Santiago v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedApril 4, 2002
DocketI.C. NO. 016391.
StatusPublished

This text of Santiago v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. (Santiago v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santiago v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., (N.C. Super. Ct. 2002).

Opinions

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Upon review of the competent evidence of record with reference to the errors assigned, and finding no good grounds to reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence, rehear the parties or their representatives, or amend the award, the Full Commission AFFIRMS and ADOPTS the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner.

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Accordingly, the Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties as:

STIPULATIONS
1. The parties are correctly designated and named in the above caption.

2. The carrier on the risk for workers' compensation purposes is Travelers Insurance Company.

3. An employment relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant-employer on 27 October 1998. Furthermore, defendant-employer regularly employs three or more employees.

4. The parties are subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

5. Plaintiff's average weekly wage on 27 October 1998 was $787.20. This yields a compensation rate of $525.06.

6. On 27 October 1998, plaintiff was working as an alpha shear operator for defendant-employer. On that date, plaintiff, while threading a frame, stepped backwards on a metal plate, twisted her left ankle, and fell backwards. The employee injury report, dated that same day, states that plaintiff sprained her left ankle and bruised her left elbow. According to the Employee Dispensary Pass dated 27 October 1998, plaintiff's left ankle was swollen and had a limited range of motion. Plaintiff also complained of severe pain when standing. Plaintiff was sent to Highsmith-Rainey Hospital Emergency Room.

7. Defendants have paid all medical compensation for treatment of plaintiff's left ankle and left elbow. Moreover, defendant-employer provided appropriate light duty for plaintiff during all relevant periods of medical restrictions so there was no lost time from work as a result of plaintiff's 27 October 1998 injury by accident.

8. In addition to the deposition transcript of Dr. Wyker and the records attached thereto, the parties stipulated into evidence in this matter a packet of medical records marked as stipulated exhibit one. Thereafter, plaintiff submitted additional records from Dr. Logel that should have been included in the packet of stipulated medical records.

9. The issue to be determined by the Commission is whether plaintiff's left hip condition and the resulting need for medical treatment are causally related to plaintiff's compensable 27 October 1998 injury by accident.

10. Defendants further reserved the right to obtain an independent medical evaluation.

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The Full Commission adopts the findings of fact found by the Deputy Commissioner and finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff injured her left ankle and left elbow when she slipped and fell backwards at work on 27 October 1998. Plaintiff completed an injury report, indicating that she had twisted her ankle and bruised her elbow.

2. Plaintiff reported that same day to the dispensary where she complained of a swollen and painful left ankle with limited range of motion, and a bruised left elbow. Plaintiff was sent to Highsmith-Rainey Memorial Hospital, where she reported the following day. X-rays were taken of plaintiff's left ankle and left elbow. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a sprained left ankle and a left elbow contusion, and was given crutches because she was unable to bear weight on her injured ankle.

3. Plaintiff was placed on light duty after this injury, and she did not miss any time from work because defendant-employer provided her with appropriate suitable light duty work. Defendants admitted liability for plaintiff's injury by accident and paid for all medical treatment for her ankle and elbow.

4. Plaintiff then began treating with Dr. Robert J. Logel, an orthopedist, on 4 November 1998. At this evaluation, plaintiff informed Dr. Logel that her elbow problems had basically resolved, but that she had continued to have ankle pain. Dr. Logel prescribed ankle exercises and partial weight-bearing.

5. In January 1999 plaintiff returned to full-duty work with no restrictions and no permanent functional impairment. By 26 January 1999, Dr. Logel noted that plaintiff had only occasional ankle pain, no elbow pain, and had stopped taking medication. Dr. Logel released plaintiff from his care at this time.

6. The first mention of plaintiff's complaints of left hip pain appeared in August 1999, ten months after the admittedly compensable injury by accident, when plaintiff returned to Dr. Logel and reported that "[s]everal months ago" she started having pain in her left hip. Dr. Logel diagnosed probable early arthritis. The medical note from 19 August 1999 does not attribute plaintiff's hip complaints to any particular cause or event.

7. The first mention in the employer's records of problems with plaintiff's left hip came on 16 October 1999 when plaintiff asked to be seen at the dispensary for left hip pain. At this time, almost exactly one year after the admittedly compensable injury by accident, plaintiff related her hip pain to the fall at work on 27 October 1998. The record does not indicate that defendants paid medical compensation for treatment of plaintiff's left hip.

8. From this point on, the medical records attribute plaintiff's left hip pain to the 27 October 1998 injury by accident, and most physicians appeared willing to accept plaintiff's accounts that the problems with her left hip surfaced at or shortly after the 27 October 1998 fall at work. Plaintiff was evaluated and/or treated by a number of physicians, including Drs. Vaught, Jones, Dalldorf, and Wyker, for her left hip complaints. Plaintiff also underwent short courses of chiropractic treatment and physical therapy. Most of these physicians, with the exception of Dr. Robert Wyker, treated plaintiff on only one or at most several occasions.

9. Plaintiff first reported to Dr. Wyker, an orthopedic surgeon, on 31 August 2000. According to Dr. Wyker's notes, plaintiff again attributed her hip complaints to the 27 October 1998 injury by accident. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Wyker that she had experienced persistent back and left hip pain over the preceding two years. Plaintiff continued to treat with Dr. Wyker, and on 20 October 2000 Dr. Wyker performed an arthoscopy of plaintiff's left hip. The procedure confirmed a recent MRI diagnosis of torn labrum. Dr. Wyker debrided and cleaned the torn portion of plaintiff's hip.

10. As a result of the surgical procedure on her left hip, plaintiff was totally disabled beginning 18 October 2000. Dr. Wyker indicated in his deposition that plaintiff was totally disabled for a period of approximately six weeks post-surgery, and thereafter she was probably capable of light-duty, sedentary work. Dr. Wyker assigned a permanent partial impairment rating of ten percent to plaintiff's left leg.

11. Dr. Wyker, the only medical expert deposed, stated that plaintiff's left hip problems could not have developed solely due to degenerative changes, but that some trauma had to have been involved. Due to plaintiff's accounts of the fall on 27 October 1998 and her history that her left hip had given her trouble since the date of the injury, Dr. Wyker initially believed that the 27 October 1998 injury by accident was the cause of plaintiff's subsequent left hip problems.

12.

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Santiago v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/santiago-v-goodyear-tire-rubber-co-ncworkcompcom-2002.