In the
Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth
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No. 02-25-00241-CR
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SANTIAGO PADRON ARTEAGA, Appellant V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3 Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1870663
Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
In a single point on appeal, appellant Santiago Padron Arteaga contends that the trial court reversibly erred by giving the jury a punishment-phase instruction that “is violative of [his] rights to due process and due course of law.” Because the jury charge contained error but that error is harmless, we will overrule his complaint and affirm his convictions and punishments. However, we will modify one of the four judgments to accurately name the offense for which Arteaga was convicted. We will affirm that judgment as modified and affirm the remaining three judgments.
II. BACKGROUND
In May 2025, a grand jury issued an indictment1 charging Arteaga with seven counts of sexual offenses against the same child complainant. The State and Arteaga tried the case to a jury.
The complainant testified at trial that Arteaga used to babysit her when she was around five or six years old. One day, while she and Arteaga were riding in the backseat of a car with her parents––who were in the front seat looking forward––
1 This indictment was a re-indictment. Although a grand jury had issued the first indictment in November 2007, Arteaga was released on bond in February 2008. Upon his release, he went to Mexico, where he remained for the next fourteen years. In October 2022, Arteaga was arrested after a traffic stop in Tarrant County, based on an arrest warrant that had been issued in this case in April 2008.
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Arteaga put her on his lap and started rubbing his clothed genital area against her clothed “lower butt area.”
The complainant further testified that on a different day, while Arteaga was babysitting her and her infant sister, Arteaga tried to kiss her; when she told him she did not want to kiss him, he suggested that he kiss her sister instead. The complainant then said, “[O]kay, I’ll do it.” She testified that she did not like Arteaga’s kissing her and that she “didn’t want [her] sister to go through that.”
Arteaga then kissed the complainant on the mouth. After that he got behind her and told her to look forward. But she looked and saw him with his penis in his hand, masturbating. He then put his penis “in between [her] legs” while kissing her on the neck. The complainant testified that although Arteaga was not able to penetrate her vagina, he did contact her anus and female sexual organ with his penis. The complainant told Arteaga that he was hurting her and that she did not like what he was doing, but he told her that he was doing what people do when they love each other.
According to the complainant, when she was a child, Arteaga gave her toys, gifts, and money.2 When she was eight or nine, the complainant told her cousin what Arteaga had done. She did not tell her parents until she was thirteen or fourteen.
The complainant’s mother testified that she had noticed the attention Arteaga 2
paid to the complainant, but she thought that he was simply being nice. Nevertheless, the complainant’s mother realized that he seemed to pay more attention to the
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The complainant became emotional while testifying. Her cousin later testified that the complainant was sad and scared when she first reported what Arteaga had done to her. The complainant’s mother testified that Arteaga had lived with the family for a couple of years and that at some point during that time the complainant began to want to stay over at her grandmother’s house more. As the complainant got older, she did not want to be around Arteaga, and she became “really protective of her little sister.”
A witness who performed a 2007 forensic interview of the then-thirteen-year-
old complainant at the Children’s Advocacy Center testified about the interview and also about characteristics of child grooming––“behavior where an offender engages with a potential victim in a way to lower inhibitions.” According to that witness, grooming involves “building a very trusting relationship with” the victim and “can potentially involve . . . buying them things and treating them special to really facilitate this strong emotional connection” and “potentially . . . prohibit the child from telling later.” When asked whether “telling a child this is what people who love each other do to each other” could be grooming, she answered, “Could be, yes. I’ve heard kids say that to me before . . . .”
A former Alliance for Children therapist with whom the complainant had individual counseling beginning in June 2007 testified that she had worked with the
complainant than to the complainant’s siblings. Arteaga later testified that the complainant’s mother was lying.
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complainant on self-esteem issues, boundaries, safety and trust, and anger and other emotions related to the trauma she had experienced. The witness read the contents of a letter that the complainant had written to Arteaga as part of her therapy; in it, the complainant said that she had thought at first that Arteaga was nice but that her feelings changed after he “began molesting” her. The witness also testified about child grooming, specifically that it often involves manipulation and threats to loved ones or pets.
In October 2007, a former Arlington police detective––Corinthia Campbell–– interviewed Arteaga with the assistance of a translator. Campbell testified that Arteaga admitted having lived with the complainant and her family when the complainant was around four to six years old. When Campbell asked Arteaga whether he had touched the complainant around her sexual organ and anus, Arteaga “explain[ed] . . . he touched the victim when he was changing her diapers.”3 Campbell prepared an arrest warrant for Arteaga in November 2007.
Arteaga testified and denied ever having touched the complainant in a sexual way. He agreed on cross-examination that the complainant’s parents had trusted him and treated him like family.
3 The complainant’s mother had testified earlier that she had potty-trained the complainant and her siblings early and that the complainant was not still wearing diapers or pull-up pants from ages four through six.
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At the guilt–innocence charge conference, the State waived Counts 3 through 5 of the indictment. The jury convicted Arteaga of all the remaining counts: two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (Counts 1 and 2), one count of indecency with a child by contact (Count 6), and one count of indecency with a child by exposure (Count 7). See Tex. Penal Code §§ 21.11(a), (c), 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii–iv).
In the punishment phase, the trial court included an instruction in the jury charge indicating that Arteaga would be eligible to earn good-conduct-time credit.4
4 The text of the instruction is as follows:
Under the law applicable, the defendant, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, may earn time off the sentence imposed through the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities may award good conduct time to a prisoner who exhibits good behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison authorities may also take away all or part of any good conduct time earned by the prisoner.
For the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact the parole law is as follows: Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served equals one-half of the sentence imposed or 30 years, whichever is less, without consideration of any good conduct time he may earn.
However, in no event is he eligible for release on parole in less than two calendar years. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
For the offense of indecency with child by exposure the parole law is as follows: Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served plus any good conduct time earned equals one-fourth of the sentence imposed. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
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Arteaga did not object to any part of the jury charge. The jury assessed Arteaga’s punishment at sixty-five years’ confinement for Count 1, sixty-five years’ confinement for Count 2, five years’ confinement for Count 6, and ten years’ confinement for Count 7. The trial court ordered that the sentences run concurrently. Arteaga timely filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by operation of law, and a notice of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(a), 21.8(a), (c), 26.2(a).
III. DISCUSSION
In his only point on appeal, Arteaga contends that part of the punishment-
phase jury charge, which indicates that he would be eligible to earn good-conduct time, was misleading or confusing to the jury and thus violated his rights to due process and due course of law.
It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct time might be applied to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison and parole authorities.
You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant. Such matters come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pardons and Paroles Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the Governor of Texas.
See Act of May 8, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 165, §§ 12.01, 12.03, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 327, 425–26, 438–39 (current version, as amended, at Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.145(d)(1), (2), (f)) (setting forth the mandatory minimum confinement applicable to Arteaga’s offenses).
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A. Applicable Law, Standard of Review, and Error Determination Although Arteaga did not object to the jury charge at trial, we must review “all alleged jury-charge error . . . regardless of preservation in the trial court.” Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Unpreserved charge error warrants reversal only when the error resulted in egregious harm. Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g).
Egregious harm is difficult to show. Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011). In determining whether a defendant was egregiously harmed by an erroneous instruction, we must consider the actual degree of harm in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the arguments of counsel, and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 705–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Errors that result in egregious harm are those that affect the very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right, vitally affect the defensive theory, or make a case for conviction clearly and significantly more persuasive. Taylor, 332 S.W.3d at 489. To conclude that an appellant was egregiously harmed by unobjected-to charge error, we must be able to discern actual, not merely theoretical, harm to the accused. Id. at 490.
The good-conduct-time instruction about which Arteaga complains is substantially the same as the instructions used in Boykin v. State, No. 02-24-00273-CR,
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2025 WL 1909333, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 10, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), and Garcia v. State, 710 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025, pet. ref’d). In those cases, we held that the good-conduct- time parts of the charges were outdated and erroneous5 and reviewed the unpreserved error for egregious harm. See Boykin, 2025 WL 1909333, at *1–9; Garcia, 710 S.W.3d at 364–68 (listing numerous cases in which courts in this judicial district gave the same erroneous good-conduct-time instruction in the punishment charges and encouraging the trial courts within our jurisdiction “to update their punishment charges to reflect
5 Arteaga incorrectly asserts in his brief that the instruction about which he complains was authorized by Article 37.07, Section 4(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But that assertion is based on a since-repealed version of Article 37.07, Section 4(a). See Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 770, §§ 2.08, 4.02, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 2321, 2367, 2395 (amended 2019) (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a)); Boykin, 2025 WL 1909333, at *5. Arteaga acknowledges that this change in the law applies to defendants sentenced on or after September 1, 2019––and that his trial was held from July 11, 2025, to July 15, 2025–– but then he inexplicably contends that the 2019 change in the law does not apply to him. See Act of May 15, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 260, §§ 2–3, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 446, 448 (providing that change in law applies to defendants sentenced on or after September 1, 2019); Garcia, 710 S.W.3d at 364 (acknowledging that 2019 change to Article 37.07, Section 4(a) was not dependent on date offense was committed).
We note that the brief in this case is substantially the same as the brief in Clayborn v. State. Brief for Appellant Edward Leon Clayborn, No. 02-19-00214-CR (Tex. App.––Fort Worth filed June 22, 2020). But in Clayborn, the revised version of Article 37.07, Section 4(a) did not apply because the defendant had been sentenced before September 1, 2019. See id.
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the current statutory language”).6 And in Boykin, we relied on Garcia’s general observation regarding harm from this type of error, noting that in that case we had
recognized that—although the [egregious-harm] inquiry is fact- and casespecific —a defendant generally does not suffer egregious harm from the unpreserved erroneous inclusion of a good-conduct-time instruction when (1) the charge also contains the standard curative language stating that the jury cannot consider the extent to which the good-conduct time could be awarded to or forfeited by the defendant; (2) the punishment-
phase evidence makes it unlikely that the good-conduct-time reference caused any harm in light of the defendant’s prior convictions or other bad acts; and (3) neither party mentions good-conduct time during closing arguments.
Boykin, 2025 WL 1909333, at *2 (footnote omitted). B. Egregious-Harm Analysis During voir dire, both the State and defense asked the veniremembers if they could not consider probation as a potential punishment; nothing in the record indicates that any veniremember responded affirmatively. No one mentioned good- conduct time or parole. The State’s and defense’s opening statements and closing arguments at guilt–innocence were brief and focused on the complainant’s credibility.
At punishment, the complainant testified about the sexual offenses’ impact on her: she constantly worried about her children being around other people, including family; she was uncomfortable knowing that Arteaga was not incarcerated; and she
6 Although citing Garcia in its alternative egregious-harm analysis, the State ignores Garcia’s holding that the good-conduct-time instruction at issue here is erroneous and outdated––based on the 2019 amendment to Article 37.07, Section 4(a)––arguing instead that the trial court was required by law to give the erroneous instruction and therefore that no error occurred.
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had distanced herself from part of her family. Her personal relationship with her partner had been affected. The State emphasized these effects on the complainant during its closing argument, contending that she had suffered and would continue to suffer for life. In arguing against probation as a punishment, the State argued that children in the community would be unsafe if Arteaga were not incarcerated and that Arteaga might try to go back to Mexico again. The defense urged the jury to consider probation, especially considering that Arteaga did not have a criminal history.
Neither party mentioned good-conduct time during any part of the proceedings; the only mention of good-conduct time occurred when the trial court read the punishment charge to the jury. And the punishment charge contained “the standard curative language” telling the jury that it could not consider the extent to which the defendant might accumulate good-conduct time. See Boykin, 2025 WL 1909333, at *7–8; Garcia, 710 S.W.3d at 365, 367–68.
After deliberating on punishment for only fifteen minutes, the jury sent the following note: “If consecutive sentencing, is Defendant eligible for release after serving 50 percent of Count One? Does Defendant serve sentencing for Count Two, Six, Seven before eligibility for release?” Without objection from the defense or the State, the trial court answered, “I refer you back to the Court’s charge.” The jury then deliberated for thirty-three more minutes before returning its punishment assessments for all four offenses.
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As in Boykin, the jury in this case sent a note inquiring about whether the multiple offenses’ sentences would run consecutively or concurrently. 2025 WL 1909333, at *9. That note did not ask expressly about the effect of good-conduct time or parole on the four sentences, nor did it imply that the jury was confused about the curative instruction in the punishment charge or had discussed the possibility of Arteaga’s earning good-conduct time. Because nothing in the record indicates otherwise, we presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. See, e.g., Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Boykin, 2025 WL 1909333, at *9.
As Arteaga points out, the jury assessed a significant period of incarceration as punishment for the aggravated sexual assaults even though the State offered no evidence of other crimes or bad acts at punishment––all of the punishment evidence was related to the charged offenses and their effect on the complainant. Arteaga argues that these facts suggest that the jury assessed such lengthy sentences from fear that he would be released early from earning good-conduct time.
But at guilt–innocence the jury had heard the then thirty-one-year-old complainant’s detailed testimony about the offenses and how Arteaga had taken advantage of his access to her––and her trust for him––when she was very young. It had also heard evidence about child-grooming behaviors and how Arteaga had engaged in such behaviors with the complainant. Finally, the jury had seen the complainant’s emotional state at trial and heard from multiple witnesses about the
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continuing effect the offenses had had on her. Thus, the state of the evidence heavily weighs against a finding of egregious harm. See, e.g., Igo v. State, 210 S.W.3d 645, 647– 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Boykin, 2025 WL 1909333, at *8–9.
Arteaga has not shown that he was actually, rather than merely theoretically, harmed by the erroneous part of the punishment-phase jury charge. Therefore, we conclude that Arteaga did not suffer egregious harm from the unobjected-to jury- charge error. We overrule Arteaga’s sole point. C. Modification of Count 7 Judgment Although Arteaga does not complain about any error in the judgments, the record reveals one clerical error that requires modification.
The Count 7 judgment lists “INDECENCY W/CHILD SEXUAL CONTACT (21.11(a)(1))” as the offense for which Arteaga was convicted. But the record shows that in Count 7 Arteaga was charged with, and convicted by the jury of, indecency with a child by exposure. Thus, the Count 7 judgment should have listed the offense for which Arteaga was convicted as “INDECENCY W/CHILD EXPOSURE (21.11(a)(2)(A)).”
Because an appellate court has the authority to modify a judgment to accurately reflect the record, we modify the Count 7 judgment in part so that under the heading “Offense for which Defendant Convicted,” it reads “INDECENCY W/CHILD EXPOSURE (21.11(a)(2)(A)).” See French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Cain v. State, 621 S.W.3d 75, 87–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet.
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ref’d) (modifying judgment sua sponte to reflect accurate statute for offense when judgment erroneously listed another statute).
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Arteaga’s sole point, we affirm the Counts 1, 2, and 6 judgments. Having determined that the offense description in the Count 7 judgment is inaccurate, we modify that description to list the offense as “INDECENCY W/CHILD EXPOSURE (21.11(a)(2)(A))” as outlined in paragraph III.C above, and we affirm that judgment as modified. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b).
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: August 13, 2026