Santiago Garcia v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 30, 2010
• Docket: 14-09-00662-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Memorandum Opinion of February 4, 2010 Withdrawn.  Affirmed and Substitute Memorandum Opinion filed March 30, 2010.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

___________________

NO. 14-09-00662-CR

SANTIAGO GARCIA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 185th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1204693

SUBSTITUTE MEMORANDUM OPINION

            The memorandum opinion issued February 4, 2010 is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted therefore.  Appellant Santiago Garcia appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine challenging the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress.  We affirm.

I.  Background

            Late at night on February 22, 2009, Officer Victor Hung was on patrol and saw appellant stumbling down a street where several bars were located.  By the time Officer Hung and his partner reached appellant, he was in the parking lot adjacent to one of the bars.  Appellant was stumbling, had trouble maintaining his balance, and officers smelled the strong odor of alcoholic beverage.  Because he was in a parking lot and had been walking along the street, Officer Hung believed appellant was a danger to himself and placed him under arrest for public intoxication.  Officer Hung searched appellant incident to his arrest and discovered a small bag of cocaine and a handgun.  Appellant was arrested for possession of cocaine.

            Appellant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine alleging that the police officers exceeded their authority in arresting him.  The trial court held a hearing at which Officer Hung testified that he arrested appellant for public intoxication and searched him incident to arrest.  Appellant presented the testimony of two witnesses who stated they were with appellant the night of his arrest and that the officers did not arrest him before conducting the search.  Appellant’s witnesses, however, gave conflicting testimony relative to events that occurred on the night appellant was arrested.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, specifically finding Officer Hung’s testimony was credible, and the inconsistent testimony of appellant’s witnesses was not credible.   Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine.   The trial court granted permission to appeal its ruling following Appellant’s guilty plea.  In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police officers exceeded their authority in arresting him.

II.  Standard of Review

            The appropriate standard of review for a suppression ruling is a bifurcated review, giving almost total deference to the trial court’s findings of fact, but conducting a de novo review of its application of law to those facts.  Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).  The denial of a motion to suppress should be upheld if the ruling is reasonably supported by the record and correct on any theory of the law applicable to the case.  Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 

III.  Discussion

Appellant first argues that the State failed to prove, pursuant to Article 14.03(a)(1), that the officers arrested him in a suspicious place.  A police officer may make a warrantless arrest if (1) there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed or is being committed and (2) the arrest falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the warrant requirement specified in articles 14.01 through 14.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.  Stull v. State, 772 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).  Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists when a police officer has reasonably trustworthy information, considered as a whole, that is sufficient to cause a reasonable, prudent officer to believe that a particular person has committed or is committing an offense.  See Hughes v. State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  A reviewing court is to consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether the facts were sufficient to give the officer probable cause to arrest the defendant.  Chilman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d).  Once a suspect is validly arrested, he may be properly searched incident to the arrest.  Busby v. State, 990 S.W.2d 263, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

            Article 14.03(a)(1) provides:

(a) Any peace officer may arrest, without warrant:

(1) persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony, violation of Title 9, Chapter 42, Penal Code, breach of the peace, or offense under Section 49.02, Penal Code, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the laws[.]

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009).

            Officer Hung did not rely on article 14.03 to arrest appellant for public intoxication, but on article 14.01, which permits a peace officer to arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view.  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.  14.01(b) (Vernon 2005); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 534 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”).  Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress based on his allegation that the State failed to prove he was arrested in a suspicious place.

Appellant further argues that Officer Hung did not have probable cause to arrest him for public intoxication because the State failed to show that appellant was a danger to himself.  The offense of public intoxication occurs when an individual (1) appears in a public place while intoxicated and (2) is so intoxicated that he might endanger himself or another.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).  The danger need not be immediate or apparent; it is sufficient if the defendant places himself or others in potential danger.  See Dickey v. State, 552 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).  The only question is whether, under the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, he had reasonably trustworthy information that would warrant a prudent person in believing that the defendant or others were facing potential danger.  Britton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); see e.g., White v. State, 714 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, no pet.) (probable cause to arrest for public intoxication existed because of the dangers inherent in a parking lot).  When an officer is confronted with a person intoxicated in a public place, his determination as to probable danger that may befall the individual is not reviewed under the same standard used in a judicial determination of guilt.  Britton, 578 S.W.2d at 689, citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967) and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).

Appellant exposed himself to potential danger by attempting to walk in a parking lot of a public place while in a state of intoxication.  Therefore, Officer Hung had knowledge of sufficient facts to warrant his belief that appellant was intoxicated and may have endangered himself or others.  The facts and circumstances surrounding appellant’s arrest justify the trial court’s conclusion that officers had probable cause to arrest appellant for public intoxication.  Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                                                    PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Yates, Seymore, and Brown.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).