Santiago v. Santiago

28 P.R. 903
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedDecember 14, 1920
DocketNo. 2054
StatusPublished

This text of 28 P.R. 903 (Santiago v. Santiago) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santiago v. Santiago, 28 P.R. 903 (prsupreme 1920).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Aldrey

delivered the opinion of the court.

The children and heirs of Portalatin Santiago Galarza brought an action of ejectment against the children and heirs of their uncle, Gregorio Santiago Galarza, and against his widow, Ana Maria Torres, to recover two properties situated in the ward of Tayales of Adjuntas, one of five acres and the other of eleven and a half acres, and also the mesne profits. They alleged that at the time of his death on February 9, 1908, their father was the owner in fee simple of these two properties and that in the partition of his estate by a deed of November 7, 1908, the said properties were conveyed to Gregorio Santiago Galarza in payment of a debt of five hundred dollars without the authorization of court, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs were then minors.

The defendants substantially admitted all of the facts alleged in the complaint, but set up as new matter of defense in their answer that Portalatin was never the owner of the said properties, for although they appear to have been sold to him by Ana Maria Torres and her husband, Gregorio Santiago Galarza, by a deed of December 27, 1901, the fact is that the said sale was made without a consideration and was simulated; that the supposed grantee never took possession of the properties and executed a counter-document wherein he stated the real facts, and that the conveyance was [905]*905made for the sole purpose of restoring the title to the properties to Gregorio and his wife. They further alleged that in 1908 no authorization of the court was necessary for making conveyances in payment of debts in the partition of an estate, according to the interpretation of the courts of that time, and that the recovery of mesne profits was barred by limitation.

After a trial judgment was entered to the effect that the said conveyance was null and void;; that the record thereof in the registry of property should be canceled; that the defendants should give the plaintiffs possession of the properties, and that the defendants should pay for the profits received since the date of the filing of the complaint, without special imposition of costs.

From that judgment the defendants took the present appeal, the first two assignments of error being as follows:

1. The court erred in not considering the issues raised by the answer as new matter of defense, notwithstanding the specific plea to that effect.-

2. The court erred in sustaining the complaint on the ground that the evidence supported its allegations and in ignoring absolutely the allegations of the answer which did not controvert those of the complaint, but contained additional allegations which, if true, defeated the cause of action of the plaintiffs.

The appellants argued these two assignments together and we shall so consider thém.

As in its opinion on which the judgment is based the trial court held only that the facts alleged in the complaint had been established and did not refer to the new matter of defense set up in the answer, the appellants understand that the court ignored the questions 'raised by them.

We can not agree with the appellants that the court committed these errors, for in holding by its judgment that the conveyance in payment of the debt was a nullity and order[906]*906ing the restitution of the properties to the plaintiffs, it decided the questions raised by the defendants, because the judgment would not have'been rendered in these terms if the court had found that when he died Portalatin was not the owner of the properties for the reason that his purchase from the parents of the defendants was simulated and without a consideration and that the sole purpose of the conveyance made in the partition of the estate was to restore the title to the properties to their real owners, the spouses Gregorio and Ana Maria. Although it is true that the opinion of the court was silent regarding these matters, that does not affect the efficacy and validity of the judgment, for appeals are taken from judgments and not from the opinions on which they are based. Besides, in stating in the opinion that the plaintiffs had proved their averments, among which was one that when he died their father was the owner of the properties in fee simple, the court tacitly held that the defendants did not prove that he was not such owner because his purchase was simulated and’ without consideration, or that the sole purpose of the conveyance was to restore the title of ownership to the parents of the defendants.

The appellants argued together assignments three, four and sis, but we think that these and the others may be considered at the same time, since they are derived from the evidence and are closely related to each other. They are as follows:

“3rd. The court erred in annulling the conveyance made in the partition under the rule laid down in the case of Longpré v. Díaz, because that case is not in point and because if the conveyance was not valid as such it was valid as a restitution to Gregorio Santiago of what lawfully belonged to him. If in fact there was no alienation, the court could not adjudge null and void an alienation which never existed.
“4th. The court erred in holding that the deed of sale of December 27, 1901, was sufficient to pass title to the ancestor of the plaintiffs, inasmuch as it was simulated and without a consideration.
[907]*907“5th. The court erred in holding that the mere execution of the deed, without delivery of possession, vested any ownership right in the ancestor of the plaintiffs.
“6th. The court erred in not giving full weight to the other document signed by the parties when the contract of purchase and sale was made, stating that the latter was simulated and without a consideration.
“7th. The court erred in not giving proper weight to the admission made by the widow of the ancestor of the plaintiffs, Ramona Rodriguez, who is also the lawful representative of the plaintiffs, that the property in question belonged to the ancestor of the defendants, and to the agreement to restore it to the said ancestor, Gregorio Santiago Galarza.
“8th. The court erred in refusing to admit in evidence the testimony of Pelegrín López de Victoria, Modesto Roca and attorney José F. Fernández Coronas, tending to prove the admission by the widow of Portalatin Santiago that the properties in suit were not his, but belonged to Gregorio Santiago y Galarza, and to explain why the properties were conveyed to the latter in the deed of partition. ’ ’

Portalatin Santiago Galarza was not married, but lived in concubinage with Ramona Rodriguez, known as Ramona Velazquez, wlio bore him nine children. These children were legitimated by the marriage of their parents in the year 1905. Before that date, or by a public deed of December 27, 1901, executed before notary Solis of Tauco, he purchased from Ana Maria Torres and her husband, Gregorio Santiago Galarza, one property of IV/2 acres, which Ana Maria Torres had inherited from her father, and another of 5 acres, which her husband had purchased, both situated in the ward of Tayales of Adjuntas, and on the following day this sale was recorded in the Registry of Property of Ponce.

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28 P.R. 903, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/santiago-v-santiago-prsupreme-1920.