Santiago v. The City Of Rochester

• Court: District Court, W.D. New York
• Decided: September 20, 2024
• Docket: 6:14-cv-06719
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Carlos A. Santiago,

Plaintiffs,

v. 14-cv-6719-FPG-MJP

Nurse Jeanne Odel,

Defendant.

DECISION and ORDER Plaintiff Carlos A. Santiago, proceeding pro se, asks the Court (1) for its “immediate intervention to compel discovery” and (2) for an extension of deadlines to permit additional discovery, including re- sponses to Plaintiff’s discovery demands. (ECF No. 199, Sept. 11, 2024; Pl.’s First Set of Interrogatories, ECF No. 197, June 21, 2024.) Defend- ant Jeanne Odel responded. (ECF No. 201, Sept. 18, 2024.) Having re- viewed the parties’ submissions, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s requests are DENIED for the reasons that follow. The Court will not compel Defendant Odel to respond to any outstanding discovery re- quests. Plaintiff had ample time to pursue discovery. This case will pro- ceed to dispositive motions, which are due by December 2, 2024. First, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s discovery requests are untimely. Plaintiff served interrogatories and other discov- ery requests just days before the close of discovery for Defendant on June 28, 2024. (Ninth Am. Scheduling Order ¶ 1, ECF No. 196, May 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff is permitted to obtain discovery from Defendant Odel until June 28, 2024.”).) The weight of authority in this Circuit estab-

lishes that when service of new requests is within 30 days of the close of discovery, those requests are untimely. See, e.g., Cardew v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 21-CV-6557-CJS-MJP, 2024 WL 3647784, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2024) (noting that this Cir- cuit’s “weight of authority establishes that when service of new requests is within 30 days of the close of discovery, those requests are untimely”);

Siemens Indus., Inc. v. Great Midwest Ins. Co., No. 1:23-CV-05046 (JHR) (SDA), 2024 WL 3305602, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2024) (“Failure to serve discovery requests within the time prescribed for responses is suf- ficient to deny those requests as untimely.”); Joye v. Psch, Inc., No. 14CIV3809ATHBP, 2016 WL 3141659, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2016) (collecting cases); Pullano v. UBS/Paine Webber, Inc., No. 03-CV-6313, 2007 WL 9779148, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2007) (“Finally, plaintiff's

motion to compel responses to his First Set of Interrogatories is also de- nied. Rule 33(b)(3) allows a party thirty days to respond to interrogato- ries, however, plaintiff's interrogatories were untimely served less than one month prior to the discovery deadline.”). Second, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot show good cause to extend deadlines. Plaintiff’s request lacks diligence. (Ninth Am. Scheduling Order ¶ 1, ECF No. 196 (“The Court will deny any extension request that fails to show diligence. ‘[A] finding of good cause depends on the diligence of the moving party.” Parker v. Columbia Pictures In-

dus., 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000)’” (emphasis removed)).) Here, two relevant deadlines have passed that Plaintiff would need to extend: The deadline for discovery from Defendant and the dead- line for motions to compel. The scheduling order provided a deadline of June 28, as noted, and a deadline of July 1, 2024, for motions to compel. (Ninth Am. Scheduling Order ¶¶ 1 & 3, ECF No. 196.) And the schedul-

ing order also unambiguously stated: “When seeking an extension of any deadline in this scheduling order, the parties must file a motion, or letter motion, before the deadline that shows good cause. Absent truly excep- tional circumstances, any motion for an extension shall be made at least one week before the deadline to be extended.” (Id. ¶ 6(a) (emphasis re- moved).) Thus, Plaintiff was on notice from late May when the Court issued the ninth amended scheduling order about (1) the deadlines for

discovery and motions to compel and (2) the court-ordered method for asking for an extension of time. Courts decline to find good cause because of a lack of diligence if the party “knew, or should have known” steps it needed to take “in ad- vance of the deadline sought to be extended.” Smith v. Bradt, 329 F.R.D. 500, 505 (W.D.N.Y. 2019). Here, despite notice of the deadline for discovery and motions to compel, and the method for extending those deadlines, Plaintiff did not ask this Court to compel discovery and for an extension until months after both deadlines lapsed. See Shemendera v.

First Niagara Bank N.A., 288 F.R.D. 251, 253 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (de- clining to extend deadlines where counsel did “little or nothing to sched- ule depositions” until shortly before the deadline). Significant for this case, courts will deny even pro se plaintiffs an extension of deadlines if the pro se plaintiff was on notice that he or she needed to request an extension (or make a motion) before the applicable

deadline. See, e.g., Essani v. Earley, No. 13CV3424JMASIL, 2018 WL 3785109, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 13CV3424JMASIL, 2018 WL 4100483 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2018); Case v. Clivilles, No. 12-CV-8122 (TPG), 2016 WL 5818577, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2016). On this record, the Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of establishing the good cause needed to extend deadlines for the tenth time. Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204

F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000). [Remainder of page intentionally blank.] CONCLUSION The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for an extension of dead- lines. Discovery in this case is now closed. And so, the Court will not

(and cannot) compel Defendant to respond to discovery requests. Dispos- itive motions are due by no later than December 2, 2024. Finally, any appeal of this order must be taken pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2024 Rochester, NY /s/ Mark W. Pedersen MARK W. PEDERSEN United States Magistrate Judge