FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON MAY 22, 2025
IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON SARAH R. PENDLETON MAY 22, 2025 SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
RAJIV SANGHA, ) ) No. 103332-0 Respondent, ) ) v. ) En Banc ) JEREMY KEEN, RACHEAL LOMAS, and ) Filed : May 22, 2025 ALL OTHER OCCUPANT(S), ) ) Appellants. ) )
MADSEN, J.—At issue in this case is whether RCW 59.18.365 permits a default
judgment against a tenant who appears but does not answer an unlawful detainer action.
Subsection (3) of the statute informs tenants that they may respond to a summons with a
notice of appearance. The trial court below entered a default judgment and writ of
restitution against Jeremy Keen and Racheal Lomas (collectively tenant) despite their
written notice of appearance. The tenant argues this was error pursuant to RCW
59.18.365(3). We agree and reverse the trial court.
BACKGROUND
In 2021, the tenant began renting a house from Rajiv Sangha (landlord). In
November 2023, the tenant stopped paying rent. Six months later, in April 2024, the Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
landlord served a 14-day notice to pay rent or vacate on the tenant. The tenant took no
action on the notice. In early May, the landlord commenced an unlawful detainer action
by serving the tenant with a summons and complaint pursuant to RCW 59.18.365(3).
Among other things, the summons required the tenant to submit a “written response” by
5:00 p.m. on May 22, 2024, or lose the right to defend against the action or be
represented by a lawyer. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 11 (boldface omitted). The summons
also stated that the tenant “may respond with a ‘notice of appearance’” and alerted the
tenant that the case had not yet been filed with the court. CP at 12. The tenant timely
faxed a written pro se notice of appearance to the landlord, stating they intended to be “at
any court case or appearance.” CP at 14-16, 18.
The summons, complaint, and tenant’s notice of appearance were filed with the
King County Superior Court. In early June, the landlord moved for an order of default
and judgment based on the tenant’s failure to file an answer by the date listed in the
summons. The tenant received the motion for default and notice of hearing. The tenant
then called the King County Superior Court Clerk’s Office and alleges they were told
they did not need to attend this “closed door hearing.” CP at 47.
In July, the trial court found the tenant in default for lack of answer and issued the
default judgment and writ of restitution. The writ of restitution was posted at the
property about a week later. The tenant retained counsel and moved to vacate the default
judgment and quash the writ. The tenant’s attorney argued primarily that default for an
appearing tenant violated the statutory right to counsel and contradicts the statutory
2 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
summons language that requires a show cause hearing. RCW 59.18.640; SPR 98.24W;
RCW 59.18.365. The landlord responded that the Civil Rules require a defendant to
serve an answer within the prescribed period and the failure to serve an answer entitles
the landlord to a default judgment. See CR 55. The landlord further argued that a motion
to show cause is not required under the procedures set forth in chapter 59.18 RCW, and
the right to counsel for indigent tenants applies only to unlawful detainer proceedings
rather than general proceedings under the Civil Rules. The landlord argued that the
tenant here was notified of the motion for default, and the summons informed the tenant
of their right to counsel, if indigent; thus no statute or court rule was violated.
The trial court agreed with the landlord, finding that the landlord has a right to
proceed by motion for default under the Civil Rules despite a tenant’s notice of
appearance as long as the notice is not also an answer. The court also found that a show
cause hearing is not mandatory, and that the “landlord here complied with the obligation
to notify the tenant of the right to counsel and . . . the statutory notice required to explain
how to file an appearance.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (July 30, 2024) at 20. The judge was
troubled by the statutory language in the summons form that stated tenants may file an
appearance, which constitutes compliance, but did not clarify that a subsequent motion
for default could occur if no show cause was set. The judge also found the notice and
opportunity to be heard were sufficient because the tenant was notified of the default
proceeding. Finally, the court found no violation of the right to counsel: information was
provided at the start of the case to the tenant about the right and the court followed the
3 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
procedures set out in the statutory right to counsel by issuing a stay of the writ. RCW
59.18.640. Accordingly, the judge rescinded the stay and denied the motion to vacate
default judgment.
The tenant was evicted. They sought direct review of the denial of the motion to
vacate judgment and moved to accelerate review. The landlord opposed both. We
retained the case and granted the motion for accelerated review.
We received amicus curiae briefs in support of the tenant from the Office of Civil
Legal Aid (OCLA), Tenant Law Center, and Northwest Justice Center.
ANALYSIS
A superior court’s interpretation of a statute and court rule involves a question of
law, which we review de novo. Faciszewski v. Brown, 187 Wn.2d 308, 313-14, 386 P.3d
711 (2016) (citing King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 142
Wn.2d 543, 555, 14 P.3d 133 (2000)); Seto v. Am. Elevator, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 767, 772,
154 P.3d 189 (2007). When determining the meaning of a court rule, we apply the same
principles we use to determine the meaning of a statute. Gourley v. Gourley, 158 Wn.2d
460, 466, 145 P.3d 1185 (2006) (plurality opinion). “Our fundamental purpose in
construing statutes is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature.” In re
Marriage of Schneider, 173 Wn.2d 353, 363, 268 P.3d 215 (2011). We determine
legislative intent primarily from the statutory language. Id. When the meaning of a
statute or rule is plain on its face, we must give effect to that meaning. Dep’t of Ecology
v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Plain meaning is derived
4 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
from “all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose
legislative intent about the provision in question.” Id. at 11.
Because this case concerns residential evictions, the right to counsel for indigent
tenants, and the court rule implementing that right, it is useful to first review the statutory
eviction process.
Unlawful Detainer
Unlawful detainer actions are governed by chapters 59.12 and 59.18 RCW.
Procedures set out in the generalized unlawful detainer statutes, chapter 59.12 RCW,
apply to the extent they are not supplanted by those in the Residential Landlord-Tenant
Act of 1973 (RLTA), chapter 59.18 RCW. Hous. Auth. v. Pleasant, 126 Wn. App. 382,
390, 109 P.3d 422 (2005). Both chapters are in derogation of the common law and are
strictly construed in the tenant’s favor. Hous. Auth. v. Terry, 114 Wn.2d 558, 563, 789
P.2d 745 (1990).
To evict a holdover tenant, a landlord must serve an eviction notice. If the tenant
has not complied with the notice, the landlord may commence an unlawful detainer
action by serving to the tenant the statutory summons and complaint. Christensen v.
Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 371, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). The summons must contain
certain information set out in RCW 59.18.365.
The tenant’s answer or notice of appearance must be in writing by the return date
listed in the summons. RCW 59.18.365. “An appearance is a party’s formal entry into a
lawsuit. . . . By appearing, a defendant becomes entitled to notice of all subsequent
5 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
proceedings.” 14 DOUGLAS J. ENDE, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9:1,
at 314 (3d ed. 2018). A defendant may appear simply by serving a written notice of
appearance, without immediately serving an answer. Id. § 9:2, at 315; see RCW
4.28.210. To evict the tenant, a landlord may apply for a writ of restitution at the same
time as commencing the action or at any time thereafter. RCW 59.18.370.
To obtain a writ of restitution, the “landlord must apply for an order for a show
cause hearing.” Randy Reynolds & Assocs., Inc. v. Harmon, 193 Wn.2d 143, 157, 437
P.3d 677 (2019); RCW 59.18.380. A show cause hearing is a “‘summary proceeding[] to
determine the issue of possession pending a lawsuit,’ and is not the final determination of
rights in an unlawful detainer action.” Reynolds, 193 Wn.2d at 157 (alteration in
original) (quoting Carlstrom v. Hanline, 98 Wn. App. 780, 788, 990 P.2d 986 (2000)).
At a show cause, the court will determine if the landlord is entitled to a writ of restitution
before trial on the complaint and answer. RCW 59.18.380. If, at the hearing on the
motion for a writ “it shall appear to the court that there is no substantial issue of material
fact of the right of the plaintiff to be granted other relief as prayed for in the complaint . .
. , the court may enter an order and judgment.” Id. As a practical matter, if the issue is
payment of rent only, as here, and the tenant fails to show cause why the landlord is not
entitled to the writ, the court may issue the writ and enter judgment for the unpaid rent.
Indigent Tenant Right to Counsel
In 2021, the legislature enacted the indigent tenant right to counsel statute. LAWS
OF 2021, ch. 115, § 8 (codified in RCW 59.18.640). The right to counsel provision was
6 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
passed, among other changes, to the RLTA in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See
id. § 1. The legislature found that the pandemic caused “unprecedented” layoffs and
economic hardship to Washingtonians, resulting in lost wages and the inability to pay for
basic expenses, such as rent. Id. Lawmakers recognized the continued financial
precariousness of many renters in Washington and the increased likelihood of evictions
that jeopardize renters’ health and safety. Id. Thus, lawmakers intended the 2021
amendments to increase tenant protections and provide legal representation for qualifying
tenants during evictions, among other things. Id.
The right to counsel provision states that subject to the available appropriated
amounts, “the court must appoint an attorney for an indigent tenant in an unlawful
detainer proceeding under this chapter and chapters 59.12 and 59.20 RCW.” RCW
59.18.640(1). OCLA is responsible for implementing the law. Id. The statute defines
“indigent” as any person who, at any stage of a court proceeding, is receiving certain
types of public assistance or receiving an annual income after tax of 200 percent or less
the current federal poverty level. RCW 59.18.640(2). The statute took effect in the
spring of 2021. LAWS OF 2021, ch. 115, § 8.
To implement RCW 59.18.640, this court adopted SPR 98.24W, effective October
31, 2023. SPR 98.24W applies to individuals qualifying for an attorney at public expense
under .640. The rule contains two subsections: (1) if a tenant appears in court without an
attorney, the court shall inform the tenant that if they are indigent, they have a right to
counsel, and the court shall continue the hearing so that counsel may be obtained, and (2)
7 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
if a tenant is unrepresented and a judgment was entered (such as default), the tenant may
file a motion requesting appointment of attorney prior to execution of the writ. SPR
98.24W. 1
1. RCW 59.18.365 precludes a default judgment against a tenant who appears but does not submit a written answer in an unlawful detainer action The tenant contends that the trial court erred when it entered a default judgment
for failure to answer the complaint. Specifically, the tenant reasons that RCW
59.18.365’s summons form directs defendants to respond with a notice of appearance
and, by responding, the tenant will receive a show cause hearing. The landlord disagrees,
relying primarily on the Civil Rules, which require an answer and allow a default
judgment regardless of a party’s notice of appearance.
RCW 59.18.365 governs the procedure for an unlawful detainer summons and
contains three subsections. Subsection (1) requires that a summons contain information
about the parties, nature of the action, relief sought, and return date. Subsection (2)
instructs the defendant how to serve a response to the summons. “A defendant may serve
1 King County Superior Court adopted a standing order on the indigent tenant right to counsel. The order states that once OCLA’s right to counsel plan has been implemented, “[a]t the first hearing, the court will advise the tenant of their right to appointed counsel if indigent and inquire whether they wish to assert that right.” Ct.’s Standing Ord. for Eviction Resol. Pilot Program (ERPP), In re Resp. by King County Super. Ct. to Pub. Health Emergency in Wash. State, No. 21-0-12050-3, at 4 (King County Super. Ct. July 16, 2021), https://courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/COVID19_King/King%20County%20Superior%20 Court%20FILED- Court’s%20Standing%20Order%20for%20Eviction%20Resolution%20Pilot%20Program%20(E RPP).pdf. “If so, the court shall refer the tenant to the county-specific entity designated by [OCLA] for eligibility screening and/or appointment of counsel.” Id. If the tenant is referred, the court may continue the hearing or grant other appropriate relief to allow the litigant to receive assistance from counsel. Id. at 5. 8 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
a copy of an answer or notice of appearance” to the person who signed the summons at
the street address listed on the summons by delivery, mail, or fax. RCW 59.18.365(2)(a)-
(c).
Subsection (3) outlines the summons form to be used in unlawful detainer actions.
The summons form “shall be substantially in the [statutory] form.” RCW 59.18.365. In
addition to a caption for the action, the form states that “THIS IS AN IMPORTANT
LEGAL DOCUMENT TO EVICT YOU. YOUR WRITTEN RESPONSE MUST BE
RECEIVED BY 5:00 p.m., on . . . .” Id.
The statute goes on to direct tenants to GET HELP: If you do not respond by the deadline above, you will lose your right to defend yourself or be represented by a lawyer if you cannot afford one in court and could be evicted. Id. Next, the statutory form explains how to respond to the summons, HOW TO RESPOND: Phone calls to your Landlord or your Landlord’s lawyer are not a response. You may respond with a “notice of appearance.” This is a letter that includes the following: (1) A statement that you are appearing in the court case (2) Names of the landlord(s) and the tenant(s) (as listed above) (3) Your name, your address where the legal documents may be sent, your signature, phone number (if any), and case number (if the case is filed). Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiffs are directed to mail, fax, or hand deliver the “response
letter to your Landlord’s lawyer.” Id.
Finally, the form ends with a section regarding a court date. “COURT DATE: If
you respond to this Summons, you will be notified of your hearing date in a document
9 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
called an ‘Order to Show Cause.’” Id. (emphasis added). It warns the tenant, “If you get
notice of a hearing, you must go to the hearing. If you do not show up, your landlord
can evict you.” Id.
RCW 59.18.365(3) tells tenants how to respond to an eviction summons. The
response cannot be a phone call; it must be a written response received by a prescribed
date and time. Id. Importantly, in the section titled “HOW TO RESPOND,” a tenant
“may respond with a ‘notice of appearance.’” Id. (boldface omitted). That notice is a
letter that may be mailed, faxed, or delivered to the landlord or their attorney. Id. RCW
59.18.365(3) equates a response with a notice of appearance. Further, subsection (3)
explains that if the tenant responds, they “will be notified” of a hearing in “an ‘Order to
Show Cause.’” Id. (emphasis added).
The statutory evolution of RCW 59.18.365(3) supports the tenant’s reading of the
statute. The most significant amendment to subsection (3) occurred in 2019, when
lawmakers rewrote the summons form as part of sweeping changes to the RLTA to
address homelessness. LAWS OF 2019, ch. 356, §§ 1, 9. The 2019 amendment adding
bolded section headings provided more information on accessing free or low-cost legal
help, clarified how a tenant may respond, and modified the language on eviction court
dates. Id. The version of the statute in force, enacted in 2008, stated that a tenant could
“respond to the complaint in writing by delivering a copy of a notice of appearance or
answer.” LAWS OF 2008, ch. 75, § 1. And, the 2008 statute provided that a plaintiff “may
also be instructed in a separate order to appear for a court hearing.” Id. (emphasis
10 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
added). “If [the plaintiff] receive[d] an order to show cause [they] must personally
appear at the hearing.” Id.
Lawmakers changed this language in 2019. The 2019 amendment clarified what
constitutes a response, stating that the tenant may “respond with a ‘notice of
appearance.’” LAWS OF 2019, ch. 356, § 9. The equivocal statement that a tenant may
receive a hearing became mandatory. Provided a tenant responds to the summons, they
“will be notified” of a hearing in a show cause order. Id. 2 RCW 59.18.365, as amended
in 2019, was in force during the unlawful detainer action here.
The indigent tenant right to counsel and corresponding court rules provide further
support. RCW 59.18.640(1) requires the appointment of counsel for indigent tenants.
SPR 98.24W(1) requires appointment of counsel for a “tenant [who] appears without an
attorney.” (Emphasis added.) The rule anticipates a hearing at which the unrepresented
tenant appears in person because it requires the court to (a) advise the tenant of their right
to counsel, (b) refer the tenant for eligibility screening, and (c) continue the hearing for
appointment of counsel. SPR 98.24W(2) also provides a path to obtain counsel for
unrepresented tenants if the court issues a writ of restitution before judgment or by
default. The construction of this rule reflects RCW 59.18.365(3). Where tenants appear
in court without an attorney, the court “shall” inform the tenant of their right to counsel if
indigent. SPR 98.24W(1); RCW 59.18.365(3).
2 RCW 59.18.365(1) was also amended in 2020 to identify the Northwest Justice Project as a legal resource for low income plaintiffs. LAWS OF 2020, ch. 315, § 4. 11 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
Read together, the statutory summons provision, indigent tenant right to counsel,
and court rule explain that a response is required and a tenant may comply by submitting
a written notice of appearance. If, however, a tenant fails to respond, or fails to appear at
a show cause hearing or other unlawful detainer proceeding, and a judgment is taken
against them, such tenants may request appointment of an attorney prior to execution of
the writ. SPR 98.24W(2); RCW 59.18.365(3). This latter circumstance recognizes that
default judgments are available in unlawful detainer actions, but only if the unrepresented
tenant fails to respond by the date noted in the summons or fails to appear at a show
cause or other unlawful detainer proceeding. In other words, if a tenant timely responds
to a summons, a default order may not be entered unless the tenant fails to appear at a
subsequent hearing.
The tenant also relies on RCW 59.18.380. RCW 59.18.380 provides that at the
“hearing of plaintiff’s motion for a writ of restitution, the defendant . . . may answer,
orally or in writing.” The court must “examine the parties and witnesses orally to
ascertain the merits of the complaint and answer.” RCW 59.18.380 (emphasis added).
The tenant reasons that because .380 permits an oral or written answer at a show cause
hearing, the legislature did not intend to allow a default for failure to answer when
landlords did not seek a show cause hearing. RCW 59.18.365(3) aligns with .380. Both
provisions anticipate that a tenant who responds to a summons with a notice of
appearance will receive a show cause hearing where the tenant may then answer orally or
in writing. Also, if the tenant appears without counsel at the show cause hearing, the
12 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
court must inform a tenant (if indigent) that they have a right to counsel and refer them
for eligibility screening. RCW 59.18.640; SPR 98.24W(1).
Here, the tenant submitted a written notice of appearance by the date listed in the
summons. Pursuant to RCW 59.18.365(3), the tenant timely responded and a default
order should not have been entered. Had the tenant appeared unrepresented at a hearing
in the unlawful detainer action, the court was required to advise the tenant of their right to
counsel if indigent, refer the tenant for eligibility screening, and continue the hearing.
SPR 98.24W(1); Ct.’s Standing Ord. for Eviction Resol. Pilot Program (ERPP), In re
Resp. by King County Super. Ct. to Pub. Health Emergency in Wash. State, No. 21-0-
12050-3, at 4 (King County Super. Ct. July 16, 2021) (Ord. 21-0-12050-3),
https://courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/COVID19_King/King%20County%20Superi
or%20Court%20FILED-
Court’s%20Standing%20Order%20for%20Eviction%20Resolution%20Pilot%20Program
%20(ERPP).pdf. If the tenant did not respond to the summons or responded to the
summons but failed to appear at the hearing, the landlord could properly move for default
under CR 55. See SPR 98.24W(2).
The landlord’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
First, the landlord argues that the Civil Rules allow default judgments for failure to
answer a complaint as this court recognized in Reynolds, 193 Wn.2d at 157. The Civil
Rules govern civil proceedings except where inconsistent with statutes applicable to
special proceedings. CR 81(a). Unlawful detainer actions are “special proceedings,”
13 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
making the Civil Rules inapplicable if inconsistent with the unlawful detainer statutes.
Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 374-75. Thus, the Civil Rules apply to unlawful detainer
actions, but when they conflict with the unlawful detainer statute, the statute as a “special
proceeding” controls. Id. In this case, contrary to the landlord’s claim, CR 55 conflicts
with RCW 59.18.365(3). See Br. of Resp’t at 18 (“there is no conflict between” the court
rules and unlawful detainer statutes). Though the rule allows a motion for default based
on the failure to answer, the statute informs tenants that they must respond to a summons
and equates a response only to a notice of appearance—not an appearance and an
answer. 3
Reynolds did state that CR 55 permits default judgment for failure to answer an
eviction complaint. 193 Wn.2d at 157. Reynolds is distinguishable, however. The tenant
in that case did not appear in the unlawful detainer action. And, while Reynolds cited
RCW 59.18.365 in support of the default statement, at issue was the 2008 version of the
statute. Reynolds was decided prior to the 2019 amendments in which lawmakers
3 RCW 59.12.120 provides that “[i]f on the date appointed in the summons the defendant does not appear or answer, the court shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint.” (Emphasis added.) Neither party cites .120. Chapter 59.12 RCW governs forcible entry and forcible and unlawful detainer. Chapter 59.18 RCW governs the RLTA. Both chapters concern unlawful detainer actions but chapter 59.12 RCW is broader than chapter 59.18 RCW. For example, chapter 59.12 RCW includes unlawful detainer actions commenced as a result of a trustee’s sale and hold over tenants on agricultural land. RCW 59.12.032, .035. Chapter 59.18 RCW deals specifically with residential tenancies. Therefore, the specific statutory requirements established in chapter 59.18 RCW apply in this case. See Pleasant, 126 Wn. App. at 390. 14 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
clarified that a written notice of appearance constitutes a response to an eviction
summons. See LAWS OF 2019, ch. 356, § 9.
The landlord further contends that RCW 59.18.365(3) cannot require a show cause
hearing because such hearings are not mandatory. RCW 59.18.370 states that when an
unlawful detainer action is filed, a landlord “may apply to the superior court . . . for an
order directing the defendant to appear and show cause” why a writ of restitution should
not be issued. (Emphasis added.) The tenant explains that they are “not arguing that a
show cause hearing is mandatory in all cases and does not dispute that landlords may
obtain default judgments under CR 55 when a tenant has failed to appear.” Appellant’s
Reply Br. at 16; see SPR 98.24W(2) (indigent tenants who receive default judgments
may move for appointment of an attorney). RCW 59.18.365 contemplates .370’s
permissive structure.
Next, the landlord points out that subsection (1) of RCW 59.18.365 directs
defendants to “appear and answer” the complaint within the time designated. Subsection
(1) states that a summons must “notify the defendant to appear and answer.” But, the
tenant notes, the subsection does not “impose any specific obligation on a tenant as to
when to answer or what form an answer must take.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 14 n.2. 4
Nothing in subsection (3) alerts a defendant that they must provide notice of appearance
4 Indeed, the next sentence in RCW 59.18.365(1) states that the summons must also contain an address for service of the “notice of appearance or answer.” (Emphasis added.) Subsection (2) provides that a defendant may serve a copy of “an answer or notice of appearance.” RCW 59.18.365 (emphasis added). RCW 59.18.365(1) is not consistent with its requirements for defendants, directing them to appear and answer as well as appear or answer. 15 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
and an answer. Subsection (3) instructs the opposite. It states expressly that the
defendant “may respond with a ‘notice of appearance,’” and the rest of the subsection
concerns where to respond and the consequences of a response. The landlord here used
the statutory summons form verbatim. Compare RCW 59.18.365(3), with CP at 11-13
(summons). “‘A specific statute will supersede a general one when both apply.’”
Kustura v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 169 Wn.2d 81, 88, 233 P.3d 853 (2010) (quoting
Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc. v. Util. & Transp. Comm’n, 123 Wn.2d 621, 630, 869 P.2d
1034 (1994)). We construe unlawful detainer statutes strictly in favor of the tenant.
Terry, 114 Wn.2d at 563. Accordingly, as discussed above, we hold that the more
specific directions in subsection (3) instruct defendants only to respond by written
appearance.
The landlord also asserts that RCW 59.18.640 and SPR 98.24W do not “attach to
general civil proceedings, such as CR 55 default judgment hearings.” Br. of Resp’t at 3-
4, 46-47. In the landlord’s view, neither authority references court rules or general
proceedings, and both depend on the prerequisites of available funding and a factual basis
of indigency. Yet our court rule plainly applies to tenants facing default. SPR
98.24W(2) (“If the tenant is unrepresented and the court issues a writ of restitution before
judgment or by default. . . .” (emphasis added)). We have recognized that when the Civil
Rules conflict with unlawful detainer statutes, the statutes control as special proceedings.
Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 374. This distinction requires a conflict. Absent a conflict,
the Civil Rules are the rules of practice for unlawful detainer actions. Hall v.
16 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
Feigenbaum, 178 Wn. App. 811, 818, 319 P.3d 61 (2014) (citing RCW 59.12.180).
Thus, no reference to the rules or general proceedings is required.
More fundamentally, landlords seeking a default judgment and writ of restitution
do so in the context of an unlawful detainer action. The grounds for default stem from a
failure to respond to the eviction summons and complaint. E.g., RCW 59.18.365(3); 4A
ELIZABETH A. TURNER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES PRACTICE SPR 98.24W at 46
(8th ed. Supp. 2024) (“A tenant does not have the right to appointed counsel until a
lawsuit is formally commenced, either by service of a summons and complaint or by the
filing of the lawsuit with the court.”). The landlord asks us to carve out default judgment
motions and hearings from the unlawful detainer statutes without identifying a conflict or
any other justification. We decline to do so.
Finally, it appears indigent tenant representation was funded, staffed, and
operational during the eviction in this case. RCW 59.18.640(1) (“[s]ubject to the
availability of amounts appropriated for this specific purpose”); OFF. OF CIV. LEGAL AID,
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 3 (July 28, 2022) (reporting that by January 2022, OCLA
had attorneys “trained and available for appointment in all 37 judicial districts” in
Washington), https://www.ocla.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/OCLA-Report-to-
the-Legislature-Implementation-of-Indigent-Tenant-Right-to-Counsel-FINAL-7-28-22-
.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9G6-U8YM]. The statute, court rule, and King County’s
standing order require the court to inform an unrepresented tenant of their right to counsel
at the first unlawful detainer hearing, inquire whether they want to assert the right, and
17 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
refer the tenant for eligibility screening. No discretion is provided. The court does not
need to ascertain a factual basis for indigency; the predicate is a tenant who appears
without representation and the court’s duty to inquire whether the tenant wishes to be
screened. SPR 98.24W(1)(a); Ord. 21-0-12050-3, supra, at 4; see also MOSM, LLC v.
Deegan, 30 Wn. App. 2d 284, 291-92, 544 P.3d 591 (2024).
2. Relief
The tenant urges us to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it
declined to vacate the default judgment under CR 60(b)(1). The tenant claims irregularity
in the trial court’s procedure, justifying relief from judgment by showing the court
committed legal error when it did not appoint counsel and set a show cause hearing. But
that argument goes to the underlying judgment. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 17 (trial court’s
decision rests on “errors of law”). The tenant appealed the order denying the motion to
vacate judgment, not the judgment itself. Generally, when a judgment is not appealed
within 30 days, that appeal is precluded. Kemmer v. Keiski, 116 Wn. App. 924, 937, 68
P.3d 1138 (2003). CR 60(b) does not allow a litigant to challenge the underlying
judgment and “‘correct any errors of law into which [the court] may have fallen.’” In re
Est. of Jones, 116 Wash. 424, 428, 199 P. 734 (1921) (quoting 1 HENRY CAMPBELL
BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 329 (2d ed. 1902)). “An appeal from
denial of a CR 60(b) motion is limited to the propriety of the denial not the impropriety
of the underlying judgment.” Bjurstom v. Campbell, 27 Wn. App. 449, 450-51, 618 P.2d
533 (1980). An “unappealed final judgment cannot be restored to an appellate track by
18 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
means of moving to vacate and appealing the denial of the motion.” State v. Gaut, 111
Wn. App. 875, 881, 46 P.3d 832 (2002). “The exclusive procedure to attack an allegedly
defective judgment is by appeal from the judgment, not by appeal from a denial of a CR
60(b) motion.” Bjurstom, 27 Wn. App. at 451 (citing De Filippis v. United States, 567
F.2d 341, 342 (7th Cir. 1977), overruled in part by United States v. City of Chicago, 663
F.2d 1354 (1981)).
Generally, arguments addressing the propriety of the judgment would not be
considered because they are not appropriate for appeal. See id. In that case, and absent
another reason that the denial of a CR 60 motion was in error, an appellate court would
affirm the default judgment. See id. Exceptions to this rule exist for issues affecting
constitutional rights, a trial court’s jurisdiction, and we may exercise our discretion to
resolve any issue as justice may require. RAP 12.2 (“The appellate court may reverse,
affirm, or modify the decision being reviewed and take any other action as the merits of
the case and the interest of justice may require.”); State v. Santos, 104 Wn.2d 142, 145-
46, 702 P.2d 1179 (1985). Though the landlord did not raise this issue, we exercise our
RAP 12.2 discretion and reach the tenant’s arguments on the underlying judgment in
order to provide guidance to trial courts considering the indigent tenant’s right to counsel
and procedures implementing that right. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude
that default was improperly entered. Accordingly, the default ruling is reversed and we
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
19 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
3. The landlord is not entitled to appellate attorney fees
The landlord seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1(1), RCW
59.18.410(1), and .290(3). See Tedford v. Guy, 13 Wn. App. 2d 1, 17, 462 P.3d 869
(2020).
RAP 18.1(a) allows a party to recover reasonable attorney fees and expenses
provided the party “request[s] the fees or expenses” and “applicable law grants to a party
the right to recover.” The party must do so in a separate section of their opening brief.
RAP 18.1(b). Courts award attorney fees to the prevailing party “‘only on the basis of a
private agreement, a statute, or a recognized ground of equity.’” Tedford, 13 Wn. App.
2d at 17 (quoting Equitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Cedarbrook, Inc., 52 Wn. App. 497,
506, 761 P.2d 77 (1988)). RCW 59.18.410(1) provides for reasonable attorney fees as
provided in RCW 59.18.290(3), which states, “Where the court has entered a judgment in
favor of the landlord restoring possession of the property to the landlord, the court may
award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the landlord.”
For the reasons discussed above, the trial court erred in entering the default
judgment order. See RCW 59.18.410(1), .290(3). The landlord has not shown that
applicable law permits recovery of fees and expenses under RAP 18.1(a). Accordingly,
we deny the landlord’s request for attorney fees on appeal. 5
5 The tenant argues that regardless of the outcome on appeal, the landlord is not entitled to attorney fees because the unlawful detainer action was served by alternative service. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 21 (quoting RCW 59.18.055(2) (“‘[N]o money judgment may be entered against the tenant or tenants until such time as jurisdiction over the tenant or tenants is obtained.’”)); Negash v. Sawyer, 131 Wn. App. 822, 827, 129 P.3d 824 (2006) (holding RCW 59.18.055(2) precluded 20 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
CONCLUSION RCW 59.18.365(3) directs tenants to respond in writing to the eviction summons
with a “notice of appearance.” A tenant who responds “will be notified of [their] hearing
date in a document called an ‘Order to Show Cause.’” RCW 59.18.365(3). The tenant in
this case filed a written notice of response by the deadline listed on the summons. The
tenant complied with the eviction summons. The trial court therefore erred in entering a
default judgment based on the tenant’s failure to answer.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s entry of default and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
entering money judgment against a tenant who had not been personally served). Because we deny the landlord’s attorney fee request under RAP 18.1(a) and RCW 59.18.410(1), and we have only the tenant’s briefing on issue, we decline to address it. 21 Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
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WE CONCUR: