Sarah Lee Sanders v. Drivetime Car Sales Company, LLC, etc.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Sarah Lee Sanders v. Drivetime Car Sales Company, LLC, etc.

221 So. 3d 718, 2017 WL 2350111, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 7848

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMay 31, 2017

DocketCASE NO. 1D16-5406

StatusPublished

This text of 221 So. 3d 718 (Sarah Lee Sanders v. Drivetime Car Sales Company, LLC, etc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sarah Lee Sanders v. Drivetime Car Sales Company, LLC, etc., 221 So. 3d 718, 2017 WL 2350111, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 7848 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This appeal involves an arbitration agreement. We write only to address the portions of the agreement that prohibit the parties from bringing private attorney general actions. The appellant argues that such a ban-precludes her from raising her Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) claims as part of the arbitration. The appellant further argues that if her FDUTPA claims are precluded in arbitration under the agreement, such agreement is void as a violation of public policy. It is not necessary to address whether such a provision would be void as a violation of public policy because we find such a claim is not a private attorney general action. ;

FDUTPA states that a cause of ¡action can be brought by a. person who has suffered a loss or has been aggrieved by a violation of FDUTPA, an interested party, or an enforcing authority. See §§ 501.206, 501.207, & 501.211, Fla. Stat. (2015). An interested party is defined as a person who has been affected by a violation of FDUT-PA or by an order of the enforcing authority. § 501.203(6), Fla. Stat. (2015). An enforcing authority is defined as the office of the state attorney or the Department of Legal Affairs depending upon the situation as stated in section 501.203(2), Florida Statutes (2015). Based on the definition, an individual does not qualify as an enforcing authority. Thus, an individual’s private claims for violations of FDUTPA cannot be deemed a private attorney general action since a person has no statutory right to represent the enforcing agency or another person under FDUTPA.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, O.J., MAKAR, AND JAY, JJ., CONCUR.

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PER CURIAM.

This appeal involves an arbitration agreement. We write only to address the portions of the agreement that prohibit the parties from bringing private attorney general actions. The appellant argues that such a ban-precludes her from raising her Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) claims as part of the arbitration. The appellant further argues that if her FDUTPA claims are precluded in arbitration under the agreement, such agreement is void as a violation of public policy. It is not necessary to address whether such a provision would be void as a violation of public policy because we find such a claim is not a private attorney general action. ;

FDUTPA states that a cause of ¡action can be brought by a. person who has suffered a loss or has been aggrieved by a violation of FDUTPA, an interested party, or an enforcing authority. See §§ 501.206, 501.207, & 501.211, Fla. Stat. (2015). An interested party is defined as a person who has been affected by a violation of FDUT-PA or by an order of the enforcing authority. § 501.203(6), Fla. Stat. (2015). An enforcing authority is defined as the office of the state attorney or the Department of Legal Affairs depending upon the situation as stated in section 501.203(2), Florida Statutes (2015). Based on the definition, an individual does not qualify as an enforcing authority. Thus, an individual’s private claims for violations of FDUTPA cannot be deemed a private attorney general action since a person has no statutory right to represent the enforcing agency or another person under FDUTPA.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, O.J., MAKAR, AND JAY, JJ., CONCUR.

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Bluebook (online)

221 So. 3d 718, 2017 WL 2350111, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 7848, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sarah-lee-sanders-v-drivetime-car-sales-company-llc-etc-fladistctapp-2017.