Santo, S. v. Batterman, C.

Opinion

J-A22033-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

SILVIA SANTO : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHAD BATTERMAN : : Appellant : No. 409 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered January 14, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Domestic Relations at No(s): 2024DR00154

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 8, 2025

Appellant, Chad Batterman, appeals pro se from the January 13, 2025,

Order entered by the Honorable James M. McMaster in the Court of Common

Pleas of Bucks County denying Appellant’s petitions to reinstate his passport,

to lift a non-disbursement order, and to proceed in forma pauperis and

denying Appellant’s oral motion for recusal of the Honorable Judge McMaster.

After careful review, we affirm.

This appeal arises from an ongoing support matter which was initiated

in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Relevant to the instant

appeal, on September 25, 2023, Appellant at that time having substantial

arrearages in missed support payments, a non-disbursement order was

entered by the Honorable Judge Margaret T. Murphy of said court, directing

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A22033-25

certain settlement proceeds relative to a personal injury claim which were

owed to Appellant to be held in escrow “pending resolution of [Appellant’s]

child support matter,” and further instructing that “no funds may be

distributed to [Appellant] without further specific order of [that] Court.” Trial

Court Opinion 4/4/2025, Exhibit A.

The Honorable Judge McMaster sets forth the subsequent factual and

procedural history as follows:

Through an Order dated April 25, 2024, [the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County] registered the Foreign Support Order Number 17-01602 issued by the Philadelphia County Court effective August 23, 2023, which directed Father to pay $674.48 per month for the children, with arrears of $28,575.23 at that time.

On June 20, 2024, a Petition for Contempt was filed against Father. As of that date arrears totaled $29,924.19.

Father filed a modification petition on August 2, 2024.

Father filed one of his petitions for In Forma Pauperis on November 7, 2024.

Father filed his first appeal on December 5, 2024, from the Order dated November 18, 2024, in which this Court denied Father's Petition for Modification of Support and denied the In Forma Pauperis Petition[1]. The Order also directed the Bucks County Domestic Relations Section to issue an Order for the Release of Information from the Law Firm of Leonard Sciolla and Zurich American Institute Insurance Company for information regarding lawsuits and settlement proceeds on behalf of or made available to Father.

1 Affirmed by this Court. Santo v. Batterman, 3258 EDA 2024, 341 A.3d 117 (Pa. Super. filed May 21, 2025)

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On December 16, 2024, Father filed a Petition for Special Relief to Reinstate Passport and Petition for Special Relief to Immediately Lift Non-Disbursement Order from September 25, 2023.

Father's second appeal was filed December 16, 2024, from an Order dated December 6, 2024 in which this Court found Father in contempt for willfully failing to pay the court ordered amount while having the financial ability to pay. Father was remanded to Bucks County Correctional Facility for six months effective December 6, 2024 with a purge amount of $25,000.00, which was immediately paid.

Trial Court Opinion 4/4/25 at 1-3.

On January 13, 2025, the lower Court presided over a hearing

addressing Appellant’s petitions to reinstate his passport and to lift the non-

disbursement order, as well as his serial petition to proceed In forma Pauperis

filed that same day. At that hearing, Appellant testified that the $25,000.00

purge amount relative to the December 6, 2024, order finding Appellant in

contempt was not paid by Appellant himself but rather by Appellant’s mother

and grandmother. N.T. Hearing 1/13/2025, at 7-9. Further, Appellant testified

that his family anticipated repayment from the funds held in escrow pursuant

to the non-disbursement order once those funds were made available to

Appellant. N.T. Hearing 1/13/2025, at 7-9. However, the trial Court did not

find Appellant to be credible. Id. at 28. Further, at the time of the January 13,

2025, hearing, Appellant’s child support for January of 2025 had been

charged, and as of that time “those arrears [were] outstanding,” in addition

to $9,634.99 in support obligations still in arrears, not having been satisfied

by the $25,000.00 purge amount. Id. at 6, 24.

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Regarding the settlement funds subject to the non-disbursement order,

counsel representing Bucks County Domestic Relations suggested during the

January 13, 2025, hearing that the settlement funds should be disbursed to

Domestic Relations to be held by the agency in escrow, in anticipation of future

non-payment of child support. Id. at 25. However, the lower Court entered

no order to that effect; rather, the Court explained to Appellant that “if the

child support system files to have [the funds] disbursed based on the arrears,

then [the Court will] entertain that Order when and if that petition is filed,”

and further the lower Court clarified that it would afford Appellant an

opportunity to be heard on any such petition prior to ruling. N.T. at 29-30.

At the conclusion of the January 13, 2025, hearing, the trial Court noted

Appellant’s failure to stay current in his child support payments as well as the

Court’s credibility determination in its decision to deny Appellant’s petitions.

Regarding the funds held in escrow pursuant to the non-disbursement order,

the trial court stated “that money stays there until [] your arrears are paid in

full.” Id. at 29. After the trial court announced its ruling, Appellant stated “I’m

going to have an oral argument for you to recuse yourself then before that

Order’s entered and that I have till [sic] Friday or Monday to enter a formal

recusal,” which Appellant styles as a motion for recusal of the trial court. Id.

Despite a marked lack of conformity with the Rules of Appellate

Procedure in Appellant’s brief, we discern that Appellant intends to raise

fourteen questions on appeal. His statement of questions presented

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incorporates by reference his concise statement of matters complained of on

appeal, the relevant section of which claims:

1. The Judge erred as a matter of law by denying Appellant's Petition for Special Relief To Immediately Lift The Non- Disbursement Order From September 25, 2023, for Appellant to access his personal injury settlement.

2. The Judge erred as a matter of law by refusing to lift the non- disbursement order as future punishment for contempt of Appellant by keeping Appellant's personal injury settlement funds as ransom from Appellant, so the Trial Court can use the settlement funds to pay Appellant's future child support payments based upon the Trial Court's belief that Appellant will not pay child support per the child support order in the future.

3. The Judge erred as a matter of law by denying Appellant's in forma pauperis [sic] for the November 18, 2024 and December 6, 2024 notes of testimony.

4. The Judge erred as a matter of law by denying Appellant's Petition for Special Relief To Reinstate Passport.

5. The Judge erred as a matter of law by failing to rule on and enter and [sic] Order regarding Appellant's oral motion for recusal at the January 13, 2025 hearing.

6. The Judge erred as a matter of law by failing to stay the order from the January 13, 2025 hearing until a recusal hearing was scheduled, heard, and ruled upon by the Court.

7. The Judge erred as a matter of law by failing to allow Appellant state [sic] his entire oral recusal motion reasons on the record at the January 13, 2025 hearing.

8. The Judge erred as a matter of law by denying Appellant's due process by stating since the Court previously found Appellant not credible, the Court will continue to find Appellant not credible and by doing so greatly prejudiced Appellant as the Court denied all of Appellant's Petitions at the January 13, 2024 hearing.

9. The Judge erred as a matter of law by improperly disregarding Appellant's evidence, testimony and witnesses based on pure

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conjecture regarding 'facts' not in evidence, and factually erroneous interpretations of the evidence and prior rulings.

10. The Judge erred as a matter of law by failing to allow Appellant to admit relevant evidence into the record.

11. The Judge erred as a matter of law by not acting as a neutral arbiter of disputes, but as a prosecutor/ counsel [sic] or advocate for Appellee.

12. The Judge erred as a matter of law by showing he is not impartial to the parties.

13. The Judge erred as a matter of law by allowing Appellee's attorneys to testify.

14. The Judge erred as a matter of law by allowing Appellee's Court appointed Counsel to ask Appellant's witness' irrelevant and inappropriate questions including about Appellant's witness personal finance and information about businesses owned by Appellant's witness despite Appellant's objections at the January 13, 2025 hearing.

Trial Court Opinion 4/4/2025 at 3-4.

Preliminarily, we note that the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief preclude

meaningful appellate review of several arguments and fragments of

arguments contained therein. Although this Court is willing to liberally

construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, Appellant is not entitled to any

particular advantage because he lacks legal training." Elliot-Greenleaf, P.C.

v. Rothstein, 255 A.3d 539, 542 (Pa.Super. 2021)(citation omitted). “To the

contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must,

to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training

will be his undoing.” Wilkins v. Marsico, 903 A.2d 1281, 1284-1285

(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 918 A.2d 747 (Pa. 2007). Thus, while we

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endeavor to review what arguments we may discern within Appellant’s brief,

we are constrained to find that he has waived a great number of the issues

enumerated in his concise statement. "The Rules of Appellate Procedure state

unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be supported by

discussion and analysis of pertinent authority." Commonwealth v. Martz,

232 A.3d 801, 811 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation and bracketed language

omitted). See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (listing argument requirements for appellate

briefs). Furthermore, this Court "will not act as counsel and will not develop

arguments on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects in a brief impede

our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal

entirely or find certain issues to be waived." In re R.D., A.3d 657, 674 (Pa.

Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

Additionally, as we have previously explained to Appellant:

“Incorporation by reference to other portions of his brief is insufficient to allow this Court to review the separate claim raised. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating argument must contain analysis and citation to pertinent analysis); Franciscus v. Sevdik, 135 A.3d 1092, 1097 (Pa. Super. 2016) (noting courts do not permit parties to incorporate by reference arguments ‘as a substitute for the proper presentation of arguments in the body of the appellate brief’)(citation omitted). [See also] Moranko v. Downs Racing LP, 118 A.3d 1111, 1117 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (‘It [is] well settled that a failure to argue and to cite any authority supporting any argument constitutes a waiver of issues on appeal’).”

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Santo v. Batterman, 2720 EDA 2023 (Unpublished Memorandum dated

January 15, 2025).2

Thus, we find that Appellant has waived his second, ninth, tenth,

eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth issues, as the corresponding sections of his

argument cite no legal authority in support of his contentions, and instead

they direct this Court to “see [] and incorporate arguments” addressing

several separate issues. We will not attempt to assemble coherent arguments

for Appellant from what fragments we may find scattered throughout his brief.

We further find that Appellant has waived his fifth issue, where, although

he makes several pronouncements of rules which he contends the lower Court

violated, he cites to no authority whatsoever in support thereof. Rather, he

includes a note which reads “(find caselaw).” In holding with our well-

established precedent, we decline to develop Appellant’s argument for him

and find that this issue has been waived.

Finally, we find that Appellant has waived his sixth, seventh, and eighth

issues, where his arguments on those points are comprised of single

paragraphs containing no citation to any legal authority or to the record.

What remains are Appellant’s first, third, fourth, and fourteenth issues.

To the extent we are able to excavate his arguments, we proceed with our

review as follows.

2 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), we may rely on unpublished memorandum

issued after May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value.

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In his first issue, Appellant challenges the lower Court’s denial of his

petition to lift the non-disbursement order issued by the Philadelphia County

Court of Common Pleas relative to his personal injury settlement funds. It is

well-settled that this Court will review child support orders and orders

addressing petitions for special relief under the Domestic Relations Code for

abuses of discretion. See Colonna v. Colonna, 855 A.2d 648, 652 (Pa.

2004); Johnson v. Johnson, 908 A.2d 290, 295 (Pa. Super. 2006).

“An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill- will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.”

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa.Super. 2022) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the section of Appellant’s argument corresponding to his first issue

spans twenty pages, is not coherently organized, and is largely concerned with

relitigating issues addressed in prior appeals, which we decline to revisit.

However, we are able to discern two arguments present in this first section of

Appellant’s brief which cognizably address the issue identified in his concise

statement and statement of questions involved.

We distil Appellant’s first argument into the following: pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. §4308.1, only “net proceeds” are subject to liens by operation of law;

as the statute defines “net proceeds” as moneys in excess of $5,000.00, the

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trial Court erred by denying his petition to lift the non-disbursement order, at

least as relates to the first $5,000.00 of Appellant’s settlement. We find the

lower Court’s reasoning on this matter sound:

“The language employed in [23 Pa.C.S. §4305] permits DRS, under court supervision but without the need for a prior court order, to issue a non-disbursement order to intercept a lump sum workers' compensation payment or settlement. [Coffman v. Klein, 167 A.3d 772, 779 (Pa. Super. 2017)]; 23 Pa. C.S. § 4305(b)(10)(i) and (ii). Section 4308.1 mandates that the attorney must distribute the net proceeds of a settlement award to a disbursement agency. Id.; 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 4308.1 (b). It is those net proceeds alone which are subject to an automatic lien by operation of law. Id. Thus, the language contained within these provisions clearly and unambiguously establishes complementary means to achieve the Act's goal of ensuring the collection of support arrears. Coffman, 167 A.3d at 780. Under § 4305, DRS may affirmatively act, to ensure the collection of any amount of a settlement. Id. Concomitantly, Section 4308.1 only obligates the attorney to disburse any amount in excess of $5,000.00 to the relevant disbursement agency. Id.

During the hearing held on January 13, 2025, Father requested lifting the Non-Disbursement Order because the $25,000 purge amount was paid. N.T. 1/ 13/25, p. 7. 6-7. The Non-Disbursement Order was issued due to Father's settlement from a personal injury case. The Order was issued on September 25, 2023, by Philadelphia County by the Honorable Margaret T. Murphy. Attached as Exhibit A is the order. The Order allowed Zurich American Institute Insurance Company to release the settlement funds to the Law Firm of Leonard Sciolla. The Order directed the funds to be held in an escrow account. The total settlement amount was $52,499.00, after attorney fees, cost, and lien by Independence Blue Cross, the net proceeds available to Father are $25,427.78. See Exhibit M-3, Settlement/Distribution Statement from Hearing dated 12/6/24. None of the settlement funds were to be disbursed to Father without further specific order of the court. By issuing the Non-Disbursement Order, the Philadelphia Court and DRS acted well within its authority. This Court denied Father's Petition to Immediately Lift the Non-Disbursement Order on January 13, 2025, because Father still had substantial arrearages owed.”

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Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/2025, at 8-9.

We discern no error in the lower Court’s analysis, nor any abuse of

discretion in their denial of Appellant’s petition. Section 4308.1 simply does

not apply to the instant case as contemplated by Appellant.

Appellant’s second argument relative to his first issue is that the lower

Court’s finding during the December 6, 2025, contempt hearing that Appellant

had access to the funds from his personal injury settlement now obligates the

lower Court to lift the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas

preventing disbursement of those funds. Appellant’s Brief at 3. However,

Appellant cites no precedent in support of this argument and as such, we find

that it is waived.3

3 To the extent Appellant seeks to litigate the lower Court’s having found Appellant in contempt on December 6, 2025, in light of the non-disbursement order, we note that issue is the subject of Appellant’s contemporaneous appeal docketed at 3350 EDA 2024, and thus arguments to that issue included in Appellant’s instant appeal are inapposite. However, we also note that this Court has very recently affirmed a prior order finding this Appellant in contempt for non-payment of child support, holding that while the regular financial support in the form of gifts and “loans” provided to Appellant by his family do not constitute “income” under 23 Pa.C.S. § 4302, they nevertheless “may be included in determining whether a party can pay child support,” and Appellant’s refusal to use these funds made available to him by his family to make such payments is sufficient to support a finding that Appellant was in contempt of court for willfully failing to pay child support while able to do so. Batterman v. Santo, 469 EDA 2024, 334 A.3d 387 (Pa. Super. filed January 17, 2025)(citing Mencer v. Ruch, 928 A.2d 294, 297 (Pa. Super. 2007)). As the record below was clear that Appellant still received financial support in the same manner from his family, we discern no reason to revisit the lower Court’s December 6, 2025, Order herein.

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Thus, Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.

Appellant’s third issue challenges the lower Court’s denial of his serial

petition to proceed In Forma Pauperis. We review such denials for abuse of

discretion. D.R.M. v. N.K.M., 153 A.3d 348, 350-51 (Pa. Super. 2016). As

noted by the lower Court, Appellant “has routinely made the same argument

for granting his Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,” and Appellant “has

not had a change in circumstance” since the previous petition in this matter,

the denial of which was affirmed by this Court. Trial Court Opinion 4/4/2025

at 15-16; Santo v. Batterman, 3258 EDA 2024, 341 A.3d 117 (Pa. Super.

filed May 21, 2025). We further note that this Court has repeatedly affirmed

the denial of In Forma Pauperis status to this Appellant by various Courts of

Common Pleas. See also Santo v. Batterman, 3136 EDA 2023, 334 A.3d

382, (Pa. Super. filed January 15, 2025); Batterman v. Santo, 967 EDA

2022, 285 A.3d 956 (Table) (Pa. Super. filed September 27, 2022)

(unpublished memorandum). After review of the record on appeal, we discern

no abuse of discretion or error of law on the part of the lower Court.

Regarding Appellant’s fourth issue challenging the lower Court’s denial

of his petition to reinstate his passport, we find no reason to disturb the

decision of the lower Court. Pursuant to the Personal Responsibility and Work

Opportunity Reconciliation Act, a state court may suspend an individual’s

passport for failure to pay child support until such time as the arrears are paid,

so long as the court follows the procedure as set forth in the Act. See 42

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U.S.C. § 652(k). Here, the lower Court recounts the circumstances leading to

the suspension of Appellant’s passport, and the Court’s reasoning for denying

the petition as follows:

Father's passport was suspended by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division by the Honorable Joel S. Johnson by Order dated April 1, 2022. The Passport was suspended again by Judge Johnson on September 1, 2022. Father's Petition to Reinstate Passport filed on September 29, 2023 was denied by the Honorable. Christopher Mallios by Order dated December 20, 2023. The Philadelphia Orders are attached as Exhibit B. In Bucks County, Father filed a Petition for Special Relief to Reinstate Passport on December 16, 2024. This Court denied his Petition to Reinstate Passport on January 13, 2025.

***

By Federal law, Father's passport was suspended for the varying amount of arrears Father owed. At the time of this Court registered the Foreign Support Order from Philadelphia County, Father owed arrears of $28,575.23. By Order dated December 6, 2024, this Court found Father in contempt for willfully failing to pay the court ordered amount and sentenced him to Bucks County Correctional Facility for six months purge amount of $25,000.00. By the time of the hearing on Father's Petition, child support for January 2025 was charged, leaving his payment and APL arrears outstanding. N.T. 1 / 13/25, p. 24. 14-17. Under the Coordinate Jurisdiction Rule, there has not been a substantial change in the facts or evidence between Father's Petition to Reinstate Passport filed in Philadelphia County and this Court to alter the previously decided resolution by the Philadelphia trial judges. The previous denial of Father's Petition to Reinstate Passport was not clearly erroneous. This Court did not abuse its discretion denying Father's Petition for Special Relief to Reinstate Passport. Therefore, our Order dated January 13, 2025 should be affirmed.

Trial Court Opinion 4/4/2025 at 14-15.

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We agree. Appellant yet had child support payment in arrears

outstanding at the time the lower Court ruled on Appellant’s petition; thus,

the lower Cout did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition.

Appellant’s fourteenth issue challenges the lower Court’s overruling his

objection to the relevance of questions asked of his mother regarding her

finances. We review the same for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.

Williams, 241 A.3d 1094, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2020).

Here, Appellant’s argument is predicated on his assertion that he did not

“ask his mother any questions relating to her businesses[’] financial status.”

Appellant’s Brief at 38. This Court finds that Appellant’s assertion is belied by

a cursory review of the record, as Appellant asked his mother multiple

questions about her finances on direct examination. N.T. Hearing 1/13/2025,

at 17-18. Furthermore, Appellant acknowledges that in response to his own

questioning, his mother “confirmed that her and her husband cannot afford to

pay off the $7,000 placed on Appellant's Father's credit card towards the

$25,000 purge,” and Appellant acknowledges his mother testified that making

this payment placed her and her husband in “financial hardship.” Appellant’s

Brief at 39. Pursuant to Pa.R.E. 607(b), “[t]he credibility of a witness may be

impeached by any evidence relevant to that issue.” It is thus apparent that

counsel’s questions regarding the number of businesses owned by the witness

and her husband and the amount of revenue those businesses produce were

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formulated to elicit relevant testimony as relates to Ms. Batterman’s

credibility. Therefore, this issue is entirely without merit.

For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial Court.

Order Affirmed.

Date: 12/8/2025

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