Santiago v. Gage

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 3, 2020
• Docket: 3:18-cv-05825
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON 2 3 4 5

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT TACOMA 8 MARCO SANTIAGO, CASE NO. 3:18-cv-05825-RBL 9 Plaintiff, ORDER 10 v. DKT. # 56 11 BRUCE C. GAGE, RYAN HERRINGTON, and SCOTT LIGHT, 12 Defendants. 13

14 INTRODUCTION 15 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Marco Santiago’s Motion for 16 Reconsideration [Dkt. # 56] of the Court’s November 15, 2019, Order dismissing Santiago’s 17 claims against all Defendants [Dkt. # 54]. 18 Under Local Rule 7(h)(1), motions for reconsideration are disfavored, and will ordinarily 19 be denied unless there is a showing of (a) manifest error in the ruling, or (b) facts or legal 20 authority which could not have been brought to the attention of the court earlier, through 21 reasonable diligence. The term “manifest error” is “an error that is plain and indisputable, and 22 that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law or the credible evidence in the 23 record.” Black’s Law Dictionary 622 (9th ed. 2009). 24 1 Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 2 finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 3 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly 4 unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, 5 committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn

6 Natraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). Neither 7 the Local Civil Rules nor the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which allow for a motion for 8 reconsideration, is intended to provide litigants with a second bite at the apple. A motion for 9 reconsideration should not be used to ask a court to rethink what the court had already thought 10 through — rightly or wrongly. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F.Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. 11 Ariz. 1995). Mere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration, 12 and reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been 13 presented at the time of the challenged decision. Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. HT & T Co., 363 F. 14 Supp. 2d 1253, 1269 (D. Haw. 2005). “Whether or not to grant reconsideration is committed to

15 the sound discretion of the court.” Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima 16 Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). 17 Here, Santiago mainly disputes the Court’s consideration of Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 18 492 (7th Cir. 2018) as guidance. Santiago argues that Kallas is distinguishable because, while the 19 plaintiff in Kallas’s treatment was merely delayed by a prolonged assessment, Santiago’s 20 treatment was authorized by the special care review committee before Defendant Herrington 21 delayed treatment further to obtain the endocrinologist consultation results. But despite the 22 committee’s authorization, Herrington’s action still amounts to a delay in Santiago’s evaluation 23 for hormone treatment. Kallas is therefore persuasive insofar as it determined that there is little 24 1 legal agreement about the appropriate length or nature of a hormone treatment evaluation. In 2 light of this legal ambiguity, “the contours of the allegedly violated right were [not] sufficiently 3 clear” that Defendants could have reasonably known that delaying Santiago’s treatment by six 4 weeks to obtain the endocrinology report would be unconstitutional. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 5 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001). Santiago’s Motion is DENIED.

6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 Dated this 3rd day of January, 2020. 9 A 10 Ronald B. Leighton 11 United States District Judge

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