Santander Holdings USA, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States

977 F. Supp. 2d 46, 2013 WL 5651414, 112 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6530, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149441
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedOctober 17, 2013
DocketCivil Action No. 09-11043-GAO
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 977 F. Supp. 2d 46 (Santander Holdings USA, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Santander Holdings USA, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 977 F. Supp. 2d 46, 2013 WL 5651414, 112 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6530, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149441 (D. Mass. 2013).

Opinion

OPINION

O’TOOLE, District Judge.

Santander Holdings USA, Inc., formerly known as Sovereign Bancorp, Inc., and referred to in this opinion as “Sovereign,” has sued to recover approximately $234 million in federal income taxes, penalties, and interest that it claims were improperly assessed and collected by the Internal Revenue Service for tax years 2003, 2004, and 2005 as a consequence of the IRS’s disallowance of foreign tax credits claimed by Sovereign for those years. The United States defends the disallowance on the ground that the transaction in which Sovereign incurred and paid the foreign taxes against which the credit was taken was a “sham” conducted not for its real economic value but rather as a contrived means of generating the tax benefit provided by the foreign tax credit.

Sovereign recently moved for partial summary judgment on a linchpin issue: whether a payment Sovereign received in the transaction from its counterparty, Bar-clays Bank PLC (“Barclays”), should be accounted for as revenue to Sovereign in assessing whether Sovereign had a reasonable prospect of profit in the transaction. It is the government’s position that the [48]*48payment should be excluded from a calculation of Sovereign’s pre-tax profit as a “tax effect” because the payment is an “effective rebate” of U.K. taxes paid by Sovereign. If the payment is excluded, as the government contends it should be, then the transaction at issue does not show a reasonable prospect of profit, but if it is included, as Sovereign contends, it shows a substantial profit to Sovereign from the transaction. This basic binary fact is not genuinely disputed. The existence or not of a reasonable prospect of profit is critical in determining whether the transaction had objective economic substance for purposes of assessing whether it was a “sham” or not. If the payment is counted as pretax revenue, it is objectively clear that the transaction has economic substance for Sovereign.

The parties submitted voluminous briefing on the matter and were heard in extended oral argument. At a pretrial conference on September 25, 2013, I announced from the bench that Sovereign’s motion for partial summary was being granted. I gave a brief oral statement of my reasoning, promising a more detailed written opinion to come. This is that opinion, and it supersedes the brief oral statement of reasons.

I. The STARS Transaction

Barclays is chartered by the United Kingdom. Together with its adviser, KPMG, Barclays developed and proposed to several U.S. banks, including Sovereign, a “Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities” (“STARS”) transaction. Viewed from 30,000 feet, the STARS transaction was designed to give Barclays substantial benefits under U.K. tax laws, in light of which Barclays could and would offer to lend funds to U.S. banks at a lower cost than otherwise might be available to them. The banks could relend the money in their normal banking operations, using the lower cost either to obtain a competitive advantage or to increase their marginal return on lending or both. Up close, however, the transaction was surpassingly complex and unintuitive; the sort of thing that would have emerged if Rube Goldberg had been a tax accountant. The government might be forgiven for suspecting that the designers of anything this complex must be up to no good, but that understandable instinctive reaction is not a substitute for careful analysis, and on careful analysis, the government’s position does not hold up.

A very brief overview of the transaction is sufficient for present purposes. Sovereign created a trust to which it contributed $6.7 billion of income generating assets. The trustee of the trust was purposely made a U.K. resident, causing the trust’s income to be subject to U.K. income taxation at a rate of 22 percent. The trust income was also subject to U.S. income taxation and was attributed to Sovereign, but with a credit available for the amount paid in U.K. income taxes under section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”). 26 U.S.C. § 901. Sovereign paid U.K. taxes and then claimed credits for the amounts paid in calculating its U.S. income tax liability for the tax years in question.

The transaction included a number of contrived structures and steps that, each viewed in isolation, would make little or no sense. For example, Barclays had an ownership interest in the trust and as a result received monthly distributions from the trust, which, under the terms of the transaction, it was required immediately to re-contribute to the trust. Standing in isolation, this circular movement of distributions would make no sense. In the context of the entire transaction, however, it was crucial to Barclays’ obtaining favorable tax treatment under U.K. law, which [49]*49gave it the ability to lower its effective lending rate to a U.S. bank. The result of the STARS transaction for Barclays was a net tax gain, which it was able to use to reduce other U.K. tax liabilities that it owed.1

The loan aspect of the transaction was also highly structured in an idiosyncratic way, although it was consistently treated by Sovereign for accounting and regulatory purposes as a secured loan, acceptably to regulating agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office of Thrift Supervision. One feature of the loan arrangements was what was denominated the “bx payment,” or the “Barclays payment.”2 It was calculated as approximately one-half of the amount Sovereign paid in taxes to the U.K. on the income earned by the trust. While in the intricacies of the transaction it was actually a monthly credit to Sovereign figured into its interest costs, the government refers to it as an affirmative payment in support of its “effective rebate” argument, and Sovereign accepts that characterization for purposes of this motion.3

II. Discussion

There is no dispute that for the years in question Sovereign incurred and paid U.K. taxes on the trust income, also reported the income on its U.S. tax returns, but claimed a foreign tax credit for the amount it paid to the U.K. There is no claim by the government that the foreign tax credit was improperly calculated or that Sovereign failed to comply with any applicable provision of statute or regulation relative to it. Rather, the government’s position is that Sovereign did not in substance pay the U.K. taxes claimed because the Barclays payment was an “effective rebate” of one-half of Sovereign’s U.K. taxes. In other words, the Barclays payment effectively relieved Sovereign of half the burden of its U.K. taxes.

In order to challenge what would otherwise be a valid claim of a foreign tax credit, the government reaches for its trump card — the “economic substance” doctrine. Cf In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir.2002) (referring to the economic substance doctrine as the government’s “trump card”). Literal compliance with the letter of the Code and regulations may be disregarded if it appears that the transaction in question had no economic substance but was simply a tax-avoiding contrivance. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470, 55 S.Ct. 266, 79 L.Ed. 596 (1935). The same principle has been articulated variantly as the “substance over form” doctrine, see Frank Lyon Co. v.

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977 F. Supp. 2d 46, 2013 WL 5651414, 112 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6530, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/santander-holdings-usa-inc-subsidiaries-v-united-states-mad-2013.