Sanjuana Renteria v. Children’s Community Health Plan, Inc. and Molina Healthcare of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sam’s Real Estate Business Trust and Sam’s East, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedDecember 23, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00374
StatusUnknown

This text of Sanjuana Renteria v. Children’s Community Health Plan, Inc. and Molina Healthcare of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sam’s Real Estate Business Trust and Sam’s East, Inc. (Sanjuana Renteria v. Children’s Community Health Plan, Inc. and Molina Healthcare of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sam’s Real Estate Business Trust and Sam’s East, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sanjuana Renteria v. Children’s Community Health Plan, Inc. and Molina Healthcare of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sam’s Real Estate Business Trust and Sam’s East, Inc., (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

SANJUANA RENTERIA,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-cv-374-pp v.

CHILDREN’S COMMUNITY HEALTH PLAN, INC. and MOLINA HEALTHCARE OF WISCONSIN, INC.,

Involuntary Plaintiffs,

v.

SAM’S REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST and SAM’S EAST, INC.,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S RULE 7(H) EXPEDITED NON- DISPOSITIVE MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (DKT. NO. 32) AND ORDERING DEFENDANTS TO PAY REASONABLE EXPERT FEES

This negligence case arises out of an April 2, 2021 incident where the plaintiff allegedly was struck by a falling rug while shopping at a Sam’s Club store in Waukesha, Wisconsin. Dkt. No. 15. On October 28, 2025, the plaintiff filed an expedited, non-dispositive motion under Civil Local Rule 7(h) seeking a protective order and an order to compel the defendants to pay an expert witness’s deposition fees. Dkt. No. 32. The defendants oppose the motion. Dkt. No. 34. I. Background The amended complaint alleges that on April 2, 2021, the plaintiff was shopping at the defendants’ store near a display of rolled-up rugs. Dkt. No. 15 at ¶¶7–8. She alleges that an employee was working on the rug display, and after the plaintiff turned her back to the employee, she was “struck in the head with a rug.” Id. at ¶¶9–11. The plaintiff alleges that she suffered an injury due to the accident. Id. at ¶12. The amended complaint raises claims of negligence and a violation of Wisconsin’s Safe Place statute. Id. at ¶¶13–24. On August 8, 2025, the court stayed all case deadlines pending the outcome of a mediation scheduled for October 29, 2025. Dkt. No. 31. The day before the mediation, the plaintiff filed the instant motion for protective order and asking the court to compel the defendants to pay the deposition fees for the plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr. Lawrence Maciolek. Dkt. No. 32. The plaintiff states that she retained her treating physician, Dr. Maciolek, as an expert. Dkt. No. 32 at 1. When the defendants reached out to schedule Maciolek’s deposition, Maciolek’s office responded with his fee schedule, which sets a deposition fee of $3,000 per hour. Id.; Dkt. No. 34 at 1– 2. Maciolek asked that the defendants pay in advance the $12,000 fee for the four-hour deposition. Dkt. No. 34 at 2. On October 9, 2025, after several discussions about the fee, the defendants stated that they would pay Maciolek only $475 per hour for the deposition and that they would not prepay the fee. Dkt. No. 35-4 at 5–6. The defendants state that on October 16, 2025, defense counsel and a court reporter appeared at Maciolek’s office for the scheduled deposition but were informed that the deposition had been canceled. Dkt. No. 35-4 at 25. Plaintiff’s counsel denied canceling the deposition, stating that the deposition could not go forward due to the lack of prepayment. Id. at 26–27. The plaintiff asserts that the defendants “unilaterally” issued a subpoena rescheduling the deposition for October 30, 2025. Dkt. No. 32-3 at ¶5. The plaintiff states that at a meet-and-confer on October 27, 2025, the parties agreed to limit the deposition to two hours but could not agree on an hourly fee. Id. at ¶8. The plaintiff also asserts that the defendants refused to reschedule the deposition despite plaintiff’s counsel’s unavailability on October 30, 2025. Id. The plaintiff filed the instant motion the day after the meet-and- confer. Dkt. No. 32. II. Motion for Protective Order A. Parties’ Arguments The plaintiff argues that the defendants must pay Dr. Maciolek’s hourly fee of $3,000. Dkt. No. 32 at 2. She contends that the party seeking discovery must pay “a reasonable fee” to the expert witness for the time he spent responding to discovery. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i)). The plaintiff states that Maciolek is a Harvard-trained, board-certified orthopedic surgeon who specializes in complex spinal surgery and that his deposition rate is consistent with the prevailing market rate in Milwaukee for similar expert witnesses. Id. According to the plaintiff, courts have approved inflation- adjusted deposition fees of over $2,000 an hour for general orthopedic surgeons; she argues that spinal surgeons earn higher salaries than general orthopedic surgeons, so a higher hourly rate is reasonable for a witness with such specialized experience. Id. at 3. The plaintiff asserts that Maciolek regularly charges $3,000 an hour for deposition testimony and $2,000 an hour for reviewing documents or consulting on cases. Id. She maintains that it is reasonable for an expert to charge a higher fee for a deposition taken by adverse counsel than for work performed for the retaining party. Id. (quoting Jones v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., Case No. 15-CV-02726, 2022 WL 834315, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2022)). The plaintiff argues that the defendants’ proposed rate of $475 an hour is unreasonable because it is derived from the average fees charged by all expert witnesses and does not consider Maciolek’s specialized training and experience. Id. at 3–4. The defendants respond that Rule 26 does not require the party seeking discovery to compensate a witness in advance of a deposition. Dkt. No. 34 at 2. They contend that although Maciolek has specialized training and experience, his requested hourly rate still is unreasonable. Id. at 3. They assert that the average prevailing hourly rate for seven comparable experts is $1,218. Id. They argue that because Maciolek is the plaintiff’s treating physician, the deposition will not be complex, and that he is not entitled to the same rates as an expert witness who is not a treating physician. Id. (citing Demar v. United States, 199 F.R.D. 617, 619 (N.D. Ill. 2001)). The defendants assert that although it may be reasonable for an expert witness to charge a “modestly higher fee” for a deposition taken by an adverse party, Maciolek’s requested rate far exceeds the amount he charges for a medical consultation. Id. at 3–4. The defendants assert that Maciolek charges only $478 for an office visit, so charging more than seven times over that amount for a deposition is unreasonable. Id. at 4. B. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E) states that “[u]nless manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery.” To determine whether an expert’s fee is reasonable, courts have considered the following factors: “(1) the expert’s area of expertise; (2) the education and training required to provide the expert insight that is sought; (3) the prevailing rates of other comparably respected available experts; (4) the nature, quality, and complexity of the discovery responses provided; (5) the fee actually being charged to the party that retained the expert; (6) fees traditionally charged by the expert on related matters; and (7) any other factor likely to be of assistance to the court in balancing the interests implicated by Rule 26.” Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Vanguard Prods. Grp., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 2d 939, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Malachinski, Case No. 96 C 6135, 2001 WL 290308, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2001)). The party seeking reimbursement carries the burden to show that the expert’s rate is reasonable; if the parties fail to provide sufficient evidence to support their proposed rates, “the court may use its discretion in setting the reasonable rate.” Royal Maccabees, 2001 WL 290308, at *16. C. Analysis The court first must determine whether Dr. Maciolek’s requested $3,000 hourly fee is reasonable.

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Related

Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Vanguard Products Group, Inc.
873 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Illinois, 2012)
Demar v. United States
199 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Illinois, 2001)
Harris v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
226 F.R.D. 675 (S.D. California, 2005)

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Bluebook (online)
Sanjuana Renteria v. Children’s Community Health Plan, Inc. and Molina Healthcare of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sam’s Real Estate Business Trust and Sam’s East, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanjuana-renteria-v-childrens-community-health-plan-inc-and-molina-wied-2025.