Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Drive.Car LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Alaska
DecidedAugust 20, 2024
Docket3:23-cv-00288
StatusUnknown

This text of Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Drive.Car LLC (Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Drive.Car LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Alaska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Drive.Car LLC, (D. Alaska 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.,

Plaintiff, v.

DRIVE.CAR LLC and CARRIGAN Case No. 3:23-cv-00288-SLG GRISBY,

Defendants.

ORDER RE MOTION TO STRIKE OR FOR ALTERNATIVE RELIEF Before the Court at Docket 25 is Plaintiff Santander Consumer USA’s (“Santander”) Motion to Stike Defendants’ Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, For Leave to File a Sur-Reply and Request For Judicial Notice. Defendants Drive.Car LLC and Carrigan Grisby did not respond. Oral argument was not requested on this motion and was not necessary to the Court’s decision. This is a suit under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement and related Alaska state law claims.1 At Docket 12, Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim. In their Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants contend for the first time that Plaintiffs failed to show ownership of the disputed mark, “a first and necessary element of a

1 Docket 1. trademark infringement suit.”2 Santander asks for this ownership argument to be stricken because it was first raised in Defendants’ Reply.3 Alternatively, it asks for leave to file a sur-reply

to address it and/or for the Court to take judicial notice of lodged records.4 The Court declines to strike the additional argument regarding ownership of the disputed mark. Rather, the Court grants Plaintiff’s alternative request for leave to file the sur-reply at Docket 25-1, which will be treated as having been duly filed.

The Court further grants the request for judicial notice at Docket 25-2. A court “may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”5 The “[r]ecords and reports of administrative bodies,” including U.S. Patent and Trademark Office records, are proper subjects for

judicial notice.6 Accordingly, the Court will take judicial notice of the two U.S.

2 Docket 23 at 3–5. 3 Docket 25 at 2–4. 4 Docket 25 at 2–5. 5 Fed. R. Evid. 201 6 Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Dahon N. Am., Inc. v. Hon, Case No. 2:11-CV-05835-ODW, 2012 WL 1413681, at *8 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2012) (taking judicial notice of the trademarks assignment website because it is an “official record memorializing ownership of the [mark], and is published by a government organization—the USPTO”); Autodesk, Inc. v. Dassault Sys. SolidWorks Corp., Case No. 08-04397, 2008 WL 6742224, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2008) (taking judicial notice of trademark registrations and applications publicly available on USPTO website). Patent and Trademark Office database records.7

DATED this 20th day of August, 2024, at Anchorage, Alaska. /s/ Sharon L. Gleason UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7 Docket 25-2 at 4–13.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Drive.Car LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/santander-consumer-usa-inc-v-drivecar-llc-akd-2024.