Sarah Minden v. Stephen Wright.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedJune 15, 2026
Docket25-P-0941
StatusUnpublished

This text of Sarah Minden v. Stephen Wright. (Sarah Minden v. Stephen Wright.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sarah Minden v. Stephen Wright., (Mass. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-941

SARAH MINDEN

vs.

STEPHEN WRIGHT.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a bench trial in the Superior Court, the plaintiff

prevailed on her claim of unjust enrichment, and judgment

entered in her favor. The defendant appeals, challenging

certain aspects of the judge's decision as clearly erroneous.

We affirm.

Background. We summarize the judge's factual findings.

The parties were involved in a long-term relationship from

approximately 2005 to 2020. In 2007 the defendant moved into

the plaintiff's home in West Roxbury. At the time the defendant

was not working, and he told the plaintiff that he did not have

much money. As a result the parties initially agreed that the

defendant could live in the plaintiff's home without paying rent or living expenses and that, in exchange, he would help her with

chores, driving, and other responsibilities.

Years before the defendant moved in, the plaintiff had

employed people to oversee her bank accounts and credit card

accounts because she was too busy with work to handle her

finances by herself. Soon after the defendant moved in, he

agreed to take over this role. To facilitate this, the

plaintiff added the defendant's name to her Brookline Bank

account (account) with the expectation that he would pay her

expenses and the parties' joint expenses from the account. The

defendant never asked the plaintiff if he could use the account

to pay for his own personal expenses, and the plaintiff never

authorized the defendant to do so. The plaintiff had had the

account since 1978, and she deposited all of her earnings into

it.

Several years later, when the plaintiff reviewed her

financial statements from 2012 and 2013, she discovered that the

expenses she had paid were "enormous" compared to what they were

before the defendant moved into her house. This discovery

prompted her to have a conversation with the defendant in 2014.

By this time the defendant was working, and the plaintiff told

him that he needed to pay one-half of their joint expenses going

forward. The defendant agreed. He then sent the plaintiff an

email message itemizing their individual and joint expenses, and

2 they discussed which items were his alone to pay. The defendant

also included in the email message a list of "MONEY CONTRIBUTED"

by him, totaling approximately 470,000 to 500,000 Canadian

dollars, which the plaintiff understood to represent the amount

of money he had deposited into the account over the years. The

plaintiff trusted the defendant and believed he had contributed

this money. Although the parties did not specifically discuss

how the defendant would pay his share of their joint expenses

going forward, the plaintiff assumed he would pay it in lump

sums, based in part on his claim of previous contributions to

the account.

In 2020 the defendant moved out of the plaintiff's home,

and the plaintiff took back responsibility for her finances.

Upon reviewing her financial statements, the plaintiff

discovered that the defendant had used the account to pay for

his personal expenses, including his long-term care insurance,

medical bills, plane tickets, and credit card bills. The

plaintiff also discovered that the defendant had contributed

"nothing ever" into the account. The plaintiff put together her

financial statements and sent the defendant an email message

asking to discuss them. The defendant replied, "No."

In 2022 the plaintiff filed the underlying complaint

raising five claims, including unjust enrichment. At trial the

defendant introduced financial statements, which revealed that

3 his assets had appreciated from approximately $500,000 to

approximately $1.5 million while he was living with the

plaintiff. The plaintiff was not previously aware that the

defendant had $1.5 million in assets.

After three days of testimony, the judge found for the

plaintiff on her unjust enrichment claim and awarded her

restitution in the amount of $137,516.41. 1 This award consisted

of (a) the personal expenses that the defendant had charged to

the account and the plaintiff's credit cards from 2016 through

2020, and (b) one-half of the parties' joint expenses from 2016

through 2020. 2 After the addition of prejudgment interest and

costs, judgment entered for the plaintiff in the total amount of

$185,980.10.

Discussion. In an appeal from a judgment entered after a

bench trial, we review the judge's conclusions of law de novo,

but we must accept the judge's findings of fact unless clearly

erroneous. See Cavadi v. DeYeso, 458 Mass. 615, 624 (2011). A

finding is clearly erroneous only if "the reviewing court on the

entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed." Demoulas v. Demoulas Super

1 The judge found for the defendant on the plaintiff's remaining claims. Those claims are not at issue on appeal.

2 The plaintiff did not present evidence about, or seek restitution for, expenses incurred before 2016.

4 Mkts. Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 509 (1997), quoting Building

Inspector of Lancaster v. Sanderson, 372 Mass. 157, 160 (1977).

In our review we must give due regard to the judge's assessment

of the credibility of the witnesses and weighing of the

evidence. See Demoulas, supra at 509-510. Thus, "[s]o long as

the judge's account is plausible in light of the entire record,

an appellate court should decline to reverse it." Id. at 510.

"Unjust enrichment occurs when a party retains the property

of another 'against the fundamental principles of justice or

equity and good conscience.'" Bonina v. Sheppard, 91 Mass. App.

Ct. 622, 625 (2017), quoting Santagate v. Tower, 64 Mass. App.

Ct. 324, 329 (2005). To prevail on a claim of unjust

enrichment, "the plaintiff must establish 'not only that the

defendant received a benefit, but also that such a benefit was

unjust,'" which "turns on the reasonable expectations of the

parties." Bonina, supra, quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

Cotter, 464 Mass. 623, 644 (2013). Here, the defendant argues

that the judge's findings about the parties' reasonable

expectations were clearly erroneous in two respects. Neither

argument persuades us.

First, the defendant maintains that the plaintiff had no

expectation that the money in the account would remain only hers

to use because she added the defendant to the account in 2008 so

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Related

Desrosiers v. Germain
429 N.E.2d 385 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1981)
Building Inspector of Lancaster v. Sanderson
360 N.E.2d 1051 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1977)
Cavadi v. DeYeso
941 N.E.2d 23 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2011)
Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.
677 N.E.2d 159 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1997)
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Cotter
984 N.E.2d 835 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2013)
Santagate v. Tower
833 N.E.2d 171 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2005)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)

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Sarah Minden v. Stephen Wright., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sarah-minden-v-stephen-wright-massappct-2026.