probation. After
a hearing, in which both Rancier and trial counsel testified, the trial court denied
the motion.
Rancier appealed.
Denial of Motion for New Trial
On appeal, Rancier argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for new trial. He argues that the motion should have been granted
because he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to
call witnesses to testify at the sentencing hearing and instead submitted letters from
them to the court. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
because Rancier did not meet his burden to show that his trial counsel performed
below objective standards of reasonableness and that, but for that performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. We agree with the State.
4 A. Standard of Review
Because Rancier raised his ineffective assistance claim in a denied motion
for new trial, we analyze the claim on appeal as a challenge to the trial court’s
ruling on that motion, and we review the ruling for an abuse of discretion.
Caballero v. State, 695 S.W.3d 467, 481 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023,
pet. ref’d). We will reverse the trial court’s ruling only if the decision to deny the
motion for new trial was arbitrary or unreasonable, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the ruling. Id.
We defer to the trial court’s decision to believe or disbelieve all or any part
of a witness’s testimony. Id. (explaining trial courts are better positioned than
appellate courts to evaluate witness credibility and to resolve conflicts in
evidence). “If there are two permissible views of the evidence, the trial court’s
choice between them cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.” Id. A trial court
abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no reasonable
view of the record could support the trial court’s ruling. Id. (citing Webb v. State,
232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
When, as here, the trial court makes no findings of fact on the denial of a
motion for new trial, we impute implicit factual findings that support the trial
judge’s ultimate ruling. Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 239 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005).
5 To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, an appellant must show that
(1) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). The Strickland standard applies to
ineffectiveness claims regarding trial counsel’s performance at both the guilt-
innocence and the punishment stages of trial. Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770,
772–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). An appellant must satisfy both prongs of the
Strickland test by a preponderance of the evidence; failure to demonstrate either
deficient performance or prejudice will defeat a claim of ineffectiveness. See Perez
v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Under the second Strickland prong, “[t]he defendant must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. at 894 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). An appellant must
show more than “that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
B. Analysis
Rancier argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call
witnesses to testify live at his sentencing hearing. “The decision whether to present
6 witnesses is largely a matter of trial strategy.” Lopez v. State, 462 S.W.3d 180, 185
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). An attorney’s decision not to present particular witnesses at the
punishment stage “may be a strategically sound decision if the attorney bases it on
a determination that the testimony of the witnesses may be harmful, rather than
helpful to the defendant.” Shanklin v. State, 190 S.W.3d 154, 164 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005), pet. dism’d improvidently granted, 211 S.W.3d 315
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Monte Toussant and Charles
Finch, two of Rancier’s coworkers who wrote letters for Rancier testified that their
testimony at the sentencing hearing would have been like the letters they provided
the court. Jorge Roman, another coworker who wrote a letter, testified that he had
additional testimony he could have provided beyond his letter because he was
present the night of the shooting. The record reflects that Roman also gave a
statement to the police.
Trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial. He stated
that he chose to submit written letters from supportive individuals rather than have
them testify as live witnesses. He thought the contents of the letters, together with
the video of the events leading up to the shooting, were sufficient to argue for
leniency.
7 He said he met and spoke with family members, and he discussed with
Rancier whether to have his daughter testify. Given Rancier’s daughter’s young
age, counsel spoke to the State and got an agreement to have her read the letter
rather than be subject to cross-examination. Counsel thought the letter was
“moving” but that live testimony may have been “a bit much” and could
potentially be viewed in a negative light. Rancier’s trial counsel testified that he
spoke with Roman “many, many times” and that the video showed that although
Roman may have been at the bar that evening, none of Rancier’s coworkers were
with Rancier at the time of the shooting.
Counsel testified that live testimony is not always better than written
testimony. He explained that he did not call some witnesses to testify, such as
Rancier’s ex-wife, because he was concerned that doing so would subject her to
cross-examination that could be unfavorable. Counsel testified that in hindsight,
after Rancier received the maximum sentence, he would have called more live
witnesses to testify.
The evidence supports factual findings that trial counsel’s decisions
regarding live and written testimony at sentencing were based on sound trial
strategy. The trial court could have reasonably believed counsel’s testimony that he
was concerned for cross-examination and the effect of some live testimony. Trial
counsel stated that he considered whether to call live witnesses and decided to have
8 Rancier’s young daughter read her letter and submit the rest of the support by letter
to the court.
The record supports the trial court’s determination that appellant’s
representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness based on
prevailing professional norms. See Carter v. State, 506 S.W.3d 529, 540–41 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (stating that “[h]ere, defense counsel
made a reasoned, strategic choice to limit the character witnesses to the two that he
thought would be more persuasive to the judge and to avoid having several
witnesses testifying to essentially the same information”). Rancier did not meet his
burden to overcome the first prong of the Strickland test. See Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 669.
Moreover, even if his counsel’s performance had been deficient, Rancier
could not establish the second prong of Strickland, but for his counsel’s
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Perez, 310 S.W.3d at 893. Rancier argues that this case
is akin to Milburn v. State, a case in which an appellate court held defense
counsel’s unreasonable failure to present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing
hearing was prejudicial, amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. Milburn v.
State, 15 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). At
the motion for new trial hearing, defendant’s counsel admitted that he neither
9 investigated nor evaluated the punishment evidence, and the court held that the
defendant demonstrated prejudice because his counsel’s failure to present any
mitigating evidence deprived the appellant of the possibility of bringing out even a
single mitigating factor. Id. at 271. In contrast here, Rancier’s counsel procured
positive letters from employers, friends, and family. These statements, and a
statement from Rancier himself were included in the punishment evidence.
Rancier also has not established that testimony by live witnesses would have
differed from the statements they provided to the court. A defendant complaining
about trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses “must show the witnesses were
available and that he would have benefited from their testimony.” Robinson v.
State, 514 S.W.3d 816, 824 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d)
(internal quotation and citation removed). The witnesses at the hearing on the
motion for new trial each testified that their live testimony at the sentencing
hearing would have been similar to their written letters.
Rancier has not met his burden to establish the second prong of the
Strickland test. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rancier’s
motion for new trial. We overrule this issue.
10 Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Susanna Dokupil Justice
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).