Saperstein v. Grund

85 F. Supp. 647, 82 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 67, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2520
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Iowa
DecidedJune 29, 1949
DocketCiv. 864
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 85 F. Supp. 647 (Saperstein v. Grund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Saperstein v. Grund, 85 F. Supp. 647, 82 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 67, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2520 (S.D. Iowa 1949).

Opinion

*649 DEWEY, District Judge.

The above entitled action was tried on its merits at Des Moines, Iowa, and submitted to this court for decision.

Plaintiff in the early part of 1928 organized a colored basketball team which was first designated as the “New York Harlem Globetrotters,” but later was called the “Harlem Globetrotters”, and at all times since has carried that name. Plaintiff has at all times been the owner of the team and has equipped it with a distinctive uniform which he has endeavored consistently to maintain.

It was organized as a professional colored basketball team and soon thereafter and at all times since has been considered a championship team. It developed and became identified with a style of play, marked with comic antics by the players which became very popular with the sport fans, at first locally and afterwards nationally.

The Globetrotters organization has grown until it engages in many different sport activities, such as in baseball, with a team which also carries the name “Harlem Globetrotters.”

The organization has a regular training camp and has spent large sums of money in developing the organized athletic groups with very successful financial results. The basketball team or teams under the name of “Harlem Globetrotters” have played in many of the states of the Union as well as in Canada and Mexico and possibly in Other foreign countries.

About the year 1935 a basketball team, either owned or formerly owned by the plaintiff, disbanded at Des Moines, Iowa, and at that time was playing under the title of the “Famous Globetrotters.” The uniforms of these players were demanded and recovered by the plaintiff but the team continued to function and was afterwards taken over by the defendant, and at all times since has played under the name of the “Famous Globetrotters,” with headquarters at Des Moines, Iowa.

During the War both teams were inactive, but thereafter each team has been very successful and the defendant’s team began to play basketball games outside of the State of Iowa and even in the foreign countries which had been or were being played in by the plaintiff’s organization.

Since the War the defendant’s team has not only come into competition with the plaintiff’s teams but, by reason of the designation of “Famous Globetrotters”, has created some confusion among sport writers and basketball fans as to the two organizations.

Plaintiff has 'brought suit in this court alleging a claimed piracy of the name of “Plarlem Globetrotters” by the defendant, and he asks in his petition in this court for damages and also for an injunction to restrain the defendant from the use of the name “Globetrotters” that has caused confusion; but, during the trial and in the arguments, the plaintiff disclaims any desire to recover damages.

The evidence is extensive and no benefit would be attained by going into it in detail, but some facts stand out prominently. One is the success of the efforts on the part of the plaintiff in forming and promoting his Harlem Globetrotters into a very successful financial organization; in the studied clowning and entertainment of the club; and its ability to win games as a professional basketball team.

A second outstanding fact is the use of the name “Famous Globetrotters” when there existed a much more famous Globetrotters organization. This would tend to confuse the sports fans as to whether the defendant’s team or the plaintiff’s teams were in fact that famous Harlem Globetrotters team.

The third fact that stands out is that the defendant not only used the word “Famous” in describing his basketball team, but also used the word “Original” in his advertisements and on his letterheads, thereby also tending to create confusion between his team and the team of the plaintiff known as the “Harlem Globetrotters.”

Defendant claims in his argument that the plaintiff can not recover because the words “Harlem Globetrotters” have not acquired a secondary meaning that entitled *650 him- to .protection; that the name “Famous Globetrotters” is so distinct as not to be confused, with “Harlem Globetrotters” ; that the plaintiff has known of the defendant’s organization since 1935 and has not taken any formal action to prevent the .use of the name, but has permitted the defendant to spend a large amount of money in playing his team under that name, and has acquiesced in the name for such a length of time that the plaintiff is -now barred by estoppel and laches from obtaining the relief .demanded.

Defendant also claims that the plaintiff does not come into court with clean hands and is therefore not entitled to relief;

Defendant also claims that under the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, the laws of the State of Iowa prevail.

It does ' appear from the recent decisions . of • the United States Supreme Court and the trend of the decisions that this case is controlled by the laws of the ■State of Iowa. But I- find the laws of the State of Iowa in harmony with the general rules regarding claimed piracy of trade •names and unfair competition. '

In Sartor v. Schaden, 125 Iowa 696, 700, 101 N.W. 511, 513, is the statement : ’ “Courts will protect trade-names or reputations, -although not registered or properly 'selected as trade-marks, on the broad ground of enforcing justice and protecting one in the fruits of his toil. This' is all bottomed on the principle of common business integrity, and proceeds on the theory that, while the primary and common use ’ of a word or .’phrase may not be exclusively appropriated, there may be a secondary meaning or construction which will'belong, to the person who has developed it.. In this-secondary meaning there may be a property right.”

And that court continued, on page 701 of 125 Iowa, on page 513 of 101 N.W.: “* * * if ^ appear that such confusion has been or is likely to be produced,- that thetfe have been actual sales of one product for the other, that there have been actual mistakes of one or the other, or if there be such similarity-of -the two brands as that one'may readily be mistaken for the other, as case is made out.”

And further at page 702 of 125 Iowa, at page 513 of 101 N.W., is the statement: “The use of the word in other states or in other parts of this state by persons who did not compete with plaintiff is not controlling on the issue of unfair competition. There cannot be unfair trade unless there be competition, and in many cases, if not in most, this competition is of necessity local.”

These principles of law were later confirmed by the cases of Motor Accessories Mfg. Co. v. Marshalltown Motor Material Mfg. Co., 167 Iowa 202, 149 N.W. 184; Atlas Assurance Company v. Atlas Ins. Co., 138 Iowa 228, 112 N.W. 232, 114 N.W. 609, 15 L.R.A., N.S., 625, 128 Am.St.Rep. 189; Dyment v. Lewis, 144 Iowa 509, 123 N.W. 244, 26 L.R.A., N.S., 73; and Lennox Furnace Co. v. Wrot Iron Heater Co., 181 Iowa 1331, 160 N.W. 356, 165 N.W. 395. These cases state generally the law as I understand it controlling the issues here.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
85 F. Supp. 647, 82 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 67, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/saperstein-v-grund-iasd-1949.