Santillan v. United States of America

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedOctober 8, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-05410
StatusUnknown

This text of Santillan v. United States of America (Santillan v. United States of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santillan v. United States of America, (E.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

US DISTRICT COURT E.0.N Y. x □□□ S 209 x UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK . BROOKLYN OFFICE HECTOR SANTILLAN, : NOT FOR PUBLICATION Plaintiff, — against — : MEMORANDUM AND ORDER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and 1:19-CV-5410 (AMD) (LB) MICHELLE BELGARD, M.D., Acting Clinical - Director, MDC Brooklyn, N.Y., Defendants. . □□□ eee eee eee KX ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge: On September 16, 2019, the pro se plaintiff, Hector Santillan, who is currently incarcerated at the Moshannon Valley Correctional Center in Pennsylvania, commenced this action against the United States of America and Dr. Michelle Belgard, the Acting Clinical Director of the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. The Court grants the plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses the complaint with leave to amend. BACKGROUND The plaintiff alleges that on he was detained at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn on August 28, 2013, and was injured when he fell from the top of his bunk. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) The plaintiff further alleges that he complained to a staff unit officer that he fainted after exercising, and was dizzy, and that “the accident could have [been] avoided” if the “staff unit officer had not acted indifferent” to the plaintiff's complaints and to his request to be moved to a lower bunk. (/d. at 6.) He seeks $60 million in damages. (/d. at 5.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW A federal court must “liberally construe[ ]” pleadings by pro se parties, and interpret their complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, a complaint still must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face if it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 US. at 555). A district court should “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, the Court is required to “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Similarly, under the in forma pauperis statute, the Court must dismiss a complaint if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

DISCUSSION Liberally construing the complaint, the plaintiff alleges violations pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 338 (1971), as well as the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 ef seq.' I. Bivens Claim An individual plaintiff may bring a claim against federal officials, in their individual capacities, for conduct violating the United States Constitution. See generally Bivens, 403 U.S. 338 (1971); see also Atterbury v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 805 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2015) (Bivens “established that a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest could . . . obtain an award of monetary damages against the responsible federal official[.]”) (citation omitted). The plaintiff “must allege a violation by a federal official of a clearly established constitutional right for which the federal official does not have immunity.” Nelson v. Hernandez, 524 F. Supp. 2d 212, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). There is no vicarious liability under Bivens. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in Bivens actions, a plaintiff must allege that the individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation.”). The statute of limitations is three years and begins to accrue when the “plaintiff either has knowledge of his or her claim or has enough information that a reasonable person

' The plaintiff makes claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides relief against defendants who act “under the color of state law.” Ostroki v. Town of Southhold, 443 F. Supp. 2d 325, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999). However, the named defendant, Dr. Michelle Belgard, is a federal employee, and thus was not acting under the color of state law. See Aikman v. Cnty. of Westchester, 691 F. Supp. 2d 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Section 1983 actions are not properly bought against federal employees.”) (citations omitted). Thus, I interpret the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim as a Bivens claim. Id. (“However, § 1983 claims improperly filed against federal employees are routinely interpreted as properly pleaded under Bivens . . . the federal counterpart to § 1983.”) (collecting cases).

would investigate and discover the existence of a claim.” Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed. First, the plaintiff did not allege any facts against Dr. Belgard; it is not clear whether Dr. Belgard ever interacted with or made decisions about the plaintiff or the conditions of his confinement. Additionally, the plaintiff's complaint is untimely: the plaintiff alleges that he was injured on August 28, 2013 — about six years before he filed his complaint.” Therefore, the plaintiff's Bivens complaint against Dr. Belgard is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2)(B). I. Federal Torts Claim Act While the United States is generally immune from suit, see United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535

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Related

United States v. Mitchell
445 U.S. 535 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Siegert v. Gilley
500 U.S. 226 (Supreme Court, 1991)
McNeil v. United States
508 U.S. 106 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Nelson v. Hernandez
524 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D. New York, 2007)
Aikman v. County of Westchester
691 F. Supp. 2d 496 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Ostroski v. Town of Southold
443 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E.D. New York, 2006)
Thomas v. Ashcroft
470 F.3d 491 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Gonzalez v. Hasty
802 F.3d 212 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Atterbury v. United States Marshals Service
805 F.3d 398 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Rivera v. United States
928 F.2d 592 (Second Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Santillan v. United States of America, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/santillan-v-united-states-of-america-nyed-2019.