IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2023-CA-00593-COA
SARAH ANDERSON (GRABMILLER) APPELLANT
v.
JOSHUA GRABMILLER APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/22/2023 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHARLES E. SMITH COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MARTY CRAIG ROBERTSON SARAH HUNTER DIDLAKE JOHN S. GRANT IV ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: WILLIAM B. JACOB NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/17/2024 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ.
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Sarah Anderson and Josh Grabmiller both filed for divorce in February 2021 in the
Chancery Court of Lauderdale County. They subsequently agreed to a divorce on the ground
of irreconcilable differences. They agreed on certain issues, and they submitted other issues
to the chancellor for resolution. Relevant to this appeal, Anderson and Grabmiller submitted
the following issue: “The amount, duration, and form of alimony, if any, to be paid by one
party to the other.” On March 22, 2023, the chancery court issued its final judgment of
divorce ordering Sarah to “pay monthly periodic alimony to Josh in the amount of $1,000.00,
beginning April 1, 2023.” The chancery court denied Sarah’s post-trial motion to alter or amend the judgment with respect to the alimony issue.
¶2. Sarah appeals only with respect to the alimony issue, asserting that (1) the chancellor
erred by failing to analyze or consider rehabilitative alimony as an alternative to periodic
alimony; and (2) the chancellor erred by failing to apply the Armstrong factors1 to decide the
proper type of alimony (rehabilitative or periodic) and by failing to consider whether any of
the factors supported rehabilitative alimony.
¶3. For the reasons addressed below, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶4. Sarah and Josh were married on December 28, 2008, and have two minor daughters,
E.R. and S.L.2 Sarah and Josh each filed separate complaints for divorce in February 2021.
The two matters were consolidated. On March 25, 2021, the chancery court issued an “Order
Granting Temporary Relief” in which the court awarded Sarah temporary physical and legal
custody of the children and delineated a visitation schedule. The chancery court also ordered,
as follows:
Sarah shall pay temporary monthly spousal support of $2,000.00.00 [sic] to Joshua beginning on April 1, 2021. Joshua shall pay temporary monthly child support to Sarah in the amount of $400.00 per month, beginning on April 1, 2021. With the requirement of both to pay support to each other, the above amounts shall be off set, with Sarah being required to pay to Joshua the amount of $1,600.00 each month.
¶5. Sarah and Josh eventually agreed to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable
differences. They also filed a “Consent to Adjudicate” in which they “request[ed] the Court
1 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993). 2 Initials are used to protect the children’s privacy.
2 to decide the matters upon which they cannot agree.” Concerning this appeal, the consent
to adjudicate specifically requested that the chancery court determine “[t]he amount,
duration, and form of alimony, if any, to be paid by one party to the other.”
I. The March 2023 Trial
¶6. A three-day trial was held on March 6-8, 2023, to address the issues listed in the
consent to adjudicate. Josh testified and called his mother as a witness. Sarah testified and
called her mother as a witness. Fifty-eight exhibits were admitted into evidence.
¶7. At the time of trial, Josh was forty-one years old, and Sarah was thirty-nine. E.R. was
nine, and S.L. was five. Sarah testified that after completing her undergraduate degree, she
moved from Mississippi to Georgia to attend the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic
Medicine (“DO school”) in Suwanee, a suburb of Atlanta, Georgia. Sarah met Josh while
she was attending DO school. Sarah and Josh married on December 28, 2008, near the end
of Sarah’s second year.
¶8. Josh has a high school diploma and has taken some college courses. When Sarah and
Josh married, Josh was working at TGC, a family business formed to install video equipment
in smart houses. Later, the business began selling DVDs on eBay and Amazon. About six
months before Sarah completed DO school, Josh was laid off from his job.
¶9. Sarah graduated from DO school in 2011. After DO school, Sarah and Josh moved
to Tupelo for Sarah to complete her residency in family medicine at North Mississippi
Medical Center. Sarah and Josh lived in Tupelo for about three years. When they moved to
Tupelo, they purchased a house that needed updating, so Josh painted and did other repair
3 work to the home for the first three to six months that they lived there. Then Josh got a sales
job at Terminix. Josh testified Terminix paid him $45,000 a year.
¶10. In August 2013, Sarah and Josh had their first child, E.R., during Sarah’s third year
of residency. After Sarah finished maternity leave, Josh resigned from Terminix to stay
home with E.R.
¶11. After Sarah’s residency, in July 2014, Sarah and Josh moved to Meridian for Sarah
to work at Rush Medical Group (Rush). Sarah and Josh purchased a home from Sarah’s
grandfather that required extensive renovation. Josh testified that they agreed he would “be
the stay-at-home parent while [Sarah] worked, and then [he] was going to continue to work
on the house as well during [his] free time.” Josh testified about the scope of the renovation,
explaining that “[w]e’re talking about a 3,500 square foot house that needed to be completely
gutted and renovated, and toilets removed on slab foundations because Sarah wanted me to.
So this wasn’t . . . a cookie-cutter remodel.” Sarah testified that “[she] wanted to buy [her
grandfather’s] house . . . [and that] she wanted updates done. And so, the plan was . . . that
[Josh] would work on those updates and then he would transition into employment.” The
parties’ second daughter, S.L., was born in August 2017.
¶12. Updates to the home were still incomplete when Josh and Sarah both separately filed
for divorce in February 2021. Josh said that the remodeling was not completed because “[i]t
was a lot to do.” He testified that “[i]t’s hard to remodel when you’re having to take care of
the family, too; pick up the kids from school, drop them up; pick them up from dance, drop
them off; cook, clean and go b[u]y the groceries. I was in charge of the finances as well.”
4 ¶13. When Sarah first started working at Rush, she had a traditional family medicine
practice where she was required to be on call. Sarah testified she enjoyed this type of work,
but it “took [her] away from [her] kids and made [her] miss things that [she] didn’t want to
miss.” After about six months, Sarah switched jobs and began working with the family
medicine residency program in Meridian. Sarah said that by the time S.L. was born in
August 2017, she was the associate program director.
¶14. Sarah testified that she had approximately $300,000 in student loan debt. According
to Sarah, “the plan was always that I was going to work, and as soon as my student loans
were paid off, that my workload would be cut back so that I could focus on being a mother.”
She said at that point, “Josh was going to get a job and a job [where] [h]e had benefits so that
he could provide for insurance and that I could cut back to part time, in order to be with the
girls more.” Sarah testified it took her five years to pay off her student loan debt; she was
able to do this by picking up moonlighting shifts in the emergency room at Stennis Hospital.
¶15. In 2019, Sarah paid off her student loans. She said that once the student loans were
paid off, she and Josh discussed that they needed to “get [their] finances in line,” so they met
with a financial planner to discuss their retirement. Based on information provided by Sarah
and Josh at the meeting, the financial planner prepared a “Wealthcare Guide Financial Plan”
dated September 2020. The Wealthcare financial plan indicated that one of their goals was
“to allow Sarah to reduce her workload and/or change jobs in about five years.” During
cross-examination, Josh acknowledged that he and Sarah told the financial planner that they
planned that he “was going to go back to work and pursue a career.” The Wealthcare
5 financial plan shows that an “[a]ssumption” with respect to the parties’ income was that Josh
would have “[r]ealtor [e]arnings” of approximately $50,000 per year from “2022-retirement.”
Following the meeting with the financial planner, Sarah and Josh both opened IRAs. Sarah
funded both accounts. Sarah and Josh also purchased life insurance policies.
¶16. Regarding childcare, when Sarah and Josh moved to Meridian in July 2014, E.R.
began attending daycare. Josh testified that S.L., who was born in August 2017, was placed
in daycare “for a short while” before the COVID-19 pandemic shut down schools in early
2020. He said that “we wanted [S.L.] to go to daycare. It was time for her to go to daycare
. . . . My job was to renovate the house at that time.” Once E.R., their older daughter, began
school, she went to daycare for at least one summer break.
¶17. Josh testified that in his free time he made do-it-yourself (DIY) videos and posted
them on YouTube “as a hobby.” He said he created his YouTube channel about two years
before his separation from Sarah and acknowledged that he did not make any kind of
substantial income from the YouTube videos.
¶18. The chancery court found that Josh and Sarah “separated as husband and wife” in
August 2019, although Josh testified he and Sarah were still living in the same house when
they filed their divorce actions in February 2021. At the beginning of the COVID-19
pandemic, the two girls stayed home with Josh. E.R. attended virtual school during this time.
Sarah testified that she often came home and found the virtual schoolwork had not been
completed. Around January 2021, Sarah made arrangements with her mother for E.R. to go
to her house after school or if there was a virtual school day. Sarah’s mother would then help
6 E.R. with her schoolwork. S.L. attended daycare during this same time. Sarah would pick
up S.L. every day on her way home from work.
¶19. During cross-examination, Josh acknowledged that he withdrew $30,000 from the
family checking account at the time of the separation. He testified he considered it family
funds because although Sarah earned the money, “I allowed her to earn it by doing what I
was doing at home by taking care of everything on the back end while she worked. It was
equal employment.”
¶20. As noted, Josh and Sarah both separately filed for divorce in February 2021, and the
cases were later consolidated. The chancery court found that as of February 11, 2021, when
each party filed for divorce, the home remodeling and addition work had not been completed.
¶21. After filing their complaints for divorce, both Josh and Sarah filed motions for
temporary relief. The chancery court issued an “Order Granting Temporary Relief” on
March 25, 2021, granting Sarah temporary physical and legal custody of both children. Josh
was granted visitation on the second, fourth, and fifth weekends of each month, as well as
summer and holiday periods. Sarah was granted temporary use of the marital home; Josh was
granted temporary use of the cabin. As noted, Sarah was also ordered to pay temporary
monthly spousal support of $2,000 to Josh beginning on April 1, 2021, and Josh was ordered
to pay temporary monthly child support to Sarah in the amount of $400 per month, beginning
on the same date. Sarah testified at trial that as of the time of trial, she had paid Josh $2,000
for the last twenty-four months ($48,000) in temporary alimony since the temporary hearing.
During that same time period, Sarah received $400 per month ($9,600) in child support from
7 Josh.
¶22. After the temporary order was entered, Josh obtained employment with Clearspan
Components (Clearspan) in Meridian doing industrial maintenance. He was still working at
Clearspan at the time of trial in March 2023. The chancery court found he has monthly
disposable income of $2,995 per month, as shown by his Rule 8.05 financial disclosures. See
UCCR 8.05. Josh testified that his work schedule is 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Monday-
Thursday and 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. on Friday. He also may work the Saturdays when he
does not have the children.
¶23. The chancellor found that Sarah works as a family physician in a clinic and has
monthly disposable income as shown on her Rule 8.05 financial disclosures of $12,969.
Sarah testified that her work schedule is 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Monday through Thursday
and 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on Friday.
¶24. At the end of the three-day trial, after both parties rested, the chancellor specifically
asked the parties’ counsel whether either one of them “want[ed] to take time for any
argument.” Both lawyers said they did not. The chancellor then said he would go through
the evidence presented and render a written opinion soon.
II. The Chancery Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Final Judgment of Divorce
¶25. The chancellor entered his memorandum opinion and the final judgment of divorce
on March 22, 2023. Regarding custody, the chancellor found that “the best interest of the
children [would] be served by granting Sarah physical custody and the parties being granted
joint legal custody.” The order detailed a visitation schedule, and Josh was ordered to pay
8 $600 per month in child support.
¶26. The chancellor then addressed the equitable division of property. He noted that the
parties agreed to the division of their real property through their stipulations in the consent
to adjudicate. Sarah would get the exclusive title, use, and possession of the marital home,
and Josh would get the exclusive title, use, and possession of the cabin. The parties also
agreed that each party would retain the use of their own vehicle, with both vehicles being
valued at about $7,000. The chancery court found that the accounts Josh held at the time of
separation were worth approximately $24,000 in total and that Sarah had her own IRA,
checking, and savings accounts totaling about $78,974. The chancellor found that “[w]ith
the parties’ agreement and the [c]ourt’s decision on the contested items, Josh has marital
assets totaling $104,306.00, and Sarah has marital assets totaling $172,982.00.” As an offset
to accomplish a fifty/fifty division, the chancellor ordered Sarah to pay Josh $34,172.50 “to
equalize the equitable distribution” of marital property.
¶27. Next, the chancellor addressed alimony. After addressing the Armstrong factors, the
chancellor ordered Sarah to “pay monthly periodic alimony to Josh in the amount of
$1,000.00, beginning April 1, 2023.” Josh was ordered to pay Sarah $600 per month in child
support, and the chancellor noted that these amounts “may be off set for as long as the parties
agree.” To avoid repetition, we detail the chancellor’s findings, analysis, and ruling only on
the alimony issue below because it is the subject of this appeal.
III. Post-Trial Proceedings
¶28. After entry of the final judgment of divorce that incorporated the chancellor’s
9 memorandum opinion, Sarah filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Relevant to this
appeal, Sarah requested that the chancery court “alter or amend the type of alimony ordered
and instead award Josh rehabilitative alimony for a period of time deemed equitable under
the totality of [the] circumstances.” The chancellor heard Sarah’s motion on May 15, 2023.
The chancellor denied her motion with respect to the alimony issue in a bench ruling and in
his order entered on May 16, 2023, after which Sarah appealed. The details of the hearing
and the chancellor’s bench ruling are discussed below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶29. “Under the standard of review utilized to review a chancery court’s findings of fact,
particularly in the areas of divorce, alimony[,] and child support, this Court will not overturn
the court on appeal unless its findings were manifestly wrong.” In re Dissolution of
Marriage of Wood, 35 So. 3d 507, 512 (¶8) (Miss. 2010). “For questions of law, our
standard of review is de novo.” Id. “[W]hen reviewing decisions on alimony, we do not
apply or reweigh the Armstrong factors de novo but instead recognize that alimony awards
are within the discretion of the chancellor, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the
chancellor abused his discretion.” Layton v. Layton, 181 So. 3d 275, 279-80 (¶10) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[t]his Court reviews a trial
court’s denial of a Rule 59 motion under an abuse of discretion standard.” Brooks v. Roberts,
882 So. 2d 229, 233 (¶15) (Miss. 2004) (referencing M.R.C.P. 59).
DISCUSSION
I. Consideration of Rehabilitative Alimony as an Alternative to Periodic Alimony
10 ¶30. Sarah asserts that the chancellor erred by failing to analyze or consider rehabilitative
alimony as an alternative to periodic alimony when he ordered her to pay Josh $1,000 per
month in periodic alimony. We disagree. Rather, based upon our review of the record and
the transcript of the entire proceedings, we find that the chancellor did, in fact, analyze and
consider rehabilitative alimony in ultimately denying Sarah’s request that the judgment be
amended to allow for rehabilitative alimony, rather than periodic alimony. Accordingly, we
are not persuaded by Sarah’s first assignment of error.
¶31. As an initial matter, we recognize that alimony “should not be considered unless the
property division results in a ‘deficit’ to one spouse.” Layton, 181 So. 3d at 282 (¶17) (citing
Seymour v. Seymour, 960 So. 2d 513, 519 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). The term “deficit”
used by the courts in this context does not mean that “one spouse[] [has received] assets with
a lesser net value than those allocated to the other spouse.” Id. “Rather, the question is
whether the spouse seeking alimony is left ‘with a deficit with respect to having sufficient
resources and assets to meet his or her needs and living expenses.’” Id. (quoting Jackson
v. Jackson, 114 So. 3d 768, 777 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)) (emphasis added by the Layton
Court).
¶32. Mississippi has four types of alimony: periodic,3 lump sum, rehabilitative, and
reimbursement. Rogillio v. Rogillio, 57 So. 3d 1246, 1250 (¶11) (Miss. 2011). The periodic
and rehabilitative types of alimony are relevant here.
3 The terms “permanent alimony” and “periodic alimony” are used interchangeably to refer to the same type of alimony. See, e.g., Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1281. We use the term “periodic alimony” in this opinion except where the term “permanent” is used in quoted material.
11 ¶33. “Periodic alimony is awarded on the basis of need, generally in monthly installments.”
Gussio v. Gussio, 371 So. 3d 734, 748 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). “It has no fixed
termination date, but it automatically terminates upon the remarriage of the recipient or death
of the payor.” Id. “It can be modified or terminated in the event of a material change of
circumstances for either party.” Id.
¶34. “[R]ehabilitative alimony is similar to periodic alimony, but it includes a ‘time
limitation’ so that it is payable only for a ‘fixed period.’” Id. at 749 (¶37). Rehabilitative
alimony is also “modifiable and vests only as it accrues.” Id. The purpose of rehabilitative
alimony is to “allow[] the party to get back into the working world in order to become
self-sufficient.” Id. (quoting Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So. 2d 843, 849 (¶15) (Miss. 2003)).
¶35. The chancellor “must consider the [Armstrong] factors in determining whether
alimony should be awarded.” Pierce v. Pierce, 132 So. 3d 553, 565 (¶30) (Miss. 2014); see
Gussio, 371 So. 3d at 749 (¶37) (An award of periodic or rehabilitative alimony is based
upon the same factors, “i.e., the Armstrong factors.”). The twelve Armstrong factors are:
1. The income and expenses of the parties;
2. The health and earning capacities of the parties;
3. The needs of each party;
4. The obligations and assets of each party;
5. The length of the marriage;
6. The presence or absence of minor children in the home, which may require that one or both of the parties either pay, or personally provide, child care;
12 7. The age of the parties;
8. The standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at the time of the support determination;
9. The tax consequences of the spousal support order;
10. Fault or misconduct;
11. Wasteful dissipation of assets by either party; or
12. Any other factor deemed by the court to be “just and equitable” in connection with the setting of spousal support.
Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280.
¶36. In considering the Armstrong factors, the appellate courts generally recognize that
“[t]he chancellor must make findings of fact regarding [each one].” Gussio, 371 So. 3d at
749 (¶39). Further, “[i]t is hornbook law that whether to award alimony and the amount to
be awarded are largely within the discretion of the chancellor.” Id. (quoting Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, 233 So. 3d 797, 811 (¶33) (Miss. 2017)). “As a result, the chancellor is given
wide latitude in determining an alimony award.” Id. “We will not disturb the chancellor’s
decision on alimony on appeal unless it is found to be against the overwhelming weight of
the evidence or manifestly in error.” Id. (quoting Creekmore v. Creekmore, 651 So. 2d 513,
517 (Miss. 1995)).
¶37. In this case, the chancellor recognized the parties had agreed that certain issues would
be decided by the court. The chancellor had the parties’ signed consent “attached and made
a part” of his memorandum opinion. One of the issues the parties requested the chancellor
to decide was “[t]he amount, duration, and form of alimony, if any, to be paid by one party
13 to the other.”
¶38. As such, when the chancellor began discussing the alimony issue, he specifically
recognized the four types of alimony in Mississippi, namely “permanent, lump sum,
rehabilitative[,] and reimbursement.” Having already completed the analysis concerning the
equitable distribution of the marital property, the chancellor recognized he “must now
determine if alimony should be awarded” by utilizing the twelve factors set forth by the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Armstrong. The chancellor then made specific findings of fact
on each of the Armstrong factors.
¶39. With respect to Sarah’s and Josh’s incomes and expenses, the needs of each party,
their earning capacities, and the obligations and assets of each party, the chancellor
incorporated his prior discussion of these factors in addressing the equitable distribution
issue. In that context, the chancellor closely examined the appraisals for the home and three
acres and the cabin property, the value of the parties’ respective vehicles, the monies each
party had at the time of separation, Sarah’s medical training, and the fact that Josh “took the
role of a stay home Dad, which he performed for a period of seven to eight years.” The
chancellor also detailed and assessed the information in the parties’ Rule 8.05 financial
disclosures and the lengthy asset list showing the items that belong to each party by
agreement. In the alimony context, the chancellor reiterated that he had “addressed issues
concerning the expenses listed by both parties” and then found that “Josh does not appear to
have as much room to reduce his expenses as Sarah, but they both can reduce expenses in the
Court’s opinion.”
14 ¶40. Additionally, the chancellor specifically assessed the parties’ monthly net disposable
income and reasonable expenses based upon their Rule 8.05 financial disclosures, as follows:
Josh’s 8.05 shows monthly net disposable income of $2,996.00 (not including alimony income). Josh will be ordered to pay child support of $600.00 per month, reducing his disposable income to $2,396.00. The Court has closely reviewed his 8.05 expenses for he and the children, and believes certain expenses are inflated or have no credibility. The Court finds that Josh’s reasonable expenses should be in the range of $3,400.00 per month . . . . Sarah’s 8.05 shows monthly net disposable income of $12,970.00, and with the Court awarding her child support of $600.00, she will have disposable income of $13,570.00 to pay her and the children’s expenses. The Court likewise believes certain expenses on her 8.05 for [her] and the children are inflated or do not exist. Except for mortgage and vehicle notes, neither party submitted documentary evidence to substantiate their monthly fluctuating expenses. The Court finds that Sarah’s reasonable expenses should be in the range of $11,500.
¶41. Following this analysis, the chancellor determined that Josh was left with a monthly
deficit of $1,004, while Sarah was left with a monthly surplus of $2,050. As such, the
chancellor found that “[t]he evidence reflects a financial disparity in the part[ies’] ability to
meet their reasonable expenses.”
¶42. Regarding the parties’ health, the chancellor incorporated his discussion of this factor
as addressed in the context of child-custody under Albright.4 The chancellor found that
“[b]oth parties are in general good physical health.” Regarding the parties’ mental health,
the chancellor summarized the testimonies from Sarah and her mother regarding Sarah’s
level “10” stress level from “working many hours and coming home to perform the duties
of a mother” before reducing her hours, as well as her comparatively calm emotional stress
level after the separation. Regarding Josh, the chancellor noted that “[w]hen asked about his
4 Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).
15 mental health, Josh answered by saying it was ‘perfect.’ This description gives the [c]ourt
some concern.”
¶43. With respect to the remaining seven factors, the chancellor found that “[t]he parties
have been married for [fourteen] years. This is considered to have been a relatively long
marriage.” Regarding the need for childcare, the chancellor found that “[t]he children are
school age and ride the bus home in the afternoons. Sarah’s mother takes care of them until
Sarah gets home without charge.” As to the parties’ ages—Josh (41) and Sarah (39)—the
chancellor found that age “is not a factor currently.” In comparing the parties’ standard of
living during the marriage and at the time support is determined, the chancellor found that
“[t]he . . . standard of living for both has changed in that they both have comfortable, livable
homes which was not the case prior to the separation. Their standard previously was not
great but not bad. Sarah now has the benefit of having paid off her student loans.”
Regarding tax consequences of the spousal support order, the chancellor found that “Sarah
will have to pay taxes on any money paid to Josh designated as alimony.” The chancellor
found that “neither party [had] more fault or misconduct than the other,” and “[n]either party
is found to have wrongfully dissipated any assets.”
¶44. Regarding any other factor deemed to be “just and equitable,” the chancellor found:
“At the present time Josh has not stated any plans for advancement in education that might
lead to a higher yearly income. Sarah has placed herself in a position to earn a very good
salary. Josh has helped in this regard by being a stay-at-home Dad for seven-eight years.”
¶45. In determining the “amount, duration, and form of alimony, if any” to be allowed, the
16 chancellor found that “Josh testified that he needed and wanted the [c]ourt to award him
permanent monthly alimony in the amount of $1,000.00. No other form of alimony was
requested. The [c]ourt finds this reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” The
chancellor ordered Sarah to “pay monthly periodic alimony to Josh in the amount of
$1,000.00, beginning April 1, 2023,” and ordered Josh to pay Sarah $600 per month in child
support. The chancellor further ordered, though, that “the above amounts may be off set for
as long as the parties agree.” Thus, by ordering Sarah to pay $1,000 per month in periodic
alimony to Josh, the chancellor addressed the “amount” and “form” of alimony as requested
in the parties’ consent to adjudicate. Further, because periodic alimony, by definition, “has
no fixed termination date,” Gussio, 371 So. 3d at 748 (¶35), the chancellor likewise
essentially addressed the alimony’s “duration.”
¶46. Sarah asserts that the chancellor committed “reversible error” by “limiting his
[alimony] inquiry” to periodic alimony when the parties’ consent to adjudicate generally
requested that the chancery court determine “[t]he amount, duration, and form of alimony,
if any, to be paid by one party to the other.” We are unpersuaded by this argument because
Sarah wholly ignores the rest of the proceedings in this case. The chancellor did consider
rehabilitative alimony when Sarah raised the issue in her motion to alter or amend the
judgment.5
5 We also point out that even in the consent to adjudicate, the parties requested the chancery court to decide “the form, if any” (emphasis added) of alimony to be awarded. Sarah consistently testified throughout trial that Josh should not receive any alimony at all. In particular, Sarah testified that she only wanted the chancellor to give her “credit” for paying temporary alimony and to deny Josh’s claim for alimony in the future. Additionally, although the chancellor specifically offered counsel the opportunity to present an argument
17 ¶47. After the chancellor’s memorandum opinion and final judgment were entered, Sarah
filed a motion that included her request that the chancery court “alter or amend the type of
alimony ordered and instead award Josh rehabilitative alimony for a period of time deemed
equitable under the totality of [the] circumstances.” In her motion, Sarah asserted that “she
and Josh were only married for approximately fourteen (14) years, two of which they spent
separated”; at the time of trial she had paid Josh “$2,000.00 per month in alimony totaling
approximately $48,000.00” pursuant to the temporary order; and that to require her to pay
“permanent alimony with no set duration could potentially have her paying alimony for more
times than the parties were married.”
¶48. At the May 15, 2023 hearing on her motion, Sarah asserted two primary arguments
concerning the chancellor’s award of periodic alimony to Josh. First, Sarah addressed the
chancellor’s finding that the parties’ fourteen-year marriage “is considered to have been a
relatively long marriage.” Sarah asserted that it was “a clear error for the Court to have
classified [their] marriage as a relatively long marriage.” She argued that rehabilitative
alimony was more appropriate in this case, citing Branch v. Branch, 174 So. 3d 932 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2015), a case in which the parties separated after twelve years of marriage and
at the end of trial (that would include, for example, an argument regarding the appropriate form of alimony, if any), Sarah’s counsel declined to do so. As for Josh, we observe that although he did not specifically request “periodic” or “permanent” alimony, he did testify that he did not have sufficient income to meet his expenses without Sarah’s assistance and that he therefore was asking for “alimony” in the amount of “$1,000 a month.” Josh explained that he wanted “alimony to help with the children and to help me with providing a good house.” Josh placed no time limit on his request for alimony, thus squarely meeting the definition of “permanent” or “periodic” alimony. See, e.g., Gussio, 371 So. 3d at 748 (¶35).
18 divorced after fourteen years. Id. at 937 (¶¶2-7). The wife was a stay-at-home mother for
most of the marriage. Id. at (¶3). The chancellor awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony
in the amount of $1,000 for seventy-two months, id. at (¶8), and this Court affirmed that
award. Id. at 945 (¶54).6
¶49. Sarah also argued that it was “clear error” for the chancellor to fail to consider Josh’s
relatively young age (forty-one at the time of divorce) in his Armstrong analysis. According
to Sarah, age was another “big critical factor” under Armstrong. She asserted that
“Mississippi case law shows patterns of denying permanent alimony [to] parties who are
young and able to still work.” On this point, Sarah’s counsel provided examples, as follows:
Examples include cases such as: Craft v. Craft, [825 So. 2d 605, 610-11 (¶¶21-22) (Miss. 2002)], from the Mississippi Court of Appeals [sic] in which the wife was [thirty-nine] and in good health and was awarded rehabilitative alimony as a result. And, similarly, in H[u]lts v. H[u]lts, [11 So. 3d 1273, 1280-81 (¶¶28-34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)], a [forty]-year-old wife that was in good health was awarded five years of rehabilitative alimony.
¶50. In response to Sarah’s assertions regarding alimony, Josh pointed out that Sarah failed
to address “the difference in disparity of income.” Josh asserted that this was a “very critical
. . . Armstrong factor” that the chancellor properly took into account in properly awarding
periodic alimony to Josh.
¶51. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the chancery court denied Sarah’s motion to alter
or amend on the alimony issue. In his bench ruling, the chancellor specifically noted that he
was familiar with the Branch case discussed by Sarah’s counsel in arguing that rehabilitative,
6 We note that the only alimony issue on appeal in Branch was whether the chancellor erred in awarding the wife rehabilitative alimony at all; periodic alimony was not awarded and was not an issue. Branch, 174 So. 3d at 944 (¶49).
19 not periodic, alimony was proper in this case. The chancellor explained that he “considered
the fact and does place a significant role on the disparity of income. That [fourteen]-year
marriage, in my opinion, . . . it may be in the middle ground somewhere, but looking at the
disparity of income, the [c]ourt is not going to make any changes on [the alimony issue].”
In his written order denying Sarah’s motion on the alimony issue, the chancellor specifically
stated that his bench ruling was made “after hearing argument of counsel and reviewing
documentary evidence” and the bench ruling was incorporated by reference into the
chancellor’s order.
¶52. Despite the chancellor’s consideration of her thorough arguments in favor of
rehabilitative alimony in her motion and at the May 15 hearing, Sarah asserts that the
chancellor erred by excluding any consideration of the rehabilitative alimony issue in this
case. She cites Stroh v. Stroh, 221 So. 3d 399, 412-14 (¶¶43-51) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), in
support of her assertion. We find that Sarah’s contention is unavailing.
¶53. In Stroh, this Court reversed a “ruling that the law would not permit an award of
lump-sum alimony (rather than periodic alimony) on the facts . . . .” Id. at 414 (¶51). In
particular, the Court found that the chancellor erred by failing to consider lump-sum alimony
based upon his mistaken determination that the Cheatham7 decision “precluded an award of
lump-sum alimony, in lieu of periodic alimony” in that case. Id. at 413-14 (¶49). According
to Sarah, Stroh applies here because “the chancellor’s outright denial of rehabilitative
alimony was ‘premised on a clear error or an erroneous legal standard’ because the denial
7 Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So. 2d 435 (Miss. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Cassell v. Cassell, 389 So. 3d 305, 315-16 (¶28) (Miss. 2024).
20 was apparently based on an incorrect finding that the issue was not before the court.”
¶54. We find no merit in this argument because we find no indication that the chancellor
believed, in any way, that the issue of rehabilitative alimony was not before him after Sarah
raised the issue in her motion to alter or amend. On the contrary, our review of the record
(and the May 15 hearing transcript in particular) clearly shows that the rehabilitative-alimony
issue was before the chancellor and that he considered it. Indeed, as set forth in the
chancellor’s written order, he explicitly considered the argument of counsel and reviewed the
evidence before issuing his bench ruling denying Sarah’s motion to alter or amend the
judgment on the alimony issue.
¶55. We find Hine v. Anchor Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n Inc., 911 So. 2d 1001 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2005), helpful in our analysis. In that case, this Court rejected the appellants’ argument
that the chancellor “clearly erred” because he did not consider a particular issue. Id. at 1005
(¶16). The Court found it was “clear that the [appellants] . . . raised the relevant law” and
the chancellor “specifically noted [in his order] that he had considered ‘the evidence and the
arguments submitted.’” Id.; see also, e.g., Roley v. Roley, 329 So. 3d 473, 499 (¶74) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2021) (rejecting appellant’s assignment of error that the chancellor failed to
consider his Rule 59 arguments where the chancellor’s order contained “the explicit
statement . . . that it was made ‘[a]fter considering the Court file and hearing oral arguments
on the matter’”). Because the chancellor in this case did consider rehabilitative alimony,
Stroh does not apply. Accordingly, we find that Sarah’s assertions on this point are not
persuasive, and we reject Sarah’s first assignment of error.
21 II. Application of the Armstrong Factors
¶56. Sarah’s second issue on appeal relates to her first. According to Sarah, the chancellor
“limited his inquiry [regarding alimony] to one type—permanent” and, thus, “erred by failing
to apply the Armstrong factors to decide the proper type of alimony (rehabilitative or
periodic) and by failing to consider whether any of the factors supported rehabilitative
alimony.” We find that the first premise underlying Sarah’s second assignment of error is
incorrect. We have already found above that the chancellor did consider rehabilitative
alimony. We also reject her assertions regarding the Armstrong factors. As we discuss
below, we find that the chancellor sufficiently analyzed the Armstrong factors in the
rehabilitative-alimony context when he denied Sarah’s post-trial motion seeking to change
the periodic alimony to rehabilitative alimony.
¶57. In this case, the chancellor made detailed findings of fact on each of the Armstrong
factors in his memorandum opinion that was entered several weeks after the conclusion of
the three-day trial. At that point, the chancellor found that Josh’s request for periodic
alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month was “reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances.” As we have already noted, the chancellor did not consider any other form
of alimony, observing that no other form of alimony was sought at trial.
¶58. After entry of the final judgment of divorce, Sarah filed a motion to alter or amend
the judgment, seeking, in relevant part, to reform the alimony award into rehabilitative
alimony. As we found above, the chancellor considered rehabilitative alimony at that point
but ultimately denied Sarah’s motion on the alimony issue. In her second assignment of
22 error, Sarah asserts that reversal is warranted because the chancellor failed to apply the
Armstrong factors in the rehabilitative-alimony context.
¶59. We recognize that the chancellor did not reiterate a complete on-the-record
consideration of the Armstrong factors in the rehabilitative alimony context when he issued
his bench ruling or order denying Sarah’s motion. In Lowrey, the Mississippi Supreme Court
observed that “[f]actor tests, such as provided in . . . Armstrong for alimony, must be
considered on the record in every case.” Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So. 3d 274, 280 (¶7) (Miss.
2009)). However, as one respected scholar has noted, the appellate courts, more
“[r]ecently[,] . . . have declined to reverse some alimony decisions for failure to make
Armstrong findings.” Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 9.04[2], at 277 (3d
ed. 2020).
¶60. Indeed, this Court has recognized in numerous cases that “[w]hile an on-the-record
analysis of the factors set out in Armstrong is helpful for appellate review, the lack of that
analysis in the record does not always warrant reversal, which will be required only in the
case of manifest error.” Lewis v. Lewis, 360 So. 3d 298, 304 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)
(quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 816 So. 2d 417, 420 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). “When
the chancellor fails to address all factors on-the-record, we are not required to remand the
case, and should not, so long as all facts are available to us so as to allow an equitable
determination to be made.” Id. (quoting Roberson v. Roberson, 949 So. 2d 866, 869 (¶6)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2007)); see also, e.g., Voda v. Voda, 731 So. 2d 1152, 1155 (¶11) (Miss.
1999) (“Even if the chancellor has failed to delineate all the factors on the record, where all
23 the facts are available to us, we are not required to remand the case to the trial court.”); Neely
v. Neely, 305 So. 3d 164, 173-74 (¶37) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020); Goellner v. Goellner, 11 So.
3d 1251, 1258 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009); Dorsey v. Dorsey, 972 So. 2d 48, 54 (¶17) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2008).
¶61. Here, the chancellor had already made findings of fact on each of the Armstrong
factors in his memorandum opinion. In his bench ruling denying Sarah’s post-trial motion,
the chancellor reassessed his original finding that the couple’s fourteen-year marriage “is
considered to have been a relatively long marriage.” He then acknowledged that the
fourteen-year marriage “may be in the middle ground somewhere.” Nevertheless, the
chancellor again noted the “disparity of income” between the parties and stated that “the
Court is not going to make any changes on [the alimony issue].”
¶62. As such, the chancellor expressly reconsidered the “length of the marriage” factor, as
well as implicitly reassessed his findings of fact on the Armstrong factors that “assist the
courts in identifying a disparity of the parties’ resources after equitable distribution,”
including “the parties’ incomes, reasonable expenses, . . . custodial arrangements, assets, and
earning capacities.” Bell, supra, § 9.04[3], at 279.
¶63. As noted, the chancellor emphasized the financial/earning capacity between the parties
in denying Sarah’s motion to reform the alimony award, and he had addressed the Armstrong
factors relevant to their financial disparity in detail in his memorandum opinion. After a
close review of the parties’ Rule 8.05 financial disclosures, the chancellor found that Josh
was left with a monthly income deficit of $1,004, while Sarah was left with a monthly
24 surplus of $2,050. The chancellor further found that “[a]t the present time Josh has not stated
any plans for advancement in education that might lead to a higher yearly income. Sarah has
placed herself in a position to earn a very good salary. Josh has helped in this regard by
being a stay-at-home Dad for seven-eight years.”
¶64. With respect to these findings, we find particularly relevant the supreme court’s
observation that “[a] significant disparity in earning capacity is a major factor in the
determination of a periodic alimony award.” Davis v. Davis, 832 So. 2d 492, 499 (¶23)
(Miss. 2002); see Hammond v. Hammond, 327 So. 3d 173, 180 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)
(When a significant factor in awarding alimony included disparity in earning capacity, this
Court found that although the spouse who was awarded alimony “might be able to earn
somewhat more, she lacks a college degree, and there is no evidence that she could earn
substantially more than she was earning at the time of trial.”); Layton, 181 So. 3d at 278-79
(¶5) (determining that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by awarding wife alimony
in divorce case where husband’s net income was ten times wife’s gross income; wife’s
income was insufficient to meet her expenses; and although the wife “attended junior college
and . . . college on two different occasions,” she never graduated, and the chancellor
“concluded that she was unlikely to complete any college degree at this point”); Watts v.
Watts, 99 So. 3d 751, 762 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (finding no abuse of discretion in
award of permanent alimony to wife where “[t]he record shows that the chancellor noted [the
husband’s] earning capacity of $150,000 per year based on his master’s degree in nurse
anesthesia, while estimating [the wife’s] earning capacity to be at best $43,000 per year”).
25 ¶65. Regarding the couple’s fourteen-year marriage, the chancellor recategorized this as
perhaps “middle ground somewhere.” But even with this “reclassification,” we find no error
in the chancellor declining to grant Sarah’s motion to reform the alimony awarded from
periodic to rehabilitative alimony. This Court has affirmed awards of periodic alimony
where the marriages were of comparable lengths. See Layton, 181 So. 3d at 287 (¶38)
(recognizing that “the chancellor was well within his discretion in finding that the length of
the marriage [(ten years)] favored periodic alimony”); Mamiaro v. Mamiaro, 179 So. 3d 51,
55 (¶¶17-19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (affirming periodic alimony where the chancellor found
the couple’s “almost” eleven-year marriage favored periodic alimony); Watts, 99 So. 3d at
755, 762 (¶¶4-5, 33) (finding no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s award of permanent
alimony where the parties separated after twelve years and agreed to a divorce after thirteen
years); see also Rogillio v. Rogillio, 101 So. 3d 150, 151, 155 (¶¶5, 21) (Miss. 2012)
(recognizing that “the chancellor did not abuse her discretion in finding that the length of the
marriage [(less than ten years)] favored [periodic] alimony”).
¶66. We recognize that the chancellor did not revisit his findings of fact on the remaining
Armstrong factors. However, both the supreme court and this Court have recognized that
“[i]n examining the Armstrong factors, the chancellor may consider them as an ‘overall
combination’ and need not individually list each one.” Rogillio, 101 So. 3d at 154 (¶16).8
8 Accord Blalack v. Blalack, 938 So. 2d 909, 912 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that “the chancellor is not required to analyze each Armstrong factor individually in his opinion, but is required to view the overall combination of the factors as a whole, opting to address individual factors at his discretion” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wells v. Wells, 800 So. 2d 1239, 1245 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001))).
26 Further, as we have already noted, even if each Armstrong factor is not addressed, “we are
not required to remand the case, and should not, so long as all facts are available to us so
as to allow an equitable determination to be made.” Lewis, 360 So. 3d at 304 (¶18)
(emphasis added).
¶67. Here, the chancellor had already made findings of fact on each Armstrong factor.
Based upon our own review of the facts of this case, including the chancellor’s findings of
fact on the remaining factors in his memorandum opinion, we find no reason that a second
on-the-record review of the remaining factors was necessary and certainly find no manifest
error in the chancellor not doing so.
¶68. To briefly address the chancellor’s findings on the remaining factors, we begin by
noting that he found that the parties’ ages (Josh (41), Sarah (39)) “[was] not a factor
currently.” Sarah contends that this finding is “clearly erroneous” and that “the age factor
weighs against the award of permanent alimony and supports rehabilitative alimony.” We
do not find that the chancellor’s “neutral” rating of this factor was manifestly wrong,
particularly in light of the “overall combination” of factors considered by the chancellor.
Further, the Court has affirmed awards of periodic alimony in cases involving alimony
recipients of comparable ages. See, e.g., Layton, 181 So. 3d at 287 (¶35) (periodic alimony
recipient thirty-four years old); Mamiaro, 179 So. 3d at 58 (¶32) (Carlton, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (affirming award of periodic alimony where chancellor found the
recipient’s age of thirty-seven years was a “neutral” factor).
¶69. Regarding the need for childcare, Sarah asserts that typically the spouse with custody
27 of the children (Sarah in this case) is also the alimony recipient. The chancellor in this case,
however, found that “[t]he children are school age and ride the bus home in the afternoons.
Sarah’s mother takes care of them until Sarah gets home without charge.” On these facts,
we find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor awarding periodic alimony to Josh simply
because the custodial parent might typically be the alimony recipient.
¶70. As for the remaining Armstrong factors, the chancellor found that “Sarah will have
to pay taxes on any money paid to Josh designated as alimony”; “neither party [had] more
fault or misconduct than the other”; and “[n]either party is found to have wrongfully
dissipated any assets.” We do not find that any of these determinations of fact warrant
reversal of the chancellor’s periodic alimony award.
¶71. In sum, after considering the chancellor’s bench ruling and order and the supporting
facts in the record we find that the chancellor did assess the Armstrong factors in the
rehabilitative alimony context, and he was neither manifestly wrong nor did he abuse his
discretion when he denied Sarah’s motion to reform the alimony award from periodic to
rehabilitative alimony.
¶72. Sarah also asserts that “[c]aselaw shows . . . there is not a single Armstrong factor that
would preclude a rehabilitative alimony award [in this case].” Thus, according to Sarah,
“[b]ecause rehabilitative alimony would be proper on [the] facts [of this case], and because
the chancellor failed to consider it in his Armstrong analysis, . . . this Court should reverse
and remand.”
¶73. Again, Sarah’s argument is based upon the incorrect premise that the chancellor did
28 not conduct an Armstrong analysis in the rehabilitative alimony context. As we have
discussed, we find that this premise is not supported by the record. We further observe that
in the cases Sarah cites to support her argument, the appellate courts found no abuse of
discretion in the chancellor awarding rehabilitative alimony and, accordingly, affirmed the
chancellor’s decision on that issue.”9 But that outcome does not necessarily support reversal
of the chancellor’s decision to award periodic alimony in this case. On the contrary, in this
case, we must apply a “limited abuse of discretion standard” in reviewing the chancellor’s
decision to award periodic alimony. We will not “disturb [his] opinion when supported by
substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong,
clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Rankin v. Rankin, 323 So. 3d
1073, 1077 (¶8) (Miss. 2021). In this regard, we “will not reweigh the testimony and
evidence and substitute [our] judgment for that of the chancellor.” Id. at 1079 (¶17).
CONCLUSION
¶74. In sum, we find that the chancellor’s judgment awarding periodic alimony to Josh “is
supported by substantial evidence, the decision is neither manifestly wrong nor clearly
erroneous, and an erroneous legal standard was not applied.” Id. at 1080 (¶19). Sarah
appealed no other aspect of the chancery court’s March 22, 2023 final judgment of divorce.
9 See, e.g., Carnathan v. Carnathan, 722 So. 2d 1248, 1249 (¶3) (Miss. 1998) (affirming chancellor’s rehabilitative alimony award); Prestwood v. Prestwood, 285 So. 3d 1213, 1219 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (same); Branch, 174 So. 3d at 944-45 (¶¶49-54) (same); Hults v. Hults, 11 So. 3d 1273, 1281 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (finding “it was within the chancellor’s discretion to award rehabilitative alimony” rather than periodic alimony); McCarrell v. McCarrell, 19 So. 3d 168, 169 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming chancellor’s rehabilitative alimony award).
29 Accordingly, the final judgment of divorce incorporating the March 22, 2023 memorandum
opinion is affirmed in all respects.
¶75. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.