Santiago-Dorrantes v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 26, 2026
• Docket: 21-1361
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MAURA SANTIAGO-DORRANTES, No. 21-1361 Agency No. Petitioner, A216-434-324 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 22, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, BENNETT, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Maura Santiago-Dorrantes seeks review of the determination of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to pretermit her application for relief from

removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The BIA held that Santiago-Dorrantes abandoned her application for relief

from removal because she failed to comply with her biometric requirements. We

“may review any issue addressed on the merits by the BIA,” Rodriguez-Castellon v.

Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2013), and we hold that there is no error in the

BIA’s determination. Santiago-Dorrantes failed to complete biometrics despite

receiving adequate notice from the Immigration Judge (IJ) that she must “comply”

with the biometrics requirements and “obtain” biometrics confirmation by the

November 5, 2018 deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(c), (d). The BIA therefore did

not abuse its discretion in affirming the IJ’s pretermission of Santiago-Dorrantes’s

application. See Gonzalez-Veliz v. Garland, 996 F.3d 942, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2021)

(holding that IJ did not abuse its discretion by pretermitting application when

applicant failed to complete biometrics obligations after receiving adequate notice).

Santiago-Dorrantes’s remaining arguments concerning her procedural due

process rights and Notice to Appear (NTA) are unexhausted, because they were

neither presented to nor passed upon by the BIA. See Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1134,

1136 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Because the IJ or BIA could have addressed [petitioner’s

procedural due process claim] if she had raised it, her claim does not fall within the

exception to the exhaustion requirement.”); Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th

544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that BIA had “no reason to consider” petitioner’s

new arguments raised in his petition concerning “NTA’s defects”).

2 21-1361 PETITION DENIED.

3 21-1361