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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 ROBINSON AGUIRRE SATIZABAL, CASE NO. 20CR0440-LAB 12
Petitioner, 13 vs. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 14 SET ASIDE SENTENCE UNDER 15 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Respondent. 16 17 18 Robinson Aguirre Satizabal moves to vacate or set aside his sentence 19 under 28 U.S.C § 2255. (Dkt. 97). The Government opposes Satizabal’s 20 motion. (Dkt. 103). Having carefully considered the pleadings in this action, the 21 Court DENIES the motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 On July 28, 2020, Satizabal plead guilty to two charges: (1) possession 24 of cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel; and (2) operation of a 25 semi-submersible vessel without nationality. (Dkt. 97 at 15). The Court 26 sentenced him to 96-months in custody to be followed by five years of 27 supervised release. (Id.). Satizabal filed this motion to vacate his sentence on II. DISCUSSION 1 Satizabal raises two claims: (1) the court lacked subject matter 2 jurisdiction; and (2) his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. (Dkt. 97 3 at 13–14). The Government argues the motion must be dismissed because: 4 (1) it is untimely; (2) Satizabal waived his right to collaterally challenge the 5 conviction and sentence in his plea agreement; (3) he failed to satisfy his 6 burden of pleading facts to establish that his counsel performed ineffectively. 7 8 (Dkt. 103 at 2). 9 A. Statute of Limitations and Collateral Attack Waiver 10 1. Timeliness 11 Under 28 U.S.C § 2255(a) a prisoner in custody may move to vacate, set 12 aside, or correct a judgment if the sentence was imposed in violation of the 13 Constitution or laws of the United States, or the court was without jurisdiction 14 to impose such a sentence, or the sentence was longer than the maximum 15 authorized by law, or the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. A 16 one-year limitations period generally applies to such motions. The limitations 17 period runs from the date on which the judgment of conviction became final. 18 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f); United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 19 1994). A hearing on the motion must be granted “[u]nless the motions and the 20 files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to 21 no relief.” Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1465. 22 The Court entered judgment in this case on March 22, 2021. (Dkt. 95). 23 The one-year limitations period expired on March 22, 2022. Satizabal filed his 24 untimely motion on August 19, 2022 – five months after the one-year deadline. 25 (Dkt. 97). Satizabal argues his untimeliness should be excused because his 26 counsel “refused to give him any documents [from] his criminal case.” (Dkt. 106 27 at 2–3). He points to his unfamiliarity with the English language and with the resources created “exceptionally extraordinary and compelling circumstances 1 warranting equitable tolling.” (Id.). The Court is dubious that Satizabal’s 2 unsubstantiated excuses for filing late justify his 150-day delay, Frye v. 3 Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001), but regardless, there are 4 sufficient reasons to deny his petition on the merits. 5 6 2. Waiver The right to collaterally attack a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is 7 8 statutory in nature, and a defendant may waive the right. See, e.g., United 9 States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that by entering 10 a plea agreement and waiving the right to appeal sentencing issues, defendant 11 relinquished his right to seek collateral relief from his sentence on the ground 12 of newly discovered exculpatory evidence). Satizabal explicitly waived in 13 writing the right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence as 14 part of his plea agreement (Dkt. 54 at 3). A knowing and voluntary waiver of 15 the statutory right to collaterally attack one’s conviction is enforceable. United 16 States v. Navarro-Botello, 92 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). 17 Satizabal’s plea agreement expressly recited that his plea was knowing 18 and voluntary, and he signed an acknowledgment that he fully understood the 19 agreement’s terms. (Dkt. 54). In addition, during his guilty plea hearing, he 20 personally confirmed he understood the concept of collateral attack, stated he 21 was knowingly waiving his right to bring such an attack, and assured the Court 22 his waiver was of his own volition. (Dkt. 102 at 15). He agreed the waiver 23 applied to both his conviction and sentence, provided his sentence didn’t 24 exceed the high end of the guidelines range as calculated by the Government 25 in the plea agreement. (Dkt. 54 at 12–13). The high end of the range was 210 26 months, 114 months higher than the 96-month sentence the Court imposed. In 27 his motion, Satizabal grumbles about “tyrannical powers” and “fundamental waiver of collateral attack. (Dkt. 106 at 3–4). The Court finds Satizabal’s waiver 1 was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. A deal’s a deal, and here the waiver is 2 3 enforceable. His motion to vacate his properly-imposed sentence is DENIED. 4 B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel While a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can survive a valid 5 waiver of collateral attack, Washington v. Lampert, 422. F.3d 864,870 (9th Cir. 6 2005), Satizabal’s fake claims of attorney incompetence are patently bogus. 7 8 “[I]n the context of § 2255 challenges brought by federal prisoners, [collateral 9 attack] waivers cannot bar [ineffective assistance of counsel] claims associated 10 with the negotiation of plea agreements.” Id. To establish ineffective assistance 11 of counsel, a petitioner must prove more likely than not that: (1) the assistance 12 provided by counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 13 (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of 14 the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 15 668, 688 (1984). To satisfy Strickland’s deficiency prong, a petitioner must 16 show that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of 17 reasonableness” and wasn’t “within the range of competence demanded of 18 attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687 (quoting McMahan v. Richardson, 397 19 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). This is a difficult showing to make because there is a 20 “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of 21 professional assistance.” Id. at 689. 22 Satizabal complains his attorney failed to challenge the United States’ 23 jurisdiction over the case. But his lawyer was no dummy and knew that such 24 a challenge would have been pointless. (Dkt. 97 at 5, 16–17; Dkt. 106 at 1). 25 The semi-submersible, drug-loaded vessel in which Satizabal was arrested 26 was stateless or “without nationality” because: (1) the master of the vessel 27 failed to make a claim of nationality even when the arresting officer inquired; didn’t contain papers documenting the vessel’s nationality. (Dkt. 54 ¶ B.4).
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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 ROBINSON AGUIRRE SATIZABAL, CASE NO. 20CR0440-LAB 12
Petitioner, 13 vs. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 14 SET ASIDE SENTENCE UNDER 15 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Respondent. 16 17 18 Robinson Aguirre Satizabal moves to vacate or set aside his sentence 19 under 28 U.S.C § 2255. (Dkt. 97). The Government opposes Satizabal’s 20 motion. (Dkt. 103). Having carefully considered the pleadings in this action, the 21 Court DENIES the motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 On July 28, 2020, Satizabal plead guilty to two charges: (1) possession 24 of cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel; and (2) operation of a 25 semi-submersible vessel without nationality. (Dkt. 97 at 15). The Court 26 sentenced him to 96-months in custody to be followed by five years of 27 supervised release. (Id.). Satizabal filed this motion to vacate his sentence on II. DISCUSSION 1 Satizabal raises two claims: (1) the court lacked subject matter 2 jurisdiction; and (2) his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. (Dkt. 97 3 at 13–14). The Government argues the motion must be dismissed because: 4 (1) it is untimely; (2) Satizabal waived his right to collaterally challenge the 5 conviction and sentence in his plea agreement; (3) he failed to satisfy his 6 burden of pleading facts to establish that his counsel performed ineffectively. 7 8 (Dkt. 103 at 2). 9 A. Statute of Limitations and Collateral Attack Waiver 10 1. Timeliness 11 Under 28 U.S.C § 2255(a) a prisoner in custody may move to vacate, set 12 aside, or correct a judgment if the sentence was imposed in violation of the 13 Constitution or laws of the United States, or the court was without jurisdiction 14 to impose such a sentence, or the sentence was longer than the maximum 15 authorized by law, or the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. A 16 one-year limitations period generally applies to such motions. The limitations 17 period runs from the date on which the judgment of conviction became final. 18 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f); United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 19 1994). A hearing on the motion must be granted “[u]nless the motions and the 20 files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to 21 no relief.” Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1465. 22 The Court entered judgment in this case on March 22, 2021. (Dkt. 95). 23 The one-year limitations period expired on March 22, 2022. Satizabal filed his 24 untimely motion on August 19, 2022 – five months after the one-year deadline. 25 (Dkt. 97). Satizabal argues his untimeliness should be excused because his 26 counsel “refused to give him any documents [from] his criminal case.” (Dkt. 106 27 at 2–3). He points to his unfamiliarity with the English language and with the resources created “exceptionally extraordinary and compelling circumstances 1 warranting equitable tolling.” (Id.). The Court is dubious that Satizabal’s 2 unsubstantiated excuses for filing late justify his 150-day delay, Frye v. 3 Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001), but regardless, there are 4 sufficient reasons to deny his petition on the merits. 5 6 2. Waiver The right to collaterally attack a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is 7 8 statutory in nature, and a defendant may waive the right. See, e.g., United 9 States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that by entering 10 a plea agreement and waiving the right to appeal sentencing issues, defendant 11 relinquished his right to seek collateral relief from his sentence on the ground 12 of newly discovered exculpatory evidence). Satizabal explicitly waived in 13 writing the right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence as 14 part of his plea agreement (Dkt. 54 at 3). A knowing and voluntary waiver of 15 the statutory right to collaterally attack one’s conviction is enforceable. United 16 States v. Navarro-Botello, 92 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). 17 Satizabal’s plea agreement expressly recited that his plea was knowing 18 and voluntary, and he signed an acknowledgment that he fully understood the 19 agreement’s terms. (Dkt. 54). In addition, during his guilty plea hearing, he 20 personally confirmed he understood the concept of collateral attack, stated he 21 was knowingly waiving his right to bring such an attack, and assured the Court 22 his waiver was of his own volition. (Dkt. 102 at 15). He agreed the waiver 23 applied to both his conviction and sentence, provided his sentence didn’t 24 exceed the high end of the guidelines range as calculated by the Government 25 in the plea agreement. (Dkt. 54 at 12–13). The high end of the range was 210 26 months, 114 months higher than the 96-month sentence the Court imposed. In 27 his motion, Satizabal grumbles about “tyrannical powers” and “fundamental waiver of collateral attack. (Dkt. 106 at 3–4). The Court finds Satizabal’s waiver 1 was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. A deal’s a deal, and here the waiver is 2 3 enforceable. His motion to vacate his properly-imposed sentence is DENIED. 4 B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel While a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can survive a valid 5 waiver of collateral attack, Washington v. Lampert, 422. F.3d 864,870 (9th Cir. 6 2005), Satizabal’s fake claims of attorney incompetence are patently bogus. 7 8 “[I]n the context of § 2255 challenges brought by federal prisoners, [collateral 9 attack] waivers cannot bar [ineffective assistance of counsel] claims associated 10 with the negotiation of plea agreements.” Id. To establish ineffective assistance 11 of counsel, a petitioner must prove more likely than not that: (1) the assistance 12 provided by counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 13 (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of 14 the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 15 668, 688 (1984). To satisfy Strickland’s deficiency prong, a petitioner must 16 show that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of 17 reasonableness” and wasn’t “within the range of competence demanded of 18 attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687 (quoting McMahan v. Richardson, 397 19 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). This is a difficult showing to make because there is a 20 “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of 21 professional assistance.” Id. at 689. 22 Satizabal complains his attorney failed to challenge the United States’ 23 jurisdiction over the case. But his lawyer was no dummy and knew that such 24 a challenge would have been pointless. (Dkt. 97 at 5, 16–17; Dkt. 106 at 1). 25 The semi-submersible, drug-loaded vessel in which Satizabal was arrested 26 was stateless or “without nationality” because: (1) the master of the vessel 27 failed to make a claim of nationality even when the arresting officer inquired; didn’t contain papers documenting the vessel’s nationality. (Dkt. 54 ¶ B.4). 1 Congress long ago constitutionally extended United States criminal jurisdiction 2 over stateless vessels in international waters (where Satizabal was 3 apprehended). See United States v. Velarezo-Orobio, 635 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 4 2011) (upholding constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2285 as within Congress’s 5 authority under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 10); United States v. Marino- 6 Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1383 (11th Cir. 1982) (criminal jurisdiction properly 7 8 extended to any stateless vessels found in international waters), so there was 9 little point in Satizabal’s lawyer arguing otherwise. Because the Court properly 10 exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Satizabal, his “my lawyer was 11 incompetent claim” fails. 12 Satizabal’s other argument is that his counsel underperformed by not 13 challenging the reasonableness of his sentence (Dkt. 97 at 1, 27; Dkt. 106 14 at 1). To begin with, this argument ignores that Satizabal, via his plea 15 agreement, acquiesced to possibly receiving a sentence more than twice as 16 long as the sentence he received. His sentence was even below the low end 17 of his applicable Guidelines. Satizabal hasn’t identified the procedural error or 18 errors the Court supposedly committed, nor has he explained his rationale for 19 claiming his counsel should be faulted after he persuaded the Court to impose 20 a substantially reduced sentence. Satizabal’s grousing aside, nothing counsel 21 said or did fell below the objective standard of reasonableness of attorney 22 competency. 23 Satizabal’s claims that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective 24 assistance are DENIED. A hearing isn’t required because Satizabal hasn’t 25 made “specific factual allegations which, if true, would entitle him to relief.” 26 Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir.1982). Nor has Satizabal 27 established that he was prejudiced, i.e., that any different result would have 4 | Ul. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 2 A certificate of appealability is authorized “only if the applicant has made 3 ||a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 4 || § 2253(c)(2). Santizabal must show that “jurists of reason could disagree with 5 || the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could g || conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to 7 || proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). On this record, g || it is difficult to conceive that reasonable jurists would disagree with this Court's g || resolution of Santizabal’s claims or that the issues he raises should go any 10 || further. The Court DENIES a certificate if appealability. 41 || IV. CONCLUSION 12 Plaintiff's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 13 || 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate is DENIED. So is his request for appointment of 44 || counsel and for a certificate of appealability. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: May 26, 2023 17 laud 4: (Aywy7 18 Hon. LARRY ALANBURNS □□□□□□ 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28