Santiago v. New York City Department of Education

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Santiago v. New York City Department of Education

130 A.D.3d 428, 10 N.Y.S.3d 873

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 2, 2015

Docket103976/12 15584 15583

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 130 A.D.3d 428 (Santiago v. New York City Department of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Santiago v. New York City Department of Education, 130 A.D.3d 428, 10 N.Y.S.3d 873 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Margaret A. Chan, J.), *429 entered August 19, 2013, which granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court correctly dismissed the complaint as against defendant New York City Department of Education (DOE), because plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies set forth in the collective bargaining agreement (see Matter of Plummer v Klepak, 48 NY2d 486, 489 [1979], cert denied 445 US 952 [1980]; Matter of Ray v New York City Dept. of Correction, 212 AD2d 387, 387 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 810 [1995]). Plaintiff was not excused from this requirement by simply alleging that the union had mishandled her grievance, because she could have instituted the grievance procedure herself, yet she failed to do so. This is not a case where the union had sole, exclusive authority over the grievance process (see Matter of Lewis v Klepak, 65 AD2d 637, 638 [3d Dept 1978], lv denied 46 NY2d 711 [1979]).

Defendant the City of New York is not a proper party to this action, as it cannot be held liable for the DOE’s alleged wrongdoings (see Perez v City of New York, 41 AD3d 378, 379 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 708 [2008]).

Plaintiffs claim against the union was not brought within the applicable four-month statute of limitations (see CPLR 217 [2] [a]). The statute of limitations was not tolled under CPLR 205 (a), because the initial federal action, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, was itself untimely. Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to the 30-day toll created by the application of Education Law § 3813 (1) and CPLR 204 (a), because the union is not an entity covered by Education Law § 3813 (1). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Richter, Manzanet-Daniels and Gische, JJ.

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Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Margaret A. Chan, J.), *429 entered August 19, 2013, which granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court correctly dismissed the complaint as against defendant New York City Department of Education (DOE), because plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies set forth in the collective bargaining agreement (see Matter of Plummer v Klepak, 48 NY2d 486, 489 [1979], cert denied 445 US 952 [1980]; Matter of Ray v New York City Dept. of Correction, 212 AD2d 387, 387 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 810 [1995]). Plaintiff was not excused from this requirement by simply alleging that the union had mishandled her grievance, because she could have instituted the grievance procedure herself, yet she failed to do so. This is not a case where the union had sole, exclusive authority over the grievance process (see Matter of Lewis v Klepak, 65 AD2d 637, 638 [3d Dept 1978], lv denied 46 NY2d 711 [1979]).

Defendant the City of New York is not a proper party to this action, as it cannot be held liable for the DOE’s alleged wrongdoings (see Perez v City of New York, 41 AD3d 378, 379 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 708 [2008]).

Plaintiffs claim against the union was not brought within the applicable four-month statute of limitations (see CPLR 217 [2] [a]). The statute of limitations was not tolled under CPLR 205 (a), because the initial federal action, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, was itself untimely. Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to the 30-day toll created by the application of Education Law § 3813 (1) and CPLR 204 (a), because the union is not an entity covered by Education Law § 3813 (1). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Richter, Manzanet-Daniels and Gische, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

130 A.D.3d 428, 10 N.Y.S.3d 873, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/santiago-v-new-york-city-department-of-education-nyappdiv-2015.

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