Sara Hadi v. Toyota Motor Corporation

District Court, C.D. California·Decided November 7, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-09613·Unknown

Opinion

S. Martin Keleti (Bar # 144208) KELETI LAW E-mail: s.martin.keleti@gmail.com 9903 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 751 Beverly Hills, CA 90212-1671 Telephone: 323.308.8489 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class [Additional Counsel appear on signature page]

David L. Schrader, Bar No. 149638 david.schrader@morganlewis.com Lisa R. Weddle, Bar No. 259050 lisa.weddle@morganlewis.com Evan A. Ormond evan.ormond@morganlewis.com 300 South Grand Avenue Twenty-Second Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-3132 Tel: +1.213.612.2500 | Fax: +1.213.612.2501 Attorneys for Defendants Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Toyota Motor North America, Inc. [Additional Counsel on Signature Page]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA YAN DONG, SARA HADI, and JUN Case No. 2:23-cv-09613-JLS-SSC IMAIZUMI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, [PROPOSED] STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER1 Plaintiffs, Magistrate Judge: Hon. Stephanie S. v. Christensen TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A., INC., a California corporation; TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC., a California corporation, Defendants.

1 This Stipulated Protective Order is substantially based on the model protective order provided under Magistrate Judge Stephanie S. Christensen’s Procedures as of July 24, 2023. Plaintiffs Yan Dong, Sara Hadi and Jun Imaizumi (“Plaintiffs”) and Defendants Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A, Inc. and Toyota North America, Inc. (collectively “Toyota”), by and through their respective counsel, and pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby stipulate and agree to the terms of this Stipulated Protective Order (hereinafter “Protective Order” or “Order”). 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purposes and Limitations. Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. 1.2 Good Cause Statement. This action is likely to involve trade secrets, valuable research, design, development, commercial, financial, technical and/or proprietary information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecution of this action is warranted. Such confidential and proprietary materials and information consist of, among other things, confidential business or financial information, information regarding confidential business practices, or other confidential research, design, development, or commercial information (including information implicating privacy rights of third parties), information otherwise generally unavailable to the public, or which may be privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under state or federal statutes, court rules, case decisions, common law, or any foreign privacy laws. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. 1.3 Acknowledgment of Procedure for Filing Under Seal. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated protective orders require good cause showing), and a specific showing of good cause or compelling reasons with proper evidentiary support and legal justification, must be made with respect to Protected Material that a party seeks to file under seal. The parties’ mere designation of Disclosure or Discovery Material as CONFIDENTIAL or HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL does not—without the submission of competent evidence by declaration, establishing that the material sought to be filed under seal qualifies as confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable—constitute good cause. Further, if a party requests sealing related to a dispositive motion or trial, which does not include discovery or class certification motions, then compelling reasons, not only good cause, for the sealing must be shown, and the relief sought shall be narrowly tailored to serve the specific interest to be protected. See Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677–79 (9th Cir. 2010). For each item or type of information, document, or thing sought to be filed or introduced under seal in connection with a dispositive motion or trial, the party seeking protection must articulate compelling reasons, supported by specific facts and legal justification, for the requested sealing order. Again, competent evidence supporting the application to file documents under seal must be provided by declaration. Any document that is not confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable in its entirety will not be filed under seal if the confidential portions can be redacted. If documents can be redacted, then a redacted version for public viewing, omitting only the confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable portions of the document, shall be filed. Any application that seeks to file documents under seal in their entirety should include an explanation of why redaction is not feasible. 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Action: above captioned case. 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information or items under this Order. 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Material: For purposes of this Order, information (regardless of how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things considered to be “CONFIDENTIAL” Material include any information that a Party believes in good faith to be confidential or sensitive non-public information, including, but not limited to, trade secrets, research, design, development, financial, technical, marketing, planning, personal, or commercial information, as such terms are used in Rule 26(c)(l)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any applicable case law interpreting Rule 26(c)(l)(G). 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record

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