SARWAR v. BIPIN-SETH INC.

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 1, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-12744
StatusUnknown

This text of SARWAR v. BIPIN-SETH INC. (SARWAR v. BIPIN-SETH INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SARWAR v. BIPIN-SETH INC., (D.N.J. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SAIM SARWAR, Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 20-cv-12744 BIPIN-SETH INC., Defendant. ORDER

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J. THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for default judgment as to Defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b), D.E. 5; and it APPEARING that Rule 55(b) authorizes courts to enter a default judgment against a properly served defendant who fails to file a timely responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). But even when a party is in default “the other side is not entitled to the entry of default judgment as of right, and the entry of such a judgment is left primarily to the discretion of the district court.” Sanchez v. Franzzano, No. 15-2316 (KSH)(CLW), 2016 WL 2892551, at *1 (D.N.J. May 12, 2016) (quoting Ramada Worldwide Inc. v. Abel Lodging, LLC, No. 14-2683, 2014 WL 5361914, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2014)); and it further APPEARING that Plaintiff sues Defendant on his behalf and for “all other individuals similarly situated” for “[i]njunctive [r]elief, and attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs pursuant to the Americas with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. (“ADA”).” D.E. 1 at 1. Generally, Plaintiff claims that various websites Defendant uses for accepting reservations at its hotel violate regulations promulgated under the ADA — specifically, 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e) see id. 10¢a)-(h) — which set forth requirements for those subject to the regulations “with respect to reservations made by any means.” /d. Plaintiff further alleges that he and “all others similarly situated,” id. 4] 17, have suffered “direct and indirect injury as a result of the Defendant’s discrimination until the Defendant is compelled to modify its websites to comply with the... ADA.” Id. § 14, and it further APPEARING that since moving for default judgment, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Defendant on January 4, 2021. See D.E. 6. And “an amended complaint supersedes the original version” and renders the Clerk’s entry of default as to Defendant “moot since the amended complaint superseded the original complaint.” Auto. Rentals, Inc. v. Bama Commercial Leasing LLC, No. 117CV3877NLHKMW, 2018 WL 3159852, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2018) (citing Enigwe v. Gainey, No. CIV.A. 10-684, 2012 WL 213510, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2012) (“The filing of the Second Amended Complaint rendered the earlier Amended Complaint a nullity . . . and [plaintiff's] request for an entry of default by [defendant] as to the Amended Complaint became moot.” (internal citation omitted)); therefore For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown IT IS on this 1“ day of February, 2021, hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, D.E. 5, as to Defendant is DENIED without prejudice; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court’s entry of default against Defendant is hereby vacated. Qe LOD Nae John Michael Vazquez, U.S\D’J .

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Related

Definitions
42 U.S.C. § 12181

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Bluebook (online)
SARWAR v. BIPIN-SETH INC., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sarwar-v-bipin-seth-inc-njd-2021.