Santoro v. Commissioner

1975 T.C. Memo. 152, 34 T.C.M. 703, 1975 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 219
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedMay 20, 1975
DocketDocket No. 4701-74.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1975 T.C. Memo. 152 (Santoro v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santoro v. Commissioner, 1975 T.C. Memo. 152, 34 T.C.M. 703, 1975 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 219 (tax 1975).

Opinion

ANTHONY SANTORO, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Santoro v. Commissioner
Docket No. 4701-74.
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1975-152; 1975 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 219; 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 703; T.C.M. (RIA) 750152;
May 20, 1975, Filed
Anthony Santoro, pro se. Jonathan A. Brod, for the respondent.

DAWSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAWSON, Chief Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $131 in petitioner's Federal income tax for 1972.

The only issue for our decision is whether petitioner is entitled to use head of household tax rates for that year.

All of the facts are stipulated and we adopt the stipulation of facts as our findings. The relevant facts are summarized below.

Anthony Santoro (herein called petitioner) was a legal resident of Hollywood, California, when he filed his petition in this proceeding. *221 His Federal income tax return for the year 1972 was timely filed with the Western Service Center, Ogden, Utah. Petitioner's parents lived in his home throughout the year 1972, and he provided more than 50 percent of their support during that year. His father and mother had gross income of $3,495 for 1972, which constituted community property. Petitioner claimed head of household status on his 1972 Federal income tax return and computed his tax on the basis of the rate applicable thereto. The deficiency in this case was based on respondent's determination that petitioner was not entitled to head of household status.

Petitioner argues that he qualifies for head of household tax rates. We must examine the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to see if he qualifies. Section 1(b) 1 permits an individual who is the head of a household to determine his tax in accordance with that section. Head of household is defined in section 2(b)(1), which, in relevant part, provides:

an individual shall be considered a head of a household if, and only if, such individual is not married at the close of his taxable year, is not a surviving spouse (as defined in subsection (a)), and either--

(A) *222 maintains as his home a household which constitutes for such taxable year the principal place of abode, as a member of such household, of--

(ii) any other person who is a dependent of the taxpayer, if the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for the taxable year for such person under section 151, or

(B) maintains a household which constitutes for such taxable year the principal place of abode of the father or mother of the taxpayer, if the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for the taxable year for such father or mother under section 151. for purposes of this paragraph, an individual shall be considered as maintaining a household only if over half of the cost of maintaining the household during the taxable year is furnished by such individual. (Emphasis added)

Since the term "dependent," as defined in section 152(a)(4), includes the father or mother of the taxpayer, petitioner must meet the requirements of either section 2(b)(1)(A)(ii) or section 2(b)(1)(B) in order to qualify as a head of household. However, both these subsections*223 require that petitioner must be entitled to a deduction for the taxable year for his mother and father under section 151 to be considered a head of household. While deductions are a matter of legislative grace, Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943), New Colonial Co. v. Helvering,292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934), whether petitioner is entitled to a deduction under section 151 is simply a matter of properly interpreting the statutory language involved. Here the problem is not difficult because the language of the statute is clear.

Section 151(e)(1) allows a taxpayer an exemption of $750 for each dependent only where the claimed dependent had gross income for the taxable year of less than $750, unless the claimed dependent is a child of the taxpayer and is either a student or less than 19 years old at the close of the taxpayer's taxable year.

Respondent concedes that the petitioner meets all the requirements for head of household status except one, i.e., the gross income of petitioner's parents exceeded the statutory ceiling. It has been stipulated that petitioner's parents earned $3,495, which constituted community property,*224 during 1972. Under California law, Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 5105 (West 1970), petitioner's parents each had a one-half interest in this amount. Thus, both his mother and father had gross income for Federal income tax purposes in excess of the statutory ceiling of $750. See United States v. Mitchell,403 U.S. 190 (1971), affirming 51 T.C. 641 (1969)

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Related

New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering
292 U.S. 435 (Supreme Court, 1934)
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner
319 U.S. 590 (Supreme Court, 1943)
United States v. Mitchell
403 U.S. 190 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Gooch v. Commissioner
21 T.C. 481 (U.S. Tax Court, 1954)
Mitchell v. Commissioner
51 T.C. 641 (U.S. Tax Court, 1969)
Carito v. Commissioner
54 T.C. 1614 (U.S. Tax Court, 1970)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1975 T.C. Memo. 152, 34 T.C.M. 703, 1975 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 219, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/santoro-v-commissioner-tax-1975.