Santa Elena Minerals IV, LP v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedSeptember 2, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00845
StatusUnknown

This text of Santa Elena Minerals IV, LP v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Santa Elena Minerals IV, LP v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santa Elena Minerals IV, LP v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., (D.N.M. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

SANTA ELENA MINERALS IV, L.P., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case 2:25-cv-845-JHR-KRS ) CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., ) ) Defendant. ) JURISDICTIONAL SHOW CAUSE ORDER THIS MATTER is before the Court sua sponte upon its review of the Notice of Removal filed by Defendant Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (“Chevron”). (Doc. 1). On September 9, 2024, Plaintiff Santa Elena Minerals IV, L.P. (“Santa Elena”) filed the “Original Complaint To Quiet Title, For Breach of Contract And For Violations of the Oil and as Payment Act” against Chevron in the Fifth Judicial District, Lea County, New Mexico. (Doc. 1-2). Chevron was served on October 1, 2024 (Doc. 1 ¶ 2), and removed the state court complaint to this Court almost eleven months later, on August 28, 2025. Chevron asserts in the Notice of Removal (“NOR”) that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the state court complaint based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Having considered the jurisdictional allegations in the NOR, the applicable law, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that the NOR fails to allege sufficient facts for the Court to plausibly infer that it has diversity jurisdiction over the matter. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014) (the allegations supporting federal jurisdiction in a defendant’s notice of removal must satisfy the plausibility standard of pleading). Accordingly, Chevron must show cause why the undersigned should not recommend that the case be remanded to state court. Chevron may do so by filing an amended NOR that adequately alleges diversity jurisdiction. See Hendrix v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 390 F.2d 299, 300-02 (10th Cir. 1968) (holding that a notice of removal that fails to specify the necessary facts to establish diversity jurisdiction is defective, but permitting amendment of notice of removal to cure technical defects in the jurisdictional allegations); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (“Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate

courts.”). Legal Standard “Federal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party,’ and thus a court may sua sponte raise the question of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction ‘at any stage in the litigation.’” Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)). As the party asserting federal jurisdiction, Chevron bears the burden of pleading and proving subject matter jurisdiction. Anderson v. XTO Energy, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1275 (D.N.M. 2018). Typically, the required showing to invoke diversity jurisdiction is satisfied by the removing defendant filing “a notice of

removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.’” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, 574 U.S. at 87 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)). “At the point of the filing of the notice of removal, … the defendant need only state the facts upon which jurisdiction is based.” McEntire v. Kmart Corp., No. CIV 09-0567 JB/LAM, 2010 WL 553443, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 9, 2010). But the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction must be established on the face of the petition or notice of removal through allegations of non-conclusory facts. See, e.g., Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Both the requisite amount in controversy and the existence of diversity must be affirmatively established on the face of either the petition or the removal notice.”); Penteco Corp. Ltd. P’ship--1985A v. Union Gas Sys., Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991) (“To determine whether a party has adequately presented facts sufficient to establish federal diversity jurisdiction, … courts must look to the face of the [notice of removal], ignoring mere conclusory allegations of jurisdiction.”). To invoke diversity jurisdiction, “a party must show that complete diversity of citizenship

exists between the adverse parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2013). Complete diversity means that no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any defendant. Id. “[F]or purposes of determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of the parties is to be determined with reference to the facts as they existed at the time of filing.” Grynberg v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 805 F.3d 901, 905 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Corporations are considered citizens of both the state where they are incorporated and the state where their principal place of business is located. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). But in Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185 (1990), the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument for extending the citizenship rule for corporations to other types of business entities. Id. at 189 (“While the rule

regarding the treatment of corporations as ‘citizens’ [of the state of incorporation and state where the company maintains its principal place of business] has become firmly established, we have (with one [very limited exception inapplicable in most cases]) just as firmly resisted extending that treatment to other entities.”). Under long established precedent, diversity jurisdiction in a suit by or against an association or entity other than a corporation depends on the citizenship of all the members of the entity. Thus, “[l]imited partnerships … are citizens of each and every state in which any partner is a citizen.” Suttman-Villars v. Argon Med. Devices, Inc., Civ. No. 20-0778 KG/JFR, 2021 WL 4086126, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 8, 2021), including both the general and limited partners, Carden, 494 U.S. 192 (“We have never held that an artificial entity, suing or being sued in its own name, can invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts based on the citizenship of some but not all of its members.”). Analysis The NOR adequately alleges that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. It

does not, however, allege facts sufficient for the Court to infer that there is diversity of citizenship. Chevron adequately alleges facts showing that it is a citizen of both Pennsylvania and California. (Doc. 1 ¶ 8). It goes on to allege complete diversity with the allegation that Santa Elena is a citizen of Texas. (Doc. ¶ 7). But the NOR fails to allege facts sufficient to support the conclusory allegation that Santa Elena is a citizen of Texas.

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Santa Elena Minerals IV, LP v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/santa-elena-minerals-iv-lp-v-chevron-usa-inc-nmd-2025.