Sarah Eichenberger v. Kilolo Kijakazi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 12, 2023
• Docket: 22-35937
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 12 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SARAH J. EICHENBERGER, No. 22-35937

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05121-MAT

v. MEMORANDUM* KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 24, 2023 Portland, Oregon

Before: BENNETT, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Sarah J. Eichenberger appeals from the district court’s affirmance of the

Social Security Administration’s decision denying her Social Security Disability

Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits. Eichenberger argues that

the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by improperly evaluating the medical

evidence, rejecting lay testimony, and providing legally insufficient reasons to

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. discount certain evidence and testimony. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

We review the district court’s order de novo and reverse only if the ALJ’s

decision “contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Ford v.

Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139

S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Eichenberger’s

medical evidence, because if the evidence in a Social Security case “is susceptible

to more than one rational interpretation, we are required to affirm.” Attmore v.

Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The ALJ’s interpretation of Eichenberger’s medical evidence is rational.

For example, when discussing the assessment of psychologist Dr. Artherholt, the

ALJ noted that later records showed improvement with regular treatment,

Eichenberger’s primary care exams revealed only mild symptoms of depression

and anxiety, and therapy records indicated that Eichenberger could engage in

activities including driving to see a friend, shopping without anxiety, and going to

church with her neighbor. Regarding the opinions of psychologist Dr. Wheeler,

the ALJ wrote that Dr. Wheeler’s conclusions about Eichenberger’s limitations

2 were impermissibly based on Eichenberger’s own complaints, which were “not

wholly consistent with the contemporaneous medical evidence of record, nor [Dr.

Wheeler’s] own mental status examination of the claimant.” In rejecting certain

opinions of healthcare professionals Godsey, Nichols, and Hook, the ALJ

identified that their opinions were impermissibly based on Eichenberger’s

subjective complaints, lacking in citations to clinical findings, and inconsistent

with some of Eichenberger’s daily activities. These determinations by the ALJ

were accompanied by “a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and

conflicting clinical evidence” supporting them. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664,

675 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

2. The ALJ gave “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” supported by

substantial evidence for discounting Eichenberger’s own testimony about her

functional limitations. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 496–99 (9th Cir.

2022) (holding that the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons

supporting a finding that the claimant’s limitations were not as severe as she

claimed). The ALJ’s reasons for discounting Eichenberger’s testimony about her

symptoms included the following: “[c]ontrary to allegations of disabling pain,

[Eichenberger] reported good relief of her fibromyalgia symptoms with ketamine”;

Eichenberger never reported her fibromyalgia flares to her primary care physician;

and Eichenberger’s mental health treatment notes show PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores

3 mostly in the moderate range. These considerations are clear, specific, and

supported by the record. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.

2007) (When a claimant has provided “objective medical evidence of an

underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce” disabling

symptoms, an “ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her

symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.”

(cleaned up)).

3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the lay testimony

offered by Eichenberger was “simply not consistent with the preponderance of the

opinions and observations by medical doctors in this case.” Lay testimony may be

discounted where it conflicts with a claimant’s medical record. See Vincent v.

Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984). And the reasons the ALJ gave for

discounting Eichenberger’s testimony apply with equal force to the ALJ’s decision

to discount the testimony of the lay witnesses. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d

1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. §

404.1502(a). When lay testimony is “similar to [the claimant’s] own subjective

complaints,” and the ALJ has “provided clear and convincing reasons for

rejecting” the claimant’s testimony, “it follows that the ALJ also gave germane

reasons for rejecting” the layperson’s testimony. Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.

Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009).

4 AFFIRMED.