Satsuma Pentecostal Church v. Harris
This text of 563 So. 2d 1247 (Satsuma Pentecostal Church v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
SATSUMA PENTECOSTAL CHURCH
v.
Melton HARRIS, Jr.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Tom Matheny, Hammond, for plaintiff.
Steven Y. Landry, Baton Rouge, James E. Kuhn, Denham Springs, for defendant.
Before EDWARDS, LANIER and FOIL, JJ.
EDWARDS, Judge.
This appeal is from a judgment rendered in two possessory actions; one was filed by plaintiffs and the second was filed by defendant as a reconventional demand. We amend the judgment, and as amended, affirm the judgment.
The plaintiffs, members and concerned worshippers of Satsuma Pentecostal Church (Church), an unincorporated association, filed a possessory action claiming that they had acquired the disputed property in 1935 and had possessed the property as owner since that time. The Church claimed that their possession had been disturbed by defendants.[1] The Church prayed *1248 for recognition of its possession and asked the trial court to order the defendants to assert their claim of ownership within sixty days of judgment in favor of plaintiffs or be precluded from so doing. The plaintiffs also filed a notice of lis pendens on June 16, 1980, in the records of Livingston Parish affecting the following described property:
Lot situated in Section 27, Township 6 South, Range 4 East, Parish of Livingston, State of Louisiana, on the western margin of the South Satsuma Road.
Defendant, Melton Harris, Jr., filed an answer and reconventional demand alleging that he had acquired the land by a "Sale with Assumption of Mortgage," dated November 10, 1977, and recorded in the records of Livingston Parish. Mr. Harris stated that he and his ancestors in title had been in possession of the property as owners since 1935. The possession was alleged to have been disturbed by the Church. The defendant, in his answer and reconventional demand, asked that (1) the Church's demand be dismissed; (2) the lis pendens be ordered cancelled; (3) Mr. Harris be recognized in his possession of the property; (4) damages be awarded for the disturbance; and (5) the Church be ordered "to assert any adverse claim of ownership of the property in a petitory action to be filed within sixty (60) days from the date of the judgment [in favor of Harris on the reconventional demand] becomes executory or be precluded thereafter from asserting the ownership thereof."[2]
After a trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the following judgment on the issues on appeal:
Upon hearing the evidence and after taking the matter under advisement, and considering the law and evidence to be in favor of the defendant, Melton Harris, Jr., in accordance with the Opinion rendered herein on December 7, 1988;
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there be judgment herein in favor of the defendant, Melton Harris, Jr., and against the plaintiff, Satsuma Pentecostal Church, dismissing the plaintiff's demands;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Satsuma Pentecostal Church is granted a period of six (6) months from the date of this judgment in which to remove the building from the subject property, and, in default thereof, the building shall revert to the owner of the subject property, Melton Harris, Jr., and/or his heirs or successors in title[.]
Plaintiffs, the Church, were also cast for all costs of the proceedings.
The trial court, in its reasons for judgment, found that the Church had not possessed the property as owner and had used the property in dispute with the permission of the record owners. The trial court opined that the notice of lis pendens should be erased and cancelled and that the church building belonged to the Church. The Church was given time to remove the building "from [the] Harris property." The trial court stated that it did not feel that plaintiff in reconvention [had] satisfactorily proved any damages by defendants in reconvention (the Church)."
The Church, plaintiffs in the original possessory action, appealed the judgment and assigned error to the trial court's failure to find that the Church had possession. Defendant, Mr. Harris, answered the appeal and assigned the following errors:
1. Failure of the trial court to order the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens; and
2. Failure of the trial court to order the Church to assert their claim of ownership of the disputed immovable property in a petitory action within the prescribed allowed time period.
It is clear from the testimony of the members and representatives of the Church, the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Harris, and the answers filed by the Church to interrogatories propounded by *1249 Mr. Harris that the Church used the property over the years with the permission of the owners and did not dispute the ownership or possession of the property until shortly before the original possessory action was filed in 1980.
LSA-C.C. art. 3437, 3438, 3439, and 3477 provide:
Art. 3437. Precarious possession.
The exercise of possession over a thing with the permission of or on behalf of the owner or possessor is precarious possession.
Art. 3438. Presumption of precariousness.
A precarious possessor, such as a lessee or a depositary, is presumed to possess for another although he may intend to possess for himself.
Art. 3439. Termination of precarious possession.
A co-owner, or his universal successor, commences to possess for himself when he demonstrates this intent by overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his co-owner.
Any other precarious possessor, or his universal successor, commences to possess for himself when he gives actual notice of this intent to the person on whose behalf he is possessing.
Art. 3477. Precarious possessor; inability to prescribe.
Acquisitive prescription does not run in favor of a precarious possessor or his universal successor.
The Church had permission to use the property and was a precarious possessor. The Church did not notify Mr. Harris of the Church's intent to claim possession for themselves until Mr. E.J. Snelgrove, as a representative of the Church, objected to Mr. Harris's proposed sale of the property and asserted the Church's claim of ownership.
To maintain a possessory action, the party claiming possession must allege and prove "possession quietly and without interruption for more than one year immediately prior to the disturbance...." LSA-C.C.P. art. 3658(2). Because the Church was a precarious possessor, the type of possession necessary to support a possessory action did not begin until Mr. Harris was clearly notified that the Church claimed ownership and, therefore, intended to possess for themselves and not on behalf of Mr. Harris. See LSA-C.C. art. 3439. The notice to Mr. Harris was not provided until early in 1980 when Mr. Snelgrove voiced his objection and made a claim on the property for the Church. The possessory action was filed in April of 1980. Because the suit was filed less than a year from the date the claim was made by the Church, the time period required by LSA-C.C.P. art. 3658(2) was not met.
After a thorough review of the record, we find no manifest error in the trial court's findings. The trial court did not err by holding in favor of Mr. Harris and dismissing the plaintiff's demand.
Defendant, Mr.
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563 So. 2d 1247, 1990 La. App. LEXIS 1684, 1990 WL 88911, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/satsuma-pentecostal-church-v-harris-lactapp-1990.