Saucier v. Nichols Portland Div.
This text of Saucier v. Nichols Portland Div. (Saucier v. Nichols Portland Div.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT Cumberland, ss CIVIL ACTION Docket No. CV-07-349 ~EC --Cu.fY1 - \Y'J.?!./'oJ THELMA SAUCIER, Petitioner /Employee
v. ORDER ON MOTION TO VACATE NICHOLS PORTLAND DIVISION AND MOTION FOR A FINDING OF and CONTEMPT
CCMSI, I ~, /.', ",. Respondents / Employer
Before the Court is Employee Thelma Saucier's ("Saucier") Motion for a
Finding that the Employer Is in Contempt. Also before the Court is Employer
Nichols Portland Division's ("Nichols") Motion to Vacate this Court's August 16,
2007 Pro Forma Decree.
This Court grants Nichols' Motion to Vacate the Pro Forma Decree
entered by this Court on August 16, 2007. The Workers' Compensation Board
decree on which this Court's Pro Forma Decree was based was vacated by the
Law Court in its opinion Saucier v. Nichols, 2007 ME 132, 932 A.2d 1178.
Accordingly, this Court must vacate the Pro Forma Decree that was issued on the
basis of the decree of the Workers' Compensation Board (the "Board").
For the reasons stated below, this Court finds that Nichols was not in
contempt of the Pro Forma Decree during the time that the decree was in effect'
and, thus, denies Saucier's Motion for a Finding of Contempt. Saucier argues
that the fact that Nichols prevailed in its appeal to the Law Court does not alter
Nichols' obligation to pay 'Saucier interest pursuant to the Pro Forma Decree as 39-A M.R.S.A. § 324(1) states that "payments may not be suspended while the
appeal [to the Law Court] is pending." This Court first notes that it is not clear
whether or not the term "payments" as used in 39-A M.R.S.A. § 324(1) includes
interest. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that § 324(1) does include interest
payments within its scope, it has not been established what amount of interest is
owed in the instant case. The parties vary greatly on the amount alleged to be
owed. Nichols has already paid $13,489.25, the amount it believes it owed in
interest, after the Pro Forma Decree was issued. Saucier alleges that she is owed
a much greater amount of interest and that Nichols' failure to pay this greater
amount is in violation of the Pro Forma Decree.
The decision by the Board is silent as to the payment of interest. While
this fact does not preclude an employee from nonetheless collecting interest, it
does prevent the Superior Court from establishing a sum that an employer must
pay. Indeed, the Law Court has specifically stated that the role of the Superior
Court in Workers' Compensation proceedings is solely to issue a pro form decree
affirming the decision of the Board. Wilcox v. Stauffer Chemical Corp., 423 A.2d
241, 243 (Me. 1980) ("[The Superior Court's] authority is limited to rendering a
decree in accordance with the Commissioner's decision"). As such, this Court
cannot speak for the Board or cure any defects in the Board's decree. Id. ("The
Superior Court has no power to cure the defect in the decree"). For this reason,
the Pro Forma Decree entered by this Court did not state a specific amount of
interest owed, but rather stated that Nichols "shall pay to [Saucier] interest owed
as prescribed by 39-A M.R.S.A. § 205(6) in accordance with the award of the
December 29, 2006 decree, attached hereto, and in accordance with W.C.B. Rule,
ch. 8, § 7."
2 As the mandate "pay.. .in accordance with the [Board's] decree... and in
accordance with W.C.B. Rule, ch 8, § 7" is subject to several possible
interpretations, Nichols cannot be said to have violated a clear and unambiguous
order. Weiss v. Brown, 1997 ME 57, ~ 7, 691 A.2d 1208, 1210 (Law Court upheld
trial court's decision finding defendant in contempt because "the facts do not
generate any ambiguity in the clear and unambiguous provision of the decree
[that defendant violated]"). As such, Saucier cannot meet her burden of
persuasion "to establish that [Nichols'] failure to comply with the [Pro Forma
Decree] was contumacious." Zink v. Zink, 687 A.2d 229, 232 (Me. 1996).
Accordingly, Saucier's Motion for a Finding of Contempt is denied.
Therefore, the entry is:
Nichols Portland Division's Motion to Vacate the Pro Forma Decree issued by this Court on August 16, 2007 is GRANTED.
Thelma Saucier's Motion for a Finding of Contempt against Nichols Portland Division is DENIED.
The clerk shall incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
Dated at Portland, Maine this 21t/t.... day of dtft&u11k ,2007.
Robert E. Crowley Justice, Superior Court
3 : COURTS ld County lX 287 e 04112-0287
ALISON DENHAM ESQ ~ DOUGLAS DENHAM BUCCINA & ERNST PO BOX 7108 PORTLAND ME 04112-7108
COURTS Id County 'x 287 ~ 04112-0287
JAl'ffiS MACADAM ESQ - yt? 208 FORE ST PORTLAND ME 04101
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