Santiago Grande v. Garland
This text of Santiago Grande v. Garland (Santiago Grande v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Mariano Santiago Grande, No. 22-761
Petitioner, Agency No. A200-823-656
v. MEMORANDUM* Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 18, 2023** San Francisco, California
Before: VANDYKE and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and VRATIL, *** District Judge.
Mariano Santiago Grande (“Santiago Grande”), a native and citizen of
Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. He moved for
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. reopening to apply for cancellation of removal, asylum, and withholding of
removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
1. Reviewing the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen for abuse of
discretion, see Jimenez-Sandoval v. Garland, 22 F.4th 866, 868 (9th Cir. 2022),
we may affirm the BIA on any ground set forth in the decision under review,
see Recinos De Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2005).
The BIA denied Santiago Grande’s motion to reopen to apply for
cancellation of removal after determining that he failed to establish prima facie
eligibility for relief. Prima face eligibility for cancellation of removal is
established “when the evidence reveals a reasonable likelihood that the statutory
requirements for relief have been satisfied.” Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d
1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The BIA
determined that Santiago Grande failed to establish that his removal would
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his four qualifying
relatives – his lawful permanent resident wife, their U.S. citizen child, and his
two U.S. citizen stepchildren.1 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The BIA concluded
instead that Santiago Grande did not show hardship beyond the ordinary
hardship expected when a close family member is removed. The BIA did not
abuse its discretion in so concluding. See Garcia v. Holder, 621 F.3d 906, 912–
1 Santiago Grande emphasized his stepdaughter’s mental health conditions and the exceptional hardship he claims his removal would cause her, but as the BIA noted, he did not submit any medical documentation or diagnosis in support of this claim.
2 13 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. The BIA also denied Santiago Grande’s motion to reopen to apply
for asylum and withholding of removal based on his membership in the
proposed particular social group of “deportees from the United States during the
Covid-19 Pandemic.” The BIA reasoned that Santiago Grande failed to submit
a new asylum application as required under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). With
respect to this ground for denial, we find no abuse of discretion.
Further, the BIA was well within its discretion to conclude that Santiago
Grande had not articulated a cognizable particular social group because a
proposed group of individuals deported during the Covid-19 pandemic is too
broad and amorphous to satisfy the particularity requirement. We have
previously rejected a similar proposed group of those “returning Mexicans from
the United States” as too broad to constitute a particular social group. Delgado-
Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). It was not “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law” for the BIA
to conclude the same here. Jimenez-Sandoval, 22 F.4th at 868.2
3. The motion for a stay of removal is denied as moot. The
temporary stay of removal remains in effect until issuance of the mandate.
PETITION DENIED.
2 In light of our resolution of these claims, we need not reach the parties’ arguments concerning the one-year bar to asylum. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004).
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