Satari v. Commissioner of Transportation, No. Cv 9763692 S (Jan. 2, 2002)

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 57
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 2, 2002
DocketNo. CV 9763692 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 57 (Satari v. Commissioner of Transportation, No. Cv 9763692 S (Jan. 2, 2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Satari v. Commissioner of Transportation, No. Cv 9763692 S (Jan. 2, 2002), 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 57 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Kalig Satari, appeals from a "Notice of Condemnation and Assessment of Damages" filed by the defendant Commissioner of Transportation pursuant to §§ 13a-73 and 13a-73 (e) of the general statutes.

The State acquired portions of three parcels owned by the plaintiff. One of the parcels was 6.46 acres more or less, and the plaintiff is not pursuing any claim for the taking from that parcel for which he was awarded $5000. The two parcels which are the subject of this appeal consist of two contiguous parcels totaling approximately 130.8 acres. The property is located on Route 31 in the town of Coventry. It has approximately 1358' of frontage on the westerly side of Route 31. The purpose of the taking was to make improvements to Route 31 including improving the drainage there. Surface water naturally flows from the east side of the highway to the west side because of the generally gentle, downward sloping from east to west. The State acquired 1920 square feet, more or less, plus certain drainage rights of way, slope easements, and an easement to drain into a undefined area as indicated by disbursement arrows on the taking map. Additional temporary rights were taken for sedimentation control, to construct a driveway and to reset a perpendicular stone wall, however these additional rights terminated upon completion of the construction and did not impact the value of the property.

The State awarded $8000 for the 130 acre parcel which is the subject of the dispute. Henceforth any references to the property will be to the 130 acre parcel.

In the course of the hearing testimony was received from appraisers for both parties, from the plaintiffs professional engineer, the State's professional engineer, the State's expert in the field of drainage and hydraulics and the State's expert in the field of geo-technical engineering. CT Page 58

In addition to the trial testimony and documentary exhibits, the Court viewed the property in the company of counsel for both parties.

It is the duty of the Court to make its own independent determination of fair compensation based on the evidence presented, a viewing of the premises, and its own general knowledge. Commissioner of Transportationv. Farina, Superior Court, Judicial District of Ansonia/Milford at Milford No. CV 98-63707, July 16, 2001, (Curran, J.); McDermott v. NewHaven Redevelopment Agency, 184 Conn. 444 (1981).

The plaintiff has the burden of proof, using the civil standard of fair preponderance. Hall v. Weston, 167 Conn. 49 (1974); Schnier v. Ives,162 Conn. 171, 185 (1972), although the State, once the burden has been met, may have the burden of showing matters in mitigation of the damages. Schnier v. Ives, supra, p. 185.

The usual measure of damages where there is a partial taking is the difference between the market value of the whole tract before the taking and the market value of what remained of it thereafter. Lynch v. WestHartford, 167 Conn. 67, 73 (1974); Minicucci v. Commissioner ofTransportation, 211 Conn. 382, 384 (1989). The same rule applies whether the partial taking is the taking of a fee-simple interest or an easement interest, and the amount of the difference is the measure of damages. NewYork. N. H. and H.R. Co. v. New Haven, 81 Conn. 581, 583 (1909),D'Addario v. Commissioner of Transportation, 180 Conn. 355, 365 (1980). Fair market value has been defined as the price a willing seller and a willing buyer would agree upon following fair armslength negotiations taking into account the highest and best use of the property: Tandet v.Urban Redevelopment Commission, 179 Conn. 293, 298, (1979).

In this case, there is no dispute that the highest and best use of the property in question is for residential development.

The plaintiff claims the damage to his property caused by the five perpetual drainage rights of way easements, the easements to slope and the removal of a stone wall along the easterly border of his property resulted in damages of $211000.

The plaintiffs appraiser, Peter R. Marsele, ascribed $88688, to a taking of a field-stone wall which ran along the frontage of the property. He arrived at that number by using the Marshall and Swift cost calculation to arrive at the cost to replace a hypothetical stone wall totaling 1100 feet in length, with an average height of 3 feet and an average depth of 2.5 feet, and then depreciating that amount by 50% for the supposed condition of the wall prior to the taking. Marsele, CT Page 59 however, never viewed the property prior to the taking and relied on information given him by Mr. Satan, the owner. (Satari was not offered as a witness at trial).

There was conflicting evidence as to the state of the so-called wall. The State's witnesses described it as the remnants of an ancient wall and essentially rubble. Donald Aubrey, a professional engineer who has been doing sub-division engineering for Satari since 1986 testified that most of the frontage held a stone wall (albeit poorly maintained), and he testified he saw rocks being removed on more than one occasion, to be used by the State to build a stone wall on the easterly side of Route 31, on property not owned by Satari.

The taking maps do delineate walls running parallel to Route 31 on Sartani's property, however, that does not assist in determining the condition of the wall, (i.e. rubble, poorly maintained, or 50%). The Court cannot conclude, as the plaintiff would have it, that because a perpendicular stone wall approximately ten feet long which was substantially intact, did exist, that is evidence of there being a wall running along Route 31. In fact, the State undertook to reset the ten foot perpendicular wall, and it is more likely that it would likewise have done so if there was more than the ruble from an ancient wall running parallel to the highway.

In addition, credible testimony was offered that state employees specifically surveyed the property prior to the taking and while there were the ruble-like remnants of an old wall, even that was not continuous (testimony of Felix Rosado, project engineer). Further, photographs were taken to memorialize the condition of the so-called wall (Exhibits A2 through A16) and they substantiate that there were scattered remnants of an ancient stone wall, that they were not continuous remains, and any impact to the valuation of the property (if indeed any existed) was de minimus. Even assuming that the so-called wall was within the boundaries of the taking map (and that is itself questionable) the Court does not ascribe any ascertainable loss to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs remaining claim is premised on the impact of increased water flow onto his property from the installation of drainage pipes running from the easterly side of Route 31 to his property on the westerly side. The fee taking of 1920 square feet is a minor consideration, even according to the plaintiffs appraiser.

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Related

Lynch v. Town of West Hartford
355 A.2d 42 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1974)
Hall v. Town of Weston
355 A.2d 79 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1974)
D'ADDARIO v. Commissioner of Transportation
429 A.2d 890 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1980)
Tandet v. Urban Redevelopment Commission
426 A.2d 280 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1979)
McDermott v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency
440 A.2d 168 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1981)
Schnier v. Ives
293 A.2d 1 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1972)
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. City of New Haven
71 A. 780 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1909)
Minicucci v. Commissioner of Transportation
559 A.2d 216 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 57, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/satari-v-commissioner-of-transportation-no-cv-9763692-s-jan-2-2002-connsuperct-2002.