Sanwa Foods, Inc. v. United States

9 Ct. Int'l Trade 167
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedMarch 25, 1985
DocketCourt No. 81-10-01363
StatusPublished

This text of 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 167 (Sanwa Foods, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sanwa Foods, Inc. v. United States, 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 167 (cit 1985).

Opinion

Ford, Judge:

This action involves the classification of rolls of plastic packaging imported from Japan and entered at the Port of Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff contests the denial of a timely protest filed with respect to the merchandise at issue. Jurisdiction is pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).

The parties are before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. There are no material facts at issue. The subject merchandise was classified by the Customs Service under Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) item 774.55 as "[Ajrticles not specially provided for, of rubber or plastics: * * * other” and assessed with duty at the rate of 8.5 percent ad valorem. Plaintiff claims the articles involved are properly subject to classification alternatively under TSUS item 274.85 as "[Pjrinted matter not specially provided for: other: [Sjusceptible of authorship” at 2 percent ad valorem; under item 274.90 as "[Pjrinted matter not specially provided for: other: other” at 7.2 percent ad valorem; or under item 772.20 as "[Cjontainers, of rubber or plastics, with or without their closures, chiefly used for the packing, transporting, or marketing of merchandise * * * other” at 7.5 percent ad valorem.

The imported merchandise consists of rolls of unassembled plastic packaging for various noodle mixes produced by plaintiff. Printed on each roll at regular intervals are the trademarked product brand name, product descriptions, preparation instructions, and magnetic black ink marks. The marks are read by an electric eye, which triggers a mechanism that cuts, folds, and seals the plastic around various noodle mixes in accordance with the location of the marks. The subject merchandise thus serves both to protect its contents and promote the sale of the product.

Of initial concern is plaintiffs claim of classification under two alternative items, both of which center on whether the subject merchandise constitutes "printed matter” within the meaning of the Tariff Schedules. By virtue of its distinctive advertising features, it is undisputed the merchandise is susceptible of authorship. This premise is fully supported by long-established case law. United States v. American Railway Express Co. et al., T.D. 43317, 17 CCPA 10 (1929).

[168]*168In considering the printed matter claim under either 274.85 or item 274.90, TSUS, the Court examines, by reference, the appropriate headnote in determining the applicability of those items. Schedule 2, Part 5, Headnote 1, TSUS, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

* * * this part covers only printed matter consisting essentially of textual or pictorial matter * * * this part does not cover any article in which printing is merely incidental to the primary use of the article or in which printing is employed mainly for coloration or to produce a decorative or novelty effect * * *.

The essential characteristic of the merchandise at issue is its packaging quality and not the printing contained thereon. While the printing serves a marketing purpose, the principal function of this merchandise is protection of the packaged product. Any additional uses are merely incidental.

This Court reached a similar conclusion in denying merchandise treatment as printed matter in Norman G. Jensen, Inc., A/C Calhoun’s Collectors Society Inc. v. United States, 84 Cust. Ct. 76, C.D. 4846, 490 F.Supp. 497 (1980), aff’d, 68 CCPA 5, C.A.D. 1255, 634 F.2d 1345 (1980). The Jensen case involved gold strips with a design embossed on their face. The Court, while acknowledging "that embossing may be printed matter within the purview of part 5 of schedule 2”, found that determination alone was not dispositive as to whether the merchandise involved could be classified as printed matter. Relying on the Brussels Nomenclature, The Court stated "for an article to be printed matter’ under part 5, the essential character of the article must be imparted by the textual and pictorial matter contained thereon”. In the case at bar, the essential character of the merchandise is its packaging function and not the utilization of the packaging for advertising. Classification of the merchandise as printed matter is therefore denied, as the criteria for such classification, derived from both statute and case law, have not been met.

Plaintiffs reliance on the holding in J.A. Chambers v. United States, T.D. 37812, G.A. 8208 (1918), to support its printed matter claim is unfounded. In Chambers, uncut paper wrappers printed with a trademark and product description were found to be printed matter. However, the relevant provisions in Chambers arose under the Tariff Act of 1913 and were not controlled by Headnote 1 of Part 5, Schedule 2 (TSUS), the determinative statutory provision pertaining to this claim. Moreover, in its treatment of paper wrappers under the 1913 Act, the Board of General Appraisers was limited to classification alternatives as either "printed matter” or "manufacturers of paper”.1 Where there has been a substantial change in the statutory language, judicial construction under a prior tariff act is not dispositive. John H. Faunce Inc., Masonite Corporation v. United States, 80 Cust. Ct. 139, C.D. 4747 (1978); Inter-Maritime Forwarding [169]*169Co. v. United States, 70 Cust. Ct. 133, C.D. 4419 (1973). Consequently, the decision in Chambers (supra) is not germane to the present case.

In evaluating a classification claim under TSUS item 772.20 (the "containers” provision), certain considerations must be weighed. In its imported condition, the subject merchandise is incapable of "containing”, as it consists of continuous lengths of flat plastic. The question arises, therefore, as to whether the merchandise is unas-sembled or unfinished for the purposes of item 772.20.

General Interpretative Rule (10)h, TSUS, states:

(h) unless the context requires otherwise, a tariff description for an article covers such article, whether assembled or not assembled, and whether finished or not finished; (Emphasis added.)

Under this rule, articles which are not assembled or finished are classified as if they are complete.

Defendant argues the merchandise at issue is merely wrapping material which requires further processing after importation, thus precluding classification as an unfinished or unassembled article. Defendant further argues the "substantial manufacturing” the plastic undergoes in the United States removes it from Rule Í0(h) through the "unless the context requires other” limitation therein.

Whether particular merchandise is a material or an unfinished article is a question which has been before the Courts on numerous occasions, with differing results depending on the facts and the statutory language in each case. United States (American Sponge & Chamois Co., Inc., Party in Interest) v. Nylonge Corporation, 48 CCPA 55, C.A.D. 764 (1960); Avins Industrial Products Co. v. United States, 72 Cust. Ct. 43, C.D. 4503 (1974), aff’d, 62 CCPA 83, C.A.D.

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515 F.2d 782 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1975)
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634 F.2d 1345 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1980)
Inter-Maritime Forwarding Co. v. United States
70 Cust. Ct. 133 (U.S. Customs Court, 1973)
Avins Industrial Products Co. v. United States
72 Cust. Ct. 43 (U.S. Customs Court, 1974)
John H. Faunce, Inc. Masonite v. United States
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84 Cust. Ct. 76 (U.S. Customs Court, 1980)

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9 Ct. Int'l Trade 167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanwa-foods-inc-v-united-states-cit-1985.