Sasu v. Yoshimura

147 F.R.D. 173, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 851, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2710, 1993 WL 82151
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 3, 1993
DocketNo. 92 C 4591
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 147 F.R.D. 173 (Sasu v. Yoshimura) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sasu v. Yoshimura, 147 F.R.D. 173, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 851, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2710, 1993 WL 82151 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HART, District Judge.

According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiffs Mensah Sasu and Anthony Simpson were in an alley, innocently attempting to recycle items in garbage cans. It is further alleged that, for no reason, plaintiffs were attacked by two Chicago police officers, defendants Ed Yoshimura and Allen Wittenberg. It is also alleged that the' beatings were pursuant to a custom or policy of defendant City of Chicago. This includes allegations that the City failed to discipline officers who repeatedly engaged in acts of excessive force and condoned a code of silence that protects officers who engaged in such conduct. Presently before the court is defendants’ motion for entry of protective order. The parties dispute the contents of that order which will affect the disclosure of police records, including police disciplinary and personnel records that are potentially relevant to the custom or policy claim against the City.

Defendants seek a protective order that prevents plaintiffs from using any information designated as confidential for any purpose other than this case, prevents plaintiffs from disclosing the confidential documents to persons not involved in the ease, and prevents plaintiffs from retaining any of the confidential documents after this case is completed. On the other side, plaintiffs seek to include a provision that reads: “All Confidential Matter shall be used only for purposes of preparation for trial or trial of this cause and, notwithstanding defendants’ objection, other litigation in which Discovering Party’s lawyers here are also lawyers for a party there, and not for any other litigation or business purposes, and shall be disclosed only in accordance with the terms of this Order.”1

Plaintiffs’ proposed protective order also has other additional disclosure provisions not contained in defendants’ proposed version. Plaintiffs’ version would permit disclosure to (a) other attorneys involved in police misconduct cases against Chicago police officers; (b) attorneys preparing police misconduct cases against Chicago police officers; and (c) [175]*175criminal defense attorneys contemplating defenses of clients based on police misconduct2 (hereinafter “outside attorneys”). Disclosure to the outside attorneys would be limited to the outside attorneys viewing the documents and communications from the attorneys in the present case; providing copies of documents to the outside attorneys would not be permitted. Plaintiffs’ draft also provides that an outside attorney must obtain permission from the court in which the other case is pending.3 There is no provision that confidential documents will be returned when the case is terminated. Furthermore, plaintiffs include the following provision:

8. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to limit the ability of the Discovering Party or his counsel to disclose publicly to other persons any documents from which the names and all other identifying information concerning the complaining witnesses and the police officers and other third parties have been redacted, or to disclose publicly statistical and other information compiled or deduced from these files, if the identity of the defendant or other police officers, complaining witnesses and other third parties is not revealed or otherwise compromised by this disclosure. It shall be the obligation of the Discovering Party to make such redactions before any such disclosure is made, subject to notice and review b^ the Responding Party’s counsel and, if necessary, by this court.

Plaintiffs’ version is essentially the same as a protective order that Judge Shadur of this court approved, over the objection of defendants, in Fallon v. Dillon (90 C 6722), 1991 WL 28223. Chief Judge Moran of this court also approved such a protective order over defendants’ objections. See Fuentes v. City of Chicago, 1993 WL 13447 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 21, 1993). Now Circuit Judge Rovner, while still on this court, approved, over objection, a protective order containing a provision essentially the same as plaintiffs’ proposed ¶ 8. See McLin v. City of Chicago, 133 F.R.D. 527, 530 (N.D.Ill.1990). Defendants represent that, on contested motions, two other judges of this court have approved the type of protective order proposed by the City and denied use of Fallon-type protective orders proposed by the plaintiffs in those cases. See Djikas v. City of Chicago (89 C 7743, Holderman, J.); Chidester v. Spencer (91 C 4145, Andersen, J.).4

Defendants argue that this court should not consider the merits of plaintiffs’ version on the ground that plaintiffs had agreed to accept defendants’ version and cannot now back out of their agreement. Regardless of whether an accord between the parties actually had been reached, a protective order also requires the approval of the court before it can be effective. Defendants still would have to show good cause for their proposed confidentiality rules even if they were presenting an agreed protective order. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 2209-10, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). The merits of the two proposals will be considered.

Defendants base their need for a protective order on the private information about police officers and their families contained in personnel records that will be provided in response to plaintiffs’ discovery requests. Defendants will also be providing files of internal Police Department investigations of complaints against police officers. Those files contain information about officers, crime victims, and complaining witnesses. Both the personnel records and the investigation files are confidential records that are entitled to protection. See McLin, 133 F.R.D. at 529; Czajkowski v. City of Chica[176]*176go, 1992 WL 57945 *2 (N.D.Ill. March 20, 1992); Martinez v. City of Stockton, 132 F.R.D. 677, 681-82 (E.D.Cal.1990). Good cause exists for granting some form of protective order.

In a recent opinion, the Seventh Circuit denied leave to file appellate briefs under seal. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings: Victor Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1992). There, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the confidentiality of court filings should be tailored to the narrow purposes being served, also keeping in mind that the need for confidentiality may also have time limitations. See id., 983 F.2d at 76-77. The court also indicated that standardless protective orders permitting any or all documents to be designated as confidential generally are not appropriate. See id. at 77-78. Here, neither party seeks the ability to designate all documents as confidential. Both proposals refer to the need to protect “documents or oral testimony which may contain highly sensitive and confidential personal, employment, disciplinary, police investigatory, witness and medical information of a non-public nature.”5 Both proposals also permit either side to object to the other’s designation of a particular document as confidential.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
147 F.R.D. 173, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 851, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2710, 1993 WL 82151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sasu-v-yoshimura-ilnd-1993.