Santiago v. United States

• Court: United States Court of Federal Claims
• Decided: March 2, 2026
• Docket: 26-124
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims GLORIA SANTIAGO,

Plaintiff, No. 26-124

v. Filed: March 2, 2026

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Gloria Santiago, who is incarcerated and proceeding pro se, brings this case

against the United States seeking $12 billion in damages for a variety of alleged torts committed

by actors besides the United States. Complaint (ECF No. 1) at 6.1 As Plaintiff’s frivolous claims

fall outside this Court’s limited jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to

Rules 12(h)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

BACKGROUND

On January 21, 2026, Plaintiff, who is a prisoner in a county jail in Virginia and proceeding

pro se, filed her Complaint and a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. See Compl.

(naming “Loudoun County Govt Jail” as Plaintiff’s address)2; ECF No. 2 (IFP Application). As

far as can be discerned from the Complaint, Plaintiff demands the Court award her $12 billion for

1 Citations throughout this Order correspond to the ECF-assigned page numbers, which do not always correspond to the pagination within the document. 2 Plaintiff also signed and submitted a Prisoner Authorization form with her Complaint, which indicates that she is a “prisoner” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See ECF No. 1-4. 1 “[d]ebt owed to me/inability to pay out lien from 1999–2089 coins.” ECF No. 1-1 (Cover Sheet)

at 1. The Complaint does not plead any facts that explain how the lien arose or who purportedly

owes Plaintiff the alleged funds. Plaintiff also references a government procurement worth $500

million, and provides no further details. Id.

Plaintiff further alleges “fault and damages against the United States of America based on

criminal stalking, stranger child abduction, child into geriatric rape/forced pregnancies and . . .

body disfigurement in all settings of life and academia and socialization.” Compl. at 2. Plaintiff

does not allege any facts that would explain how the United States or its agents caused the alleged

injuries. See id.

In addition to the above allegations against the United States, Plaintiff references dozens

of alleged torts committed by other (mostly unspecified) actors in her handwritten complaint. See

Compl. at 1–5. These injuries committed by private or unspecified actors include the following

allegations:

• Plaintiff’s online accounts with AOL, Google, Hotmail, Yahoo Mail, Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok were “closed under my legal name.” Id. at 1.

• Introduction to deadly diseases. Id. at 2.

• Miscarriages. Id.

• Violations of privacy. Id. at 3.

• “[O]ngoing stalking/harassment/medical malpractice/police malpractice.” Id.

• “Anthrax Exposure as USPS/NEX Employee and at my home in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 4.

• Exposure to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Ebola, Herpes, and unnamed other sexually transmitted diseases in 2025 at an unspecified station of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority. Id.

• Bomb fragments at the Naylor Road station of the Washington, D.C. Metro. Id.

2 • Shooting injury at Deanwood station of the Washington, D.C. Metro. Id.

• Shooting at the Wilmington, Delaware, Amtrak station. Id.

• “Gang assault/rape in 1980–[1995],” in which “[e]ach [p]erson is Bahamas citizen not Ghana.” Id. at 5.

In her Complaint, Plaintiff does not provide more than a single sentence of detail about any of

these alleged torts, nor any explanation of from whom, exactly, she seeks to recover for her alleged

injuries. See id. at 1–5.

In addition to her handwritten Complaint, Plaintiff attached more than 160 pages of

exhibits. See ECF No. 1-2 (Exhibits); ECF No. 1-5 (additional documents). The attached exhibits

include apartment listings, contact information for a local office of United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services, a flyer for a neighborhood watch program, a local periodical, and other

documents without any apparent relation to a suit in this Court. See generally id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is well-established that this Court is not a forum for all federal claims; rather it is one of

limited jurisdiction. See Marcum LLP v. United States, 753 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

(“The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Generally, the Tucker Act

defines this Court’s jurisdiction. RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed.

Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). The Tucker Act vests this Court with jurisdiction over

any suit against the United States for money damages “founded either upon the Constitution, or

any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied

contract with the United States . . . in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). It does

not create any enforceable right against the United States on its own nor does it grant jurisdiction

for “every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation[.]” United States v.

3 Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1987). To invoke

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must “identify a separate source of substantive law

that creates the right to money damages.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir.

2005) (en banc).

This Court liberally construes complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs. Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, “[t]he fact that [Plaintiff] acted pro se in the drafting of [her]

complaint may explain its ambiguities, but it does not excuse its failures, if such there be.” Henke

v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Although the Court liberally construes a

complaint filed by a pro se litigant, pro se plaintiffs must still prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (2007); Roman,

v. United States, 61 F.4th 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2023); see also Colbert v. United States, 617 F.

App’x 981, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“No plaintiff, pro se or otherwise, may be excused from the

burden of meeting the court’s jurisdictional requirements.”).

This Court must dismiss all claims outside its jurisdiction. Rule 12(h)(3); Kissi v. United

States, 493 F. App’x 57, 58 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Rule 12(h)(3)) (“If the Court of Federal Claims

determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the claim.”). “[T]he court must

address jurisdictional issues, even sua sponte, whenever those issues come to the court’s attention,

whether raised by a party or not[.]” St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 916 F.3d 987, 992–

93 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Lofton v. United States, No. 24-1959, 2025 WL 350360 (Fed. Cir.

Jan. 31, 2025) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of claims for lack of jurisdiction); D’Agostino v.

United States, No. 2024-1319, 2024 WL 4758571 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 13, 2024) (same).

4 DISCUSSION

As explained further below, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because they are frivolous

and because, to the extent that the Complaint can be understood, all of the claims fall outside of

this Court’s jurisdiction. Additionally, Plaintiff’s IFP Application must be denied on frivolousness

grounds.

I. Frivolousness

Section 1915A provides that the Court “shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in

which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). When

undertaking such a review, the Court is required to dismiss such a claim that “is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1);

see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i). The question of what is frivolous “is a discretionary one”

left to trial courts, who “are in the best position to determine which cases fall into this category.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Generally, courts may dismiss claims as frivolous

“only if the facts alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’ a category encompassing allegations that are

‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Id. at 32–33 (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s demand for $12 billion for an unexplained lien related to coins is “clearly

baseless” and “fantastic,” as Plaintiff provides no connection at all between the alleged “1999–

2089” coin lien and the massive sum of money demanded. See id. at 32; Cover Sheet at 1.

Similarly, for all of Plaintiff’s other alleged injuries, summarized above, she has failed to provide

any explanation at all of how her purported damages could approach such an extraordinary sum.

See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33; Compl. at 1–5; see also supra at Background. Indeed, judges of

this Court have found claims demanding far less money to be frivolous when, like the present

action, there is no justification for the scale of the damages. See, e.g., Polinski v. United States, 5 178 Fed. Cl. 736, 746 (2025) (finding claim for $36 million based on financial instrument without

any indication of legitimacy to be frivolous); Maat El v. United States, No. 24-1563, 2024 WL

4851311, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 21, 2024) (finding claim for $100 million without justification

frivolous). Given the fanciful sum of money requested and the lack of any facts to support the

alleged claims, Plaintiff’s action is “clearly baseless.” See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33; see also

Jackson v. United States, 612 F. App’x 997, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of claim for

“$10 billion from the United States for the use of [plaintiff’s] purported hurricane prevention

device” as frivolous). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A.

II. Jurisdiction

In any event, Plaintiff’s claims all fall outside this Court’s limited jurisdiction for two

reasons: all the claims either sound in tort or are not brought against the United States. See 28

U.S.C. § 1491.

Even construing Plaintiff’s pro se complaint in the most favorable light, Plaintiff appears

to assert various torts and cites no money-mandating source of law, a prerequisite to invoke this

Court’s jurisdiction. See Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1172; Roman, 61 F.4th at 1370; see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491 (no jurisdiction over tort claims).

Indeed, Plaintiff’s alleged injuries appear to sound in tort. See Compl. at 1–5. Plaintiff

alleges, for example, the existence of several assaults, shootings, medical malpractice, and

exposures to deadly diseases, all of which are torts, committed by unspecified actors or private

actors. See id.; supra at Background. Plaintiff also alleges that the United States committed

several tortious actions, including purported stalking and body disfigurement. See Compl. at 2. It

is axiomatic, however, that this Court lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 6 1491(a)(1) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction . . . in cases not

sounding in tort.”); Lopez v. United States, No. 2024-1860, 2025 WL 685917, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar.

4, 2025) (citing Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (“[T]he Court of

Federal Claims correctly identified that it lacks jurisdiction over tort actions against the United

States.”); Eerhart v. United States, No. 25-cv-1204, 2025 WL 2049710, at *2 (Fed. Cl. July 22,

2025). As this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider tort claims, Plaintiff’s claims sounding in tort

must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3).

Further, though unclear, Plaintiff may be attempting to assert a claim of a debt arising from

a lien (which, if so, would be Plaintiff’s only claim not sounding in tort). See Cover Sheet at 1

(claiming an amount of “$12 billion(s) Debt owed to me/Inability to payout lien from 1999–2089

Coin(s)”). However, the Court must dismiss this claim, too, because Plaintiff does not allege that

the United States owes the purported debt or that her alleged injury was caused by the United

States. See id. As the Supreme Court has observed, jurisdiction of this Court is limited to claims

“brought against the Government alone.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589 (1941).

Accordingly, it is well-established that “[t]he United States is the only proper defendant in the

Claims Court.” Lofton v. United States, No. 2024-1959, 2025 WL 350360, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan.

31, 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)); see Rodriguez v. United States, No. 2025-1750, 2025

WL 3088623, *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2025); see also Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588 (“[I]f the relief

sought is against others than the United States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the

jurisdiction of the [C]ourt.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims must all be dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction because they either sound in tort or are brought against defendants other

than the United States. See Rule 12(h)(3).

7 III. Plaintiff’s IFP Application

“Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege , . . . not a right[,]” and courts have a “duty to

deny in forma pauperis status to those individuals who have abused the system.” Bryant v. United

States, 618 Fed. App’x 683, 685 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1233

(10th Cir. 1998)); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991). For this reason, a “court shall dismiss

the case at any time” if the action to be filed in forma pauperis “is frivolous or malicious.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). As explained above, this action is frivolous. See supra at I. Further,

the Court notes that Plaintiff previously has filed several frivolous actions in other federal courts.

See Ramirez v. United States, No. 25-cv-1221 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2025) (finding frivolous a case

filed under Plaintiff’s alias); Santiago-Ramirez v. Embassy of Ghana, No. 25-607, 2025 WL

1784638, at *2 (D. Del. June 27, 2025) (finding case “clearly frivolous”); Santiago v. Maryland,

No. 25-398, 2025 WL 1424553, at *2 (D. Del. May 16, 2025) (same); Santiago-Ramirez v. Am.

Airlines, No. 25-466, 2025 WL 1424906, at *2 (D. Del. May 16, 2025) (same); Remirez v. Senator

of Del./N.J., No. 25-cv-2642, 2025 WL 1550218, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2025) (finding frivolous

a case filed under Plaintiff’s alias). Accordingly, as the present action is frivolous, the Court denies

Plaintiff’s IFP Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Maat El, 2024 WL 4851311, at *2

(“[W]here plaintiffs have exhibited a history of frivolous or abusive filings, courts have an

obligation to deny IFP status on the basis of vexatious litigation.”) (cleaned up) (quoting Straw v.

United States, Nos. 2021-1600, 2021-1602, 2021 WL 3440773, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2021)

(collecting cases)); Double Lion Uchet Express Tr. v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 415, 423 (2020)

(first citing Manning v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 679, 683 (2015), and then citing Floyd v. United

States, 125 Fed. Cl. 183, 192 (2016)) (“[Section 1915] requires that the court deny an in forma

8 pauperis application if, in connection with or prior to ruling on the application, the court finds the

case is frivolous.”) (alterations in original).

CONCLUSION

This Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s frivolous claims. Accordingly, for the

reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule

12(h)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Further, Plaintiff’s IFP Application (ECF No. 2) is DENIED

for frivolousness pursuant to U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). This Court certifies that, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), any appeal taken from this Order would not be in good faith, and therefore

in forma pauperis status is denied for purposes of an appeal. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED

to enter Judgment accordingly and mark this case as closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Eleni M. Roumel ELENI M. ROUMEL Judge

March 2, 2026 Washington, D.C.