Sargent v. N.C. Bd. of Nursing

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: January 7, 2026
• Docket: 25-356
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge Allegra Collins

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-356

Filed 7 January 2026

Wake County, No. 24CV004455-910

KIMBALL SARGENT, Petitioner,

v.

NORTH CAROLINA BOARD OF NURSING, Respondent.

Appeal by Petitioner from order entered 13 December 2024 by Judge Graham

Shirley in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 November

2025.

Dowling PLLC, by Troy D. Shelton, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, by A. Grant Simpkins, for Respondent-Appellee.

COLLINS, Judge.

Petitioner Kimball Sargent appeals from the trial court’s order on her petition

for judicial review of the North Carolina Board of Nursing’s Final Decision and Non-

Disciplinary Order. Because the trial court’s order remands the case to the Board for

further proceedings and Petitioner has not shown we have the authority to review

this interlocutory order, we dismiss Petitioner’s appeal. SARGENT V. N.C. BD. OF NURSING

Opinion of the Court

I. Procedural Background

Petitioner is a clinical nurse specialist. In 2015, a complaint against Petitioner

was submitted to the North Carolina Board of Nursing for exceeding her scope of

practice. The Board investigated the complaint and concluded that “there [was]

insufficient evidence [Petitioner] engaged in activities that were outside her scope of

practice as a psychiatric mental health clinical nurse specialist . . . .” The Board

issued a “No Action” letter, stating that “no action will be taken by the Board in this

matter and this will conclude [the Board’s] review.”

In 2019, a second complaint was submitted to the Board against Petitioner

regarding the same facts as the 2015 complaint. In 2023, the Board issued a Notice

of Hearing on the 2019 complaint to Petitioner. The hearing took place on 30 August

2023.

The Board entered its final decision and non-disciplinary order on the 2019

complaint on 6 December 2023. The Board concluded that Petitioner had exceeded

her scope of practice and violated the Nursing Practice Act and Administrative Code,

but that it was estopped from disciplining Petitioner by its prior No Action letter.

The first paragraph of the decretal portion of the final decision states:

[Petitioner] shall practice within the parameters of her education, national certification and maintained competence and is prohibited from providing psychotherapy to children, until and unless she has completed the additional education in TFCBT or current psychotherapeutic interventions with children and secures the proper credentials and certifications.

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Petitioner timely filed a petition for judicial review in the superior court. The

trial court entered a temporary restraining order to stay the Board’s decision, and the

Board consented to a preliminary injunction staying the decision. The matter was

heard on 18 November 2024, and the trial court entered an order on 13 December

2024. The trial court found that the evidence supported the Board’s decision, but

vacated and remanded the decision with the following statement:

Paragraph one of the decretal portion of the Final Decision is vacated and shall not be enforced against Petitioner. This matter is remanded to the Board for further proceedings if the Board wishes to seek to impose limitations on Petitioner’s ability to provide “psychotherapy to children.”

Petitioner appeals.

II. Appellate Jurisdiction

We first address our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Petitioner appeals from

an interlocutory order. “An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of

an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the

trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.” C. Terry Hunt

Indus., Inc. v. Klausner Lumber Two, LLC, 255 N.C. App. 8, 11 (2017) (quotation

marks and citation omitted). “Generally, a party has no right of appeal from an

interlocutory order.” Edwards v. GE Lighting Sys., Inc., 193 N.C. App. 578, 581

(2008) (citation omitted). This court therefore “must dismiss an appeal from an

interlocutory order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, unless the appellant is able

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to carry its burden of demonstrating that the order from which he or she seeks to

appeal is appealable despite its interlocutory nature.” C. Terry Hunt Indus., Inc., 255

N.C. App. at 11 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Immediate appeal from an interlocutory order may be allowed in several

instances, including “(1) if the order is final as to some but not all of the claims or

parties and the trial court certifies there is no just reason to delay the appeal

pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b),] or (2) if the trial court’s decision

deprives the appellant of a substantial right” that will be lost absent immediate

review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277(a) and 7A-27(b)(3)(a). Woody v. Vickrey,

276 N.C. App. 427, 433 (2021) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court did not certify

the order under Rule 54(b).

When an appellant asserts this Court has jurisdiction based on a substantial

right, “the statement [of grounds for appellate review] must contain sufficient facts

and argument to support appellate review on the ground that the challenged order

affects a substantial right.” N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4). Our appellate courts have

developed a two-part test to determine whether an order affects a substantial right:

first, “the right itself must be substantial[,]” and second, “the deprivation of that

substantial right must potentially work injury to [the appellant] if not corrected

before appeal from final judgment.” Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 726

(1990) (citation omitted). A substantial right determination “usually depends on the

facts and circumstances of each case and the procedural context of the orders

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appealed from.” Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 642 (1984) (citation omitted).

Thus, the burden rests upon the appellant to demonstrate that the trial court’s order

deprives the appellant of a substantial right that will be lost without an immediate

appeal. See Dailey v. Pompa, 191 N.C. App. 64, 68 (2008).

Here, the trial court vacated and remanded a portion of the Board’s final

decision for further proceedings. “Because the order requires further action to settle

the controversy, it is interlocutory . . . .” Heritage Pointe Builders v. N.C. Licensing

Bd. of Gen. Contractors, 120 N.C. App. 502, 504 (1995) (citation omitted). Petitioner

failed to acknowledge the interlocutory nature of the order and failed allege in her

statement of grounds for appellate review “sufficient facts and argument to support

appellate review on the ground that the challenged order affects a substantial right.”

N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4). Thus, Petitioner did not satisfy her burden of demonstrating

that the order is appealable despite its interlocutory nature, and this appeal must be

dismissed.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Petitioner’s appeal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

Judges ARROWOOD and HAMPSON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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