Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 427 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-24-456
SARAH-ELISE MITCHELL DUNKLIN Opinion Delivered September 17, 2025
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE DESHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 21ADR-20-45]
ROBERT GLENN CHATHAM HONORABLE ROBERT B. GIBSON III, APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
This appeal arises from the Desha County Circuit Court’s denial of appellant Sarah
Elise Dunklin’s motion for reunification counseling and request for the circuit court’s
recusal. Dunklin appealed an order entered on April 23, 2024, wherein the court granted
Dunklin’s motion to dismiss all pending motions before the court. On appeal, Dunklin
argues that the circuit court erred when it denied her request for reunification counseling
with her minor child and abused its discretion when it failed to grant the motion for recusal.
Pending before this court is a motion to dismiss filed by the appellee, Robert Glenn
Chatham, wherein he argues that Dunklin’s appeal should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because she appealed a nonappealable order. We affirm; Chatham’s motion to
dismiss is denied. I. Background Facts
Dunklin and Chatham were divorced by settlement agreement entered June 26, 2016,
in Arkansas County. There was one minor child (“MC”) born of the marriage. Dunklin and
Chatham shared legal custody of MC; however, MC lived with Dunklin the majority of the
time. In February 2020, a dispute regarding MC’s custodial arrangements began. Chatham
filed an emergency petition for relief on February 10, 2020, due to Dunklin’s behavior and
association with extreme conspiracy theories. Specifically, Chatham referenced Dunklin’s
delusional behavior and involvement with a group called The Children’s Crusade. In March
2020, Chatham filed a second petition for emergency relief, and the case was transferred to
Desha County. In an order, the circuit court noted that the most concerning allegations
involved Dunklin’s alleged involvement with The Children’s Crusade and Cynthia Acbug,
a Colorado fugitive, who attempted to kidnap her own minor child during a custody dispute.
Dunklin allowed Acbug to stay in her home in Desha County while she was a fugitive.
Dunklin underwent a psychological evaluation in August 2020, and the circuit court
noted that “the results of the evaluation were alarming and essentially confirmed
[Chatham’s] allegations.” The court held a hearing on November 18, 2020, and modified
custody of MC with Chatham having full custody and Dunklin receiving supervised
visitation for six hours every other Saturday. Dunklin’s father was to supervise the visitation,
and the court also ordered Dunklin to receive a second psychological evaluation and to
follow all treatment recommendations. The court noted that Dunklin could request that
the court revisit MC’s visitation arrangements in August 2021.
2 In spring 2021, however, Dunklin allegedly attempted to force MC to breastfeed
during one of her supervised visits. During subsequent hearings, it was established that
Dunklin’s father—who was ordered to supervise the visitation—allowed Dunklin to be alone
with MC. Accordingly, visitation was suspended with the exception of allowing some family
visitation during the Easter holiday while the criminal investigation regarding the alleged
breastfeeding incident was pending. Ultimately, the Arkansas State Police Crimes Against
Children Division determined that the charges were “unsubstantiated.”
In July 2022, Dunklin moved to reinstate in-person visitation. On November 10, the
circuit court denied the motion and specifically referenced Dunklin’s psychological
evaluation wherein the examiner “expressed significant concerns about [Dunklin’s]
psychological function as it related to her parental fitness” as well as Dunklin’s false
allegations of sexual abuse against Chatham, harboring a fugitive in her home, making false
statements to MC regarding the identity of her biological father, the breastfeeding
allegations, and repeating extreme conspiracy theories in front of MC. Furthermore, the
court cited Dunklin’s complete lack of transparency throughout her psychological evaluation
and MC’s fear of being kidnapped as a result of Dunklin’s involvement with The Children’s
Crusade. In evaluating MC’s best interest, the circuit court also held that it could not ignore
MC’s desire for no contact with Dunklin, and Dunklin’s admission that she attempted to
breastfeed MC when she was six years old. Accordingly, the court refused to reinstate
Dunklin’s visitation; however, it ordered visitation with the Dunklin family over the
Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays.
3 On December 16, 2022, Dunklin filed her motion for family-reunification counseling
and maintained that it was necessary due to Chatham’s pattern of parental alienation and
MC’s volatile reaction to being in Dunklin’s presence during the Thanksgiving visitation.
Dunklin alleged that MC’s extreme animosity toward her was attributed to Chatham’s
parental alienation and that reunification counseling was “essential to a healthy upbringing.”
The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion, and at the onset, Dunklin requested
the appointment of licensed reunification counselor Dr. Kenneth Joe Heard to conduct the
counseling at her expense. Dr. Heard testified that MC should continue to see her current
counselor and stated his willingness to “collaborate” with that counselor. He characterized
his objective as restoring a normal co-parenting relationship in which both parents
“communicate and make decisions together for the best interest of the child.” Furthermore,
Dr. Heard testified that he developed a proposal whereby he would have extensive authority
over all aspects of visitation, including the degree of supervision, if any.
Dunklin also testified at the hearing. She maintained that she had distanced herself
from her previous dealings with Acbug, The Children’s Crusade, and QAnon. However,
Dunklin interjected on two occasions during her direct examination, stating that the court
had a lot of “misinformation” about her past associations. Regarding Dunklin’s testimony
the court found as follows:
Unfortunately, her testimony did not give the court any comfort that reunification counseling was in the best interest of [MC]. Dunklin’s interjections are extremely troubling to the Court. They are troubling to the Court because Ms. Dunklin’s history and prior conduct is almost entirely undisputed. There is no real misinformation . . . . She was questioned by Chatham’s attorney about being online
4 and encouraging to mothers to effectively kidnap their own children. Dunklin claimed she couldn’t remember what she said in online videos in 2020. The Court finds this comment to be disingenuous. Those are not the type of comments that someone makes offhand. Those are not the type of comments someone forgets. . . . The interjections and comments gave the Court an unsettled feeling on the day of the hearing. The Court has listened to the audio of the testimony several times since the hearing and each time the Court has the same uncomfortable feeling.
Dr. Benjamin Silber’s second psychological evaluation of Dunklin was admitted as an
exhibit. In his most recent evaluation, Dr. Silber opined that Dunklin did not meet the
criteria for diagnosis of a psychological disorder. He further opined that “no new concerns
related to her psychological functioning were identified. . . . I am unaware of any new
instances of poor judgment, and Ms. Dunklin has demonstrated good judgment in many
other areas of her life.” Furthermore, the examiner concluded, “I cannot find current or
recent psychological evidence that would suggest Ms. Dunklin would engage in behavior
harmful to [MC].”
On the issue of reunification, the circuit court determined that it could not give Dr.
Silber’s opinion much weight, “primarily because it is based on the absence of new offenses
by [Dunklin].” The court noted that there were no new offenses because Dunklin had been
separated from MC and that the examiner’s opinion “just doesn’t hold water” because he
admittedly disregarded Dunklin’s previous admissions that she believed President Trump
sent a spaceship to watch over Dunklin and MC, that the meat of children is in ice cream
and McDonald’s chicken nuggets, that she supported QAnon movements, and that she
believed that there was a global conspiracy by elites “to traffic, rape, and potentially eat
children.” The circuit court concluded by stating, “[O]rdering reunification counseling
5 would definitely subject this child [to] additional psychological distress and could disrupt
what is otherwise a stable, healthy situation.” Accordingly, the circuit court denied
Dunklin’s motion for reunification counseling on March 8, 2024.
On March 7, Dunklin filed a motion to recuse wherein she argued that the circuit
court’s unwillingness to rule on the reunification motion after multiple requests—when
coupled with the favorable recommendations yielded by her most recent psychological
evaluation and the testimony of the reunification counselor—formed a basis for Dunklin to
reasonably question the court’s impartiality. Thus, Dunklin maintained that the circuit
court was required to disqualify itself and transfer the case. Subsequently, the circuit court
held a hearing on the recusal motion and entered its order denying Dunklin’s motion to
recuse on April 11.
Finally, on April 23, Dunklin moved to dismiss, requesting that the circuit court
dismiss all pending motions with prejudice. Specifically, Dunklin explained that she was
seeking an order of dismissal “that [would] enable her to appeal the court’s order regarding
reunification counseling and the order denying the motion to recuse.” The court granted
Dunklin’s motion and dismissed with prejudice “all pled for or sought after relief not granted
or denied.” Dunklin filed a notice of appeal from the April 23 order and “all interlocutory
orders entered prior to the final order.” This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
Our standard of review in domestic-relations cases is well settled. We review domestic-
relations cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly
6 erroneous. Doss v. Doss, 2018 Ark. App. 487, 561 S.W.3d 348. A finding is clearly erroneous
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Due deference is
given to the circuit court’s superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony. Id. As to issues of law, however, this court gives no
deference to the circuit court; rather, this court reviews issues of law de novo. Hargrove v.
Hargrove, 2015 Ark. App. 45, 453 S.W.3d 683.
Additionally, we review a circuit court’s denial of a motion to recuse under an abuse-
of-discretion standard. Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. 319, 498 S.W.3d 733. A clearly erroneous
interpretation or application of a law or rule will constitute a manifest abuse of discretion.
Id. To decide whether there has been an abuse of discretion, our appellate courts review the
record to determine if prejudice or bias was exhibited. Id.
III. Points on Appeal
Dunklin argues (1) that the circuit court clearly erred when it denied her motion for
reunification counseling because (a) the court did not make a finding that Dunklin was unfit;
(b) the court applied the wrong standard to determine the motion; and (c) the circuit court
misapplied the law and its role in domestic-relations cases and (2) that the circuit court
abused its discretion when it denied her recusal motion, and reversal is required because of
the court’s statements about Dunklin, its treatment of her during the case, and the court’s
failure to timely issue an order.
7 IV. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
As a preliminary issue, we must first address Chatham’s motion to dismiss this appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. Chatham filed the motion on October 3, 2024, and this court passed
on hearing the motion until the case was submitted. Chatham argues that (1) Dunklin
cannot appeal an order wherein she sought dismissal of her own pending motions with
prejudice (i.e., doctrine of invited error); and (2) Dunklin did not designate the motions for
reunification counseling and recusal in her notice of appeal, and they do not fall under
Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(b)’s designation of “intermediate orders”
because they do not affect the final order. The filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional;
absent an effective notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal and must
dismiss it. McMillan v. McMillan, 2024 Ark. App. 630, 703 S.W.3d 493.
Dunklin’s notice of appeal states that she is appealing the April 23, 2024 order “and
all interlocutory orders entered prior to the final order” and designated the entire record on
appeal. Pursuant to Rule 2(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil (2024),
“an appeal from any final order also brings up for review any intermediate order involving
the merits and necessarily affecting the judgment.” Furthermore, a notice of appeal
substantially complies with Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 3(e) if the notice is
clear which order the appellant is appealing, and the notice of appeal was filed timely as to
that order; thus, failure to designate the order appealed from is not a fatal defect. See Emis
v. Emis, 2017 Ark. 52, 508 S.W.3d 886.
8 In his motion to dismiss, Chatham asks this court to dismiss Dunklin’s appeal for
lack of jurisdiction because the motion for reunification counseling and motion to recuse
are not “intermediate orders” that “affect the final order” dismissing all pending matters with
prejudice. We decline to do so. First, Chatham’s motion is supported only by a blanket
statement and reference to Rule 2(b) without any convincing argument as to why the orders
are not intermediate orders that involve the merits and affect the final order. See Holliman
v. Johnson, 2012 Ark. App. 354, 417 S.W.3d 222 (holding that our appellate courts do not
consider arguments without convincing argument or citations to authority). Nonetheless,
neither the denial of Dunklin’s motion for reunification counseling nor the denial of
Dunklin’s motion to recuse were appealable orders because they did not conclude the matter
or fall under any of the immediately appealable orders outlined in Rule 2(a). In addition,
based on the facts of this case, we cannot say that the reunification-counseling and recusal
denials do not affect the final order.
Furthermore, the doctrine of invited error is not jurisdictional; thus, it does not
require this court to dismiss the appeal. See Stowell v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark.
App. 403, 586 S.W.3d 671. Accordingly, we decline to dismiss Dunklin’s appeal; Chatham’s
motion to dismiss is denied.
B. Order Denying Motion for Reunification Counseling
Dunklin maintains that her first point on appeal raises a question of law that is one
of first impression in Arkansas: whether a circuit court can deny a parent contact with her
child—or even the possibility of contact with her child—when that parent has not been found
9 unfit. In support of her argument, Dunklin maintains that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
right to due process of law includes the liberty rights of a parent to have and raise his or her
children; thus, infringement on a parent’s fundamental right to raise children—including the
right to interact with one’s child—requires a heightened review and a declaration that such
parent is unfit. Accordingly, Dunklin maintains that because she has never been deemed
“unfit,” there is no basis to deny her constitutional right to a parent-child relationship with
MC in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the United States Supreme
Court’s finding in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), that a relationship with a parent is
in a child’s best interest.
We agree with Chatham that this argument is not preserved for appellate review.
Dunklin made no constitutional argument in her motion for reunification counseling that
a finding of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence was required for the court
to deny the motion. Therefore, Dunklin failed to apprise the circuit court of the argument
she now raises on appeal and failed to obtain a ruling. It is well settled that arguments,
including constitutional ones, must be raised and ruled on in the circuit court to be
preserved for appeal. H.C. v. Nesmith, 2025 Ark. App. 59, 705 S.W.3d 880.
C. Order Denying Motion to Recuse
Second, Dunklin contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her
motion to recuse. We disagree. On appeal, Dunklin argues that the circuit court’s recusal
was mandatory because the appearance of bias and impartiality was readily apparent in the
court’s “continued practice of enforcing its own biased positions against her relationship
10 with her daughter.” Additionally, Dunklin contends that the court’s unwillingness to rule
on her reunification-counseling motion after multiple requests coupled with favorable
recommendations by her most recent psychological evaluation and testimony of her
reunification counselor formed a basis for her to reasonably question the court’s impartiality.
The rule is long established that there is a presumption of impartiality on the part of
judges. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2010 Ark. 449, 374 S.W.3d 660; Irvin v. State, 345
Ark. 541, 49 S.W.3d 635 (2001). The decision to recuse is within the circuit court’s
discretion, and it will not be reversed absent abuse. Ferguson, supra. An abuse of discretion
can be proved by a showing of bias or prejudice on the part of the circuit court, and the
burden is on the party seeking to disqualify. Id. To decide whether there has been an abuse
of discretion, this court reviews the record to see if prejudice or bias was exhibited. Id. Absent
some objective demonstration by the appellant of the circuit judge’s prejudice, it is the
communication of bias by the judge that will cause us to reverse his or her refusal to recuse
himself or herself. Id. Whether a judge has become biased to the point that the judge should
disqualify himself or herself is a matter to be confined to the conscience of the judge because
bias is a subjective matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the circuit judge. See Hawkins
v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 443, 558 S.W.3d 891.
At the recusal hearing, the circuit court declared that “[it] took its time with a very
complicated decision, with a very extensive and tortured record” and “it was not an easy
decision to make” because “it will have a permanent impact on the child, one way or
another.” On appeal, Dunklin takes issue with the circuit court’s discussing her past
11 conduct, lack of remorse and responsibility, and MC’s desire to have no relationship with
Dunklin while ignoring Chatham’s “openly blatant conduct of alienating [MC] from her
mother.” Rather, Dunklin argues that the court should have granted her motion because of
the favorable recommendations yielded in her psychological examination and the testimony
of the reunification counselor.
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dunklin’s
recusal motion. In ruling on Dunklin’s request for reunification counseling, the circuit court
specifically addressed all the evidence presented and explained the weight it assigned and
why it did not consider Dunklin’s request to be in MC’s best interest. The fact that the
court’s decision was unfavorable to Dunklin and placed concern on Dunklin’s past and
troubling behavior with MC does not constitute a basis for the court’s recusal. Our appellate
courts have held that “[j]udges may have—or develop during trial—an opinion or bias, but
this does not make the [circuit] judge so biased and prejudiced as to require his
disqualification in further proceedings.” Spurlock v. Est. of Ladd, 2023 Ark. App. 253, at 9,
669 S.W.3d 214, 221. Because Dunklin failed to satisfy her burden of overcoming the
presumption of impartiality, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying Dunklin’s motion
to recuse.
V. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying Dunklin’s
motion for reunification counseling and order denying Dunklin’s motion to recuse.
Affirmed; motion to dismiss denied.
12 THYER and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Lancaster Law Firm, PLLC, by: Clinton W. Lancaster, for appellant.
Robinson, Zakrzewski & Taylor, P.A., by: Luke Zakrzewski; and Sara M. Hartness Law
Office, by: Sara M. Hartness, for appellee.